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Preface: Nows and Thens
in the Prior Project
Patrick Blackburn
Roskilde University, Denmark
patrick.rowan.blackburn@gmail.com
This is the second volume of a collection of papers centered on the work
of Arthur Prior. It draws on material presented at two conferences:
one held in Copenhagen from 22nd-24th November 2017, and a shorter
event held at Roskilde University on 2nd March 2018 as part of the
Annual Meeting of the Danish Philosophical Society.1
Like its predecessor, this collection is broad in sweep: it contains
papers discussing the history of Arthur Prior’s life and work, papers
on philosophical themes introduced, elaborated, or alluded to by Prior,
and papers that draw their inspiration from Arthur Prior’s rich and
varied contributions to logic. This subdivision is hardly sharp. Many
contributions — much in the spirit of Prior’s own work — move easily
between history, philosophy, and logic. Moreover, like its predecessor,
this volume concludes with a paper that views the Prior Internet Re-
sources from the perspective of the digital humanities. In short, both
volumes illustrate the breadth of the Prior Project, the topic to which
we now turn.
“Prior Project” is a usefully ambiguous term. It can be read as re-
ferring to aspects of Arthur Prior’s own lifelong intellectual project, an
1The first volume, Logic and Philosophy of Time: Themes from Prior, edited by PerHasle,
Patrick Blackburn and Peter Øhrstrøm, drew on the same November 2017 event in
Copenhagen and from a still earlier conference held in Skagen (at the northernmost
tip of Jutland) held from 30th May until 1st June 2017. The papers from the previous
volume are listed, with page references, at the end of the preface.
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exploration which wove his life and work tightly together. For exam-
ple, Prior wrestled with theological issues (such as predestination) and
these fed back into his writing (in the case of predestination, via his
work on branching time). However “Prior Project” also has a more
down-to-earth use: as shorthand for a project funded by the Danish
Council for Independent Research called The Primacy of Tense — A.N.
Prior Now and Then.
The project began in October 2016 andwill run until at least October
2019. Headed by Peter Øhrstrøm, it brings together researchers, all
actively involved with various aspects of Prior’s work, from six
Danish universities: Aalborg University, Aarhus University, Roskilde
University, the University of Copenhagen, the University of Southern
Denmark, and the Technical University of Denmark.
This prompts an obvious question: how has Denmark become a cen-
tre for research on Arthur Prior? Prior is perhaps New Zealand’s best
knownphilosophical logician,2 but he is hardly a household name. Why
the continued interest, and why so far from New Zealand?
Part of the answer lies in the richness of Prior’s work. It is alive with
ideas about what logic is, does, or might be, and how it links with phi-
losophy, science, and theology. Much of this work was overlooked, per-
haps forgotten, after Prior’s death in 1969. A classic example is hybrid
logic, which lay buried in plain sight in the pages of Past, Present and
Future and Papers on Time and Tense until its first independent reinven-
tion (nearly two decades after Prior died) by the Sofia School logicians
Solomon Passy, Tinko Tinchev, George Gargov, and Valentin Goranko;
only in the late 1980s was the link with Prior’s earlier work made.
Another part of the answer, and the link with Denmark, lies in the
efforts of Peter Øhrstrøm and Per Hasle. The publication of their joint
1995 book Temporal Logic: From Ancient Ideas to Artificial Intelligence, in
which Prior’s ideas featured prominently, helped rekindle interest in
his work. Crucially, Øhrstrøm and Hasle also contacted Prior’s widow,
Mary Prior. This led to multiple trips to Oxford (Prior’s last home),
2Richard Sylvan (né Routley) is the most obvious reason for inserting a qualifying
‘perhaps’ here. These two Kiwi logicians had much in common: both were born in the
lower North Island of New Zealand, both were charismatic teachers and mentors, both
married twice, both invigorated philosophical logic with new lines of inquiry which
continue to be explored to this day, both spent their most productive years outside
New Zealand, and both died abroad. Moreover, Sylvan’s longstanding environmental
activism curiously mirrors Prior’s lifelong wrestling match with religion.
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to years of work photographing and classifying Prior’s Nachlass mate-
rial, to an ongoing transcription effort (in which Martin Prior, Arthur
Prior’s son, continues to play an important role), to the organization of
the 2014 Prior Centenary Meeting at Balliol College, and, most recently,
to the Prior Project.
The project yokes together two strands of work: the “Now” aspect
and the “Then” aspect. The “Now” aspect treats Prior’swork as a source
of philosophical and logical inspiration, and views Prior’s life and work
as fruitful objects of study. This aspect of the Prior Project is well re-
flected in this volume and its predecessor.
The “Then” aspect, however, does not fit so neatly between the pages
of a book. Rather, the heart of the “Then” aspect is contained in 29 boxes
in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, with the remainder spread over known
and yet-to-be-discovered locations around the globe. For the “Then” as-
pect is the discovery, classification, curation, digitization, and distribu-
tion of Prior’s Nachlass: draft books and papers, his off-the-cuff notes
and textual annotations, the letters he sent and the letters he received.
The cornerstones of the “Then” aspect are the online transcribers and
the transcription workshops held periodically at Aalborg University —
these make Prior’s unpublished writings readable and available. For
more on the ongoing attempts to transformPrior’s physicalNachlass into
a virtual Nachlass, see the final paper in this volume.
Time to turn to the volume’s individual contributions. Their ordering
mirrors that of the predecessor volume: loosely speaking, it begins with
the more historically oriented papers, moves through more philosophi-
cally oriented papers to those with logical themes, and concludes with
a view from digital humanities. Here is the listing:
The Return of Medieval Logic in the Philosophy of Time
David Jakobsen
Jakobsen argues that Prior’s invention of tense logic marks a return of
medieval logic to the philosophy of time. Drawing onmaterial from the
Prior archive at the Bodleian Library in Oxford, Prior’s 1958 paper The
Syntax of TimeDistinctions is read as a solution to a problemdiscussed by
Strawson and Quine in 1953. Jakobsen argues that Prior is here “invit-
ingmetaphysics into philosophy”, thereby abandoning views that dom-
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inated analytic philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century.
The Significance of the Contributions of A.N. Prior and Jerzy Łoś in the
Early History of Temporal Logic
Peter Øhrstrøm and Per Hasle
Prior is usually regarded as the founder of modern temporal logic, but
a recent paper by Marcin Tkaczyk and Tomasz Jarmużek argues that
Jerzy Łoś deserves the title. Here Øhrstrøm and Hasle present the case
for Prior. This is a topic we are unlikely to have heard the last of.
B-theory and Time Biases
Sayid R. Bnefsi
In his well-known paper Thank Goodness That’s Over, Prior pointed out
that we care not only about what experiences we have, but also about
when we have them. But why, Prior asks, should a B-theorist care about
timing? Here Bnefsi counters this “infamous kind of argument” against
B-theory. Appealing to four-dimensionalism and an evaluative princi-
ple concerningwhose experiencesmatter, he argues that B-theorists can
justify some time-biased preferences.
Presentism and Cross-Time Relations
R. D. Ingthorsson
If only the present exists, relations with other times can’t exist either.
This “problem of cross-time relations” is a strong objection to presen-
tism, the form of A-theory that Prior favoured. Ingthorsson here offers
a robust defence of presentism. The Aristotelian view of causation and
persistence does not, he argues, invoke relations between entities that
exist at different times; indeed, it excludes the possibility of such re-
lations. Moreover, rejecting the existence of the past does not lead to
absurdity.
8
Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox and the R-theory of Time
L. Nathan Oaklander
Ingthorsson recently argued that McTaggart’s argument for the unre-
ality of time rests on the principle of temporal parity: all times exist
equally in a sense that is compatible with their being successive. Hence,
as this principle underlies B-theoretic accounts of time, McTaggart’s
argument undermines B-theory. Oaklander counters with an appeal to
Russell’s account of time, arguing that R-theory is immune to objections
based on temporal parity. He also argues that Ingthorsson’s version of
presentism is susceptible to a novel interpretation of McTaggart’s argu-
ment.
Dummett on McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time
Brian Garrett
Michael Dummett (in collaboration with E. J. Lemmon) was an early
contributor to the technical development of tense logic; Prior knew their
joint work andmade use of it in Past, Present and Future. However, Dum-
mett also proposed an ingenious analysis of McTaggart’s proof of the
unreality of time. Garrett here argues that Dummett’s analysis is best
viewed as a transformation of McTaggart’s original argument into an ar-
gument showing the falsity of the observer-independence thesis.
A Logical Framework for the Spotlight Theory of Time
Ciro De Florio, Alessandro Giordani and Aldo Frigerio
Here the starting point is Broad’s moving spotlight conception of time.
De Florio, Giordani, and Frigerio first provide a conceptual analysis,
highlighting its underlying metaphysical assumptions. They then intro-
duce a logical language containing the standard Priorean tense opera-
tors, a stronger pair of tense operators, and a “now” operator. This they
use to explore the philosophical background of Broad’s theory, and to
formalize such notions as “being a lost possibility”.
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Now There Will Be Trouble
Giuseppe Spolaore and Fabio Del Prete
Here we begin with some puzzling linguistic examples: sentences with
“now” in initial position that differ in meaning from (otherwise identi-
cal) sentences with “now” in final position. As Spolaore and Del Prete
show, these indicate an interaction between tense logic and pragmatics.
This leads them to introduce a notion of “modal forcing”, which pro-
vides a uniform account of both readings of “now”, and lets them solve
somemodal-temporal problems concerning fatalism and the possibility
of a changing past.
Actuality and Possibility in Branching Time: The Roots of Transition
Semantics
Antje Rumberg
This paper examines the foundations of branching time semantics and
addresses both technical and philosophical themes. Prior explored two
approaches to branching time, but the Peircean approach he favoured
is expressively weak, and the stronger Ockhamist approach introduces
a global dimension into an otherwise local logic. Using a series of di-
agrams, Rumberg explicates an alternative: transition semantics. Her
approach is strongly Priorean in spirit: it provides a local approach to
branching time. Furthermore, it provides a setting inwhich the Peircean
and Ockhamist options emerge as polar opposites in the spectrum of
transition possibilities.
TRL Semantics and Burgess’ Formula
Roberto Ciuni and Carlo Proietti
Like the previous one, this paper explores the foundations of branch-
ing time semantics. Under the microscope here is a variant of Prior’s
Ockhamist semantics, a Thin Red Line (TRL) semantics introduced by
Bräuner, Øhrstrøm, and Hasle. Ciuni and Proietti show that this TRL
semantics invalidates Burgess’ formula 2G(ϕ →3Fφ)→3G(φ → Fφ),
which is valid in Prior’s Ockhamist semantics. The authors argue that
this is unsatisfactory, and discuss how best to amend the proposed se-
mantics to restore the validity of Burgess’ formula (and two others).
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The Role of Time in Phronetic Activities
Anne Gerdes
Time, Gerdes argues, is fundamental to the role of judgement in phro-
netic activities: it is crucial to the exercise of judgment and the evalua-
tion of the moral worth of past actions. Furthermore, its importance is
best explicated in terms of branching time semantics. Building on this,
Gerdes suggests that an artificial ethical agent could never be strongly
phronimos, as it would lack the ability to experience (and hence learn)
from the relation between time and risk.
The Prior eAchive as Virtual Research Environment: towards
Serendipity and Explorability
Fatima Sabir and Volkmar Poul Engerer
The “Then” component of the Prior Project is the ongoing attempt to
transform Prior’s physicalNachlass into a virtualNachlass. But what has
been done so far, and what should be done? The closing paper answers
both questions. Sabir and Engerer first describe the history and current
state of the Prior Internet Resources (PIR), and then argue that the PIR
should be viewed as a Virtual Research Environment and developed in
a way that will encourage explorability and serendipitous research.
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The Return of Medieval Logic
in the Philosophy of Time
David Jakobsen
Aalborg University, Denmark
davker@hum.aau.dk
Abstract
This paper argues that A.N. Prior’s invention of tense-logic constitutes a
return of medieval logic in the philosophy of time. The argument pro-
ceeds from an analysis of W.V. Quine and P.W. Strawson’s 1953 discus-
sion about the inability of formal logic to analyse the tenses of ordinary
language. Recent discoveries in the A.N. Prior archive at the Bodleian
Library in Oxford reveal that J.J.C. Smart, in a letter to Prior, brought up
their discussion in his rejection of Prior’s invention of tense-logic. The
correspondence will be discussed in terms of the importance of Prior’s
discovery of tense-logic and the presentation of this as a solution to the
problem discussed by Strawson and Quine in The Syntax of Time Distinc-
tions (1958, [9]). Recent discoveries reveal a close connection between
this discussion and Prior’s discussion of future contingency in Diodoran
Modality (1955, [7]). These discoveries support the conclusion of this
paper, which argues that Quine’s insistence that modern logic must be
conceived as tenseless was demonstrated by Prior to be false. Further-
more, through Smart’s rejection in his correspondence with Prior, it will
be shown that Smart persistently warned Prior not to present tense-logic
at the John Locke Lectures in 1956. Apparently, Smart was convinced
that Oxford would not appreciate Prior’s logic and that Prior was wrong.
Despite Smart’s warnings, Prior’s tense-logic waswell received at Oxford.
It is here argued that, to understand the importance of A.N. Prior’s inven-
tion of tense-logic, as well as Quine’s insistence that modern logic must
be tenseless and Smart’swarning against presenting it at Oxford, wemust
appreciate it as a return of medieval logic in the philosophy of time. This
15
return presented a challenge to the views of Quine and Smart—a chal-
lenge that can only be overcome by inviting metaphysics into philosophy,
thereby abandoning the view of the analysis that dominated philosophy
in the first half of the twentieth century.
Keywords: Philosophy of time, Medieval Logic, A.N. Prior, Strawson,
Quine, Tenses, Tense-logic, Formal Logic.
1 Introduction
The advent of analytic philosophy at the end of the nineteenth and be-
ginning of the twentieth centurywas, according to Bertrand Russell, the
beginning of a “new philosophy”, with the formal analysis of language
at its centre (Russell 1959, p. 42, [16]). The formal analysis of language
means, as Russell puts it, that “all sound philosophy should begin with
an analysis of propositions’, a truth that to him was ‘too evident, per-
haps, to demand a proof” (Russell 1992, p. 8, [17]). Russell’s analysis
has a purifying form that does not try to solve a philosophical problem,
in ametaphysical sense, but rather to rid language of philosophical prob-
lems by demonstrating that they are not really problems after all:
Every philosophical problemwhen it is subjected to the nec-
essary analysis and purification, is found to be not really
philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we
are using the word, logical. (Russell 1914, p. 33, [15])
The newphilosophy, ormodern analytic philosophy, was therefore born
with very little interest in medieval logic. For Russell, “logic in the Mid-
dle Ages, and down to the present day in teaching, meant no more than
a scholastic collection of technical terms and rules of syllogistic infer-
ence. Aristotle had spoken, and it was the part of humbler men merely
to repeat the lesson after him” (Russell 1914, p. 42, [15]).
Russellwas only half right in his characterization of theway inwhich
medieval philosophers such as Ockham and Scotus read Aristotle. In-
deed, they had an immense degree of respect for The Philosopher, but
they had no problem correcting himwhere they found himwrong. The
works of medieval logicians differed from Russell’s, not merely in their
respect for Aristotle but also in the role philosophical problems played
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in the development of logic. While thework of theologians, such as Ock-
ham and Scotus played a role in setting the bounds of Orthodoxy, they
were themselves potential subjects of heresy trials for unorthodoxy. The
logical analysis of propositions was part of the larger goal of remaining
within the bounds of orthodoxy, especially with regard to the
relationship of God to time and modality (see Uckelman 2009, [21]).
Of these issues, as Øhrstrøm and Hasle point out, “the most important
question […] was the problem of the contingent future” (Øhrstrøm and
Hasle 1995, p. 87, [22]). The advances made in modal logic by the me-
dieval logicians occurred in the context of attempting to solve problems
concerning God, time and necessity (Hintikka and Spade 2017, [2]).
The basic difference between Russell and medieval logicians such as
Ockham and Scotus pertains to their view on analysis—what it is about
and what it is for. Russell, like Ockham and Scotus, ascribes a puri-
fying role to analysis, but where Ockham and Scotus aim at purifying
Aristotle to get rid of false (i.e., unorthodox) philosophy, Russell aims
at purifying language so that it does not lead to a conclusion that sci-
ence would never be able to verify. For Ockham and Scotus, logic is an
intrinsic part of true propositions, and analysis therefore aims at discov-
ering whether different statements about the future or necessity align
with Christian orthodoxy. Russell was, for this reason, perhaps wrong
in another sense in calling his philosophy “a newphilosophy”. Russell’s
view on analysis was a natural development of the methodological role
logic was assigned in modern times. Øhrstrøm and Hasle argue, with
regard to the role of time reference, that a fundamental modern shift
away frommedieval logic beganwith Francis Bacon’s emphasis on logic
as a methodology and Descartes’ view of mathematics as the model of
all science. This, they argue, “would eventually lead to the dissociation
of logic from language, that very connection which in Scholastic times
had inter alia legitimized the study of propositions with time reference”
(Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995, p. 114, [22]). Thus, at the turn of the twen-
tieth century, the scene looked bleak for medieval logic in terms of the
philosophy of time. The incredible achievements made in formal logic
seemed to be able to solve all the problems the medieval logicians strug-
gled with by dissolving them into pseudo-problems. Things turned out
differently, however. Contrary to Russell’s expectations, the project of
formalising language did not dissolve problems pertaining to the philos-
ophy of time. The story of this development begins with philosophers
17
for whom the question of the nature of time is essential for an adequate
analysis of tensed propositions. It is also a story of the return of me-
dieval logic in the philosophy of time.
2 Ordinary Language and Tensed Propositions
The first half of the twentieth century was dominated by Russell’s un-
derstanding of analysis. Despite its formal advantages, philosophers
within the ordinary language tradition, such as P.F. Strawson, saw it is
as a problem that formal analysis could not make sense of tensed propo-
sitions and asked, “how are we to express in the symbolism of quan-
tifiers the difference between ‘There is’, ‘There was’, ‘There will be?’”
(Strawson 2011, p. 151, [20]). By way of example, Strawson considers
the tensed statement
(1) There was at least one woman among the survivors.
He suggests that, in formal logic, (1) would take the form
(2) ∃x : (x is a woman∧ x was among the survivors).
Given a direct translation of the form ∃x, the logical form of the state-
ment is as follows:
(3) There is at least one person who is a woman and was among the
survivors.
Contrary to (1), statement (3) suggests that the person is alive at the
time of the utterance of the proposition. Since this assumption is not in
(1), statement (3) cannot be a good analysis of it. Neither will it work
to change the second “is” to “was”, since this will only suggest that x
somehow ceased to remain a woman:
(4) There is a least one person who was a woman and was among the
survivors.
It is evident that such an analysis is hard pressed to find a way to make
purely logical sense of the tensed verb “was”. If (1) is a purely log-
ical proposition, and thus does not refer to any singular fact—which
is required for the statement to be merely about language—then “was”
must be reduced to some symbol that turns the proposition into a tautol-
ogy. Strawson’s examples point out the absurdities of Russellian anal-
ysis. The final solution considered by Strawson is to maintain that the
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existential quantifier must be interpreted as tenseless, such that “when
we speak of persons and incidents the question of time reference does
not arise” (Strawson 2011, p. 150, [20]). Aware of the unsatisfying na-
ture of such a solution, Strawson says, “Nor can the difficulty be evaded
by declaring ‘∃x’ in this sentence to be timeless; it is not true that when
we speak of persons and incidents the question of time-reference does
not arise” (Strawson 2011, p. 151, [20]).
Strawson thus concludes that formal logic is limited in its ability to
analyse natural language sentences even though it is quite capable of
making progress in analysing mathematical sentences. This strikes at
the heart of the new philosophy’s two principles by raising the question:
how can the ‘new philosophy’ solve philosophical problems in Russell’s
sense, through the analysis of propositions, if it cannot adequately for-
malise propositions in which references to time are essential?
QUINE’S RESPONSE
Strawson had put his finger on a sore problem, and Quine takes up
Strawson’s example inMr. Strawson on Logical Theory (1953, [14]). Here,
he suggests the following way of rendering Strawson’s example:
(5) ∃x : (x [is] a woman∧ x was among the survivors).
where both ∃x (as Quine always adds) and [is] are understood in a time-
less sense. It is important for Quine that the “only tenable attitude to-
ward quantifiers and other notations ofmodern logic is to construe them
always, in all context, as timeless” (Quine 1953, p. 442, [14]). “Was”
should thus, according to Quine, be understood as involving a “refer-
ence presumably to some time or occasion implicit in the missing con-
text” (Quine 1953, p. 442 [14]). Quine assumes that the context is given
by a variable for some event, D, such that the proper proposition is
(6) ∃x : (x [is] a woman∧ x [is] among the survivors of D).
Unlike Strawson, Quine is not troubled by the evident quantification
over “thing-events, four dimensional beings in space-time” (Quine 1953,
p. 442, [14]). The various context-dependent facts of the values under
quantification are just as timeless as is the universe of discourse when
the values take on mathematical properties. Strawson’s fundamental
objection is that formal logic presents a severely limited picture of reality
that is vastly different from the way reality is revealed to us in natural
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language discourse. Quine’s answer is that this is something we must
live with if we truly appreciate the value of modern formal logic:
The four dimensional view of space-time is part and parcel
of the use of modern formal logic, and in particular the use
of quantification theory, in application to temporal affairs. It
may be felt to be a criticism ofmodern logic that it calls for so
drastic a departure from the time-slanted IndoEuropean lan-
guage structure. But the better way of looking at the matter
is to recognize both in the four-dimensional approach, with
its notable technical advantages, and in quantification the-
ory, with its notable technical advantages, two interrelated
contributions to scientific method.
(Quine 1953, p. 442, [14])
The key phrase to accept inQuine’s departure from the natural language
of discourse is “technical advantages”, with regard to science. The justi-
fication of formal logic is, at its foundation, the pragmatic consequence
of such a language for science. This consequence is that the part of real-
ity encapsulated in our natural language concerning propositions that
changes truth-value must be left outside of formal logic as an aspect of
how we experience reality; it cannot be part of any precise way of repre-
senting reality in logic:
Earlier I suggested that Mr. Strawson’s failure to appreci-
ate the tenselessness of quantification over temporal entities
might be a factor in his underestimation of the scope of mod-
ern logic. I should like to go further and say that I do not see
how, failing to appreciate the tenselessness of quantification
over temporal entities, one could reasonably take modern
logic very seriously. (Quine 1953, p. 443, [14])
Quine and Strawson’s discussion about the role of tenses in propositions
sets the stage for the return of medieval logic in the philosophy of time.
Formal logic, according to Strawson, cannot stand alone. The scope of
logic is wider than what can be formalised and must also include what
Strawson calls a “study of the logical features of ordinary speech.” In
such a study, we should, however, not expect to find “that character of
elegance and systemwhich belongs to the constructions of formal logic”
(Strawson 2011, p. 232, [20]).
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3 Prior’s Invention of Tense-logic
Unknown to Quine and Strawson, two contemporary philosophers—
J.J.C. Smart (1920–2012), also known as Jack Smart, from Australia and
his friend A.N. Prior (1914–1969) from New Zealand—were engaged
in a correspondence about the same topic in 1954. Prior and Smart
had met each other in 1951, and a deep friendship formed between the
two. Their correspondence left behind a series of letters now available
at the Bodleian Library in Oxford (see [4]). In July 1954, Prior revealed
to Smart his discovery of tense-logic for the first time. At the time,
Prior was preparing a paper for the second New Zealand Philosophi-
cal Congress in Wellington on the discussion of the Master Argument,
which was later published as (1955, [7]).1
Prior’s discussion of the ancient argument begins with a clear ref-
erence to the way in which propositions were perceived in ancient and
medieval logic: propositions may be true at one time and false at an-
other. Prior’s aim was to analyse the Megaric logician Diororus’ under-
standing of possibility and necessity as “that which either is or at some
time will be true, and the necessary as that which both is and always
will be true” (Prior 1955, p. 1, [7]). Prior proposes to extend the logical
vocabulary so that it not only contains the traditional proposition vari-
ables such as p, q, and r but also contains a set of operators that form
functions taking these propositions as values. For the future tense “will
be”, Prior uses F and for the past “has been”, he uses P; thus, F p means
“It will be the case that p” and Pp means “It has been the case that p”.
Pp and F p are weak operators corresponding to a quantification over
some time in the past or in the future. From these, a strong operator
over the future and the past can also be defined.
Prior’s treatment of the Master Argument demonstrates that if
something is now true about the future, then it will necessarily be true
(F p⊃F p). To reach this conclusion, other tensed propositions must
be assumed to hold. One is the assumption that propositions about the
past are now unpreventably true (Pp⊃Pp). Another assumption is
a complex tensed proposition stating that “when anything is the case,
then it has always been the case that it will be the case” (p⊃HF p).2
Prior’s analysis is, thus, clearly medieval in the sense described above
1 Prior spells it “Diodoran”, while Benson Mates spells it “Diodorean”.
2 See [7].
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by Øhrstrøm and Hasle, because it assumes the same intimate connec-
tion between logic and language concerning future contingency as do
Ockham and Scotus.
On 30 July 1954, Smart wrote back to Prior to address Prior’s sug-
gestion of tense-logic. His response reveals that he was aware of Quine
and Strawson’s discussion.
I don’t feel the problem of Diodorus as a live one. Why
shouldn’t we say that what has happened might not have
happened? Of course if the universe is deterministic and if
by “impossible” we don’t mean “ruled out by the laws of na-
ture” but (rather eccentrically) “ruled out by the laws of na-
ture + initial conditions” then what happens is “necessary”
and what does not happen is “impossible”. But “past” and
“future” don’t come into the matter—They only date events
with respect to the moment we are at present discussing the
matter in. I don’t believe in any metaphysical difference be-
tween past and future—in fact I believe the assertion of such
a difference can be refuted. And here I have Quine on my
side - cf. his article on Strawson in Mind. (Smart, 1954 [18])
Smart has clearly chosen to adopt Quine’s idea that tenses are tacit as-
sumptions of a context by which a proposition is dated in a tenseless
manner. Smart and Prior, thus, found themselves on either side of a di-
vide concerning whether theMaster Argument is a problem or whether
it is not. The problem is only real if the tensed statements are logically
well-formed propositions, which they, in Smart and Quine’s eyes, are
not. Despite Smart’s inability to see how the past and future have any-
thing to dowith determinism, his reference toQuine and Strawson’s dis-
cussion is helpful. It is highly likely that Prior only learned of Quine’s
discussion with Strawson from this letter. Furthermore, it is reasonable
to assume that both the reference itself and Smart’s response to Prior
were themotivation behindPrior’sThe Syntax of TimeDistinctions (1958),
[9]. Its publication date obscures the fact that it was written as Prior’s
presidential address at the New Zealand Philosophical Congress given
on 27 August 1954, barely a month after Smart’s response. In The Syntax
of Time Distinctions [9], Prior jumps right into Quine and Strawson’s dis-
cussion, beginning his article with what he is aware will be the crucial
assumption that sets his view on logic apart from that of both Strawson
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and Quine: “Truth, on the face of it, is a property of propositions which
is liable to alterwith the time atwhich they are put forward” (Prior 1958,
p. 105, [9]).
In this address, Prior first explains how this view on propositions
not only was fundamental to medieval, as well as ancient logic, but sets
these apart from modern logic. He then emphasises how there are no
“grounds of a purely logical character for the current preference, and
[…] ‘propositions’ in the ancient and medieval sense lend themselves
as readily to the application of contemporary logical techniques and
procedures as do ‘propositions’ in the modern sense” (Prior 1958, p.
105, [9]). Prior therefore sets out for himself the task of showing how
the ancient and medieval conceptions of logic render both Quine and
Strawson wrong.
Strawson is wrong, according to Prior, because he “regards it as a
limitation of modern methods that they cannot cope with ‘propositions’
in the modern sense.” (Prior 1958, p. 151, [9]). Prior intends to show
that this is false, and that contrary to Strawson’s view, one can by mod-
elling the tenses in the abovementioned manner reach a conclusion as
strong as those in modern modal logic. Quine, in contrast, is wrong
when he “objects to the use of such ‘propositions’ in logic because mod-
ern methods cannot handle them” (Prior 1958, p. 105, [9]). It is not
difficult to present Strawson’s example in Prior’s notation
(3) P∃x : (x is a woman ∧ x is among the survivors).
Prior’s past operator, P, with the meaning “it has been the case”, allows
him to use only the present-tensed “is” under the scope of the existential
quantifier ∃x. The range of the quantifier is thereby no longer the entire
space-time eternal continuum. It is rather the state of affairs that was
the case when the woman survived. Formally, P is thus a propositional
operator that logically takes us back to the time in the past when the
statement
(4) ∃x : (x is a woman ∧ x is among the survivors).
was true.
It is obvious how the same can be done for the future, for which
Prior introduced the operator F with the tensed meaning “it will be the
case”. Clearly, Prior’s tense-logic, based on the ancient and medieval
view of logic, is capable of providing a formal notation that renders a
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formal analysis of tensed propositions much closer to natural language
than tenseless language can.
4 The Return of Medieval Logic in the Philosophy
of Time
There are four ways in which Prior’s invention of tense-logic constitutes
a return ofmedieval logic in the philosophy of time. The first is the obvi-
ousway outlined above in Prior’s discussion of Strawson andQuine’s ar-
gument: tense-logic constitutes a fundamental return to medieval logic
by treating propositions in the same way that ancient and medieval lo-
gicians did, as logically well formed. Prior’s development of tense-logic
in Time andModality (1957), [8] and Past, Present and Future (1969), [10],
and the fact that temporal logic has proven highly valuable as a compu-
tational tool, cements Prior’s point against Quine. Contrary to Quine, it
is indeed possible to take modern logic seriously as tensed. Second, by
returning to the way ancient and medieval logic treated propositions,
Prior’s work constitutes a correction of the mistaken view of medieval
and ancient logic that was propounded through the work of Russell,
who presented formal logic as discontinuous with the work of ancient
and medieval logicians. Modern symbolic logic stands, in Prior’s eyes,
as a continuation of medieval logic, as his comment on Leibniz demon-
strates:
And of the founders of new philosophical schools, Leibniz,
unlike most, was really interested in our subject, had consid-
erable respect for the achievements in it of Aristotle and the
Schoolmen, and anticipated modern developments by try-
ing to find a symbolism which would give it a precise math-
ematical form, and make vast extensions of it possible.
(Prior 1951, p. 17, [6])
In Prior’s eyes, neither Russell norWhitehead “brought to their work on
mathematical logic any very serious close or detailed acquaintancewith
the logic of Aristotle and the Schoolmen” (Prior 1951, p. 17, [6]). This
lack of knowledge, coupled with what Prior conceived as an attitude
of contempt had, in his eyes, “helped to make customary in English-
speaking countries for modern mathematical logic and the Aristotelian
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logical tradition to be set in sharp opposition to one another” (Prior
1951, p. 46, [6]). Third, Prior’s invention and development of tense-
logic constitutes a fundamental challenge to Russell’s perspective on
analysis, which like medieval logic openly invites metaphysical ques-
tions back to the table. The question Strawson really poses is, “can a
Russellian view on philosophical analysis hold up with regard to ten-
ses?” His answer is that no, such an analysis cannot make sense of
tenses. That conclusion is agreed upon by Quine, but Quine disagrees
about whether that constitutes a challenge to a Russellian perspective
on formal logic. The question is, however, on what basis Quine dis-
agrees and says that one cannot claim to take modern logic seriously if
one does not take it to be tenseless. Is it because a philosophical analy-
sis of tenses formally requires a tenseless understanding of time, or is it
because an analysis metaphysically requires the tenseless view on time?
It cannot be the latter without contradicting Russell’s view on analy-
sis and, in light of tense-logic, it cannot be the former. Indeed, Prior’s
development of a logic for the tenses, and a parallel logic for tenseless
dates, openly invites the metaphysical question of what is, metaphysi-
cally, most fundamental? It is not logic that decides this, but rather, to
use a phrase by Prior, a “choice of the soul”. (Prior 2003, p. 284 [13])
Consequently, it is legitimate within the philosophy of time to follow
the medieval approach of analysing the importance of Aristotle’s logic
through questions about God’s perspective on time. Our logical discus-
sions aim at helping us decide on what we fundamentally take to be the
truth, in a broad sense, and this includes our fundamental metaphysi-
cal commitments. Prior’s own commitment to tenses was thus central
to his logical work, and comes across like a theological creed:
So far, then, as I have anything that you could call a philo-
sophical creed, its first article is this: I believe in the reality
of the distinction between past, present, and future. I be-
lieve that what we see as a progress of events is a progress
of events, a coming to pass of one thing after another, and
not just a timeless tapestry with everything stuck there for
good and all. (Prior 1996, pp. 47-51, [11])
Fourth, and finally, tense-logic, by insisting on the formal validity of
fundamental metaphysical commitments, openly invites metaphysical
questions related to taking tenses seriously. Of these, the predominant
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question is the one Prior worked on from 1953 to his death in 1969, the
question of future contingency (see [5]). Smart’s abovementioned re-
sponse to Prior’s disclosure of tense-logic reveals that Smart’s failure to
take tenses seriously was instrumental in his inability to perceive the
Master Argument as constituting a genuine philosophical problem. For
Smart “past” and “future” do not come into the matter—they only date
events with respect to “the moment we are at present the matter in”
(Smart 1954, p. 2, [18]). The converse, however, also holds: if “past”
and “future” can be made formally acceptable—then ones position on
metaphysical problems pertaining to time, like the problem of future
contingency, will be legitimate objects of philosophical analysis. The
importance of Prior’s discovery of tense-logic and his application of it
to the theological problem of God’s foreknowledge and free will have
been recognised by philosophers working with the problem of divine
foreknowledge and human freedom, such as Hasker (1998), [3]. It was,
indeed, Prior who, already in 1962 with Formalities of Omniscience, [11],
began themodern discussion of the topic that occupied Scotus, Ockham
and Thomas Aquinas in late medieval philosophy. Prior’s correspon-
dence with Smart provides a valuable window into the critical phase of
Prior’s discovery of tense-logic from when he first disclosed it to Smart
in July 1954 until he presented tense-logic at the John Locke Lectures.
In 1955, Prior was invited to give the lectures in 1956 at Oxford. At this
point, in June 1955, he disclosed his plan to present tense-logic at the
event to Smart, whose negative response demonstrates his belief that if
Prior presented tense-logic, he would be running directly into a conflict.
Thus, Smart warned Prior against it quite frankly:
I still get the feeling that these lectures would more clearly
represent your genius if you cut down on the metaphysics
and stepped up the logic. As far as I can see you are at
present trying to formulate ordinary tense-logic […] This
produces a pretty cumbersome system. That is, not a pretty
system! (The tenseless logic is far superior aesthetically)
[…] I would, honestly, strongly suggest cutting down on the
quasi-metaphysics and increase the amount of formal logic.
(Smart 1955, [18])
We find similar warnings repeated in the letters leading up to the John
Locke Lectures, and Smart’s influence on the development of the lec-
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tures also comes through in Time and Modality(1957, [8]). They were
warnings from a close friend who was honestly concerned that Prior’s
John Locke Lectures would not be the success they could be if Prior in-
sisted on presenting tense-logic. Smart, following Quine, was not con-
vinced that it could be characterised as formal logic, as is evident from
his above warning. It was, as Smart perceived it, quasi-metaphysics.
Nonetheless, contrary to Smart’s warnings, Prior went on to present
tense-logic at the lectures, and it turned out to be a huge success. It
launched Prior into his fame as perhaps one of the most important phil-
osophers of that time in the late twentieth century. Part of his success
could be a result of knowing that Oxford, the home of William of Ock-
ham, would love a philosopher who did philosophical analysis in the
same sense as he did. That tense-logic ultimately proved itself valuable
in computer science, in terms of system checking and program verifi-
cation, provides an interesting twist in the story of the influence of me-
dieval logic on modern discussions in the philosophy of time. In Past,
Present and Future (1967, [10]), Prior in a comment on tense-logic for dis-
crete time noted that “the usefulness of systems of this sort does not de-
pend on any seriousmetaphysical assumption that time is discrete; they
are applicable in limited fields of discourse in which we are concerned
only with what happens next in a sequence of discrete states, e.g. in the
working of a digital computer.” (Prior 1967, p. 67, [10]). In 1977 Prior’s
vision for the applicability of tense-logic to computer science was real-
ized when the Israeli scientist Amir Pnueli applied Prior’s concepts to
program verification (see [22]). This development serves to underline
the rightness of the intuition that kept Prior determined to bring tense-
logic to Oxford, despite its obvious challenge to the then-prevalent view
of philosophical analysis. It is, as Copeland writes, “pleasant to reflect
that two major forces in the genesis of these software technologies were
Prior’s love of ancient and medieval logic and his concern to make con-
ceptual room for freedom of the human will” (Copeland 2017, [1]).
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Abstract
A.N. Prior is commonly recognized as the founding father ofmodern tem-
poral logic. However, in a recent paper Marcin Tkaczyk and Tomasz Jar-
mużek have argued that temporal logic was in fact invented by Jerzy Łoś
and first presented in 1947. In the present paper it is pointed out that the
evaluation of this claim depends on the definition of the notion of tempo-
ral logic, and that there is a straightforward and commonly accepted un-
derstanding of temporal logic, according towhich Prior is unquestionably
the founding father of modern temporal logic. Furthermore, Tkaczyk
and Jarmużek have maintained that “Prior was aware of and inspired by
Łoś’s ideas when beginning his own works in the field”. It is unknown
howmuch (if anything at all) Prior knew about Łoś’s ideas before August
1954, when he presented his first version of temporal logic at a conference
in Wellington, but nothing suggests that Łoś’s ideas had any significant
influence upon this original presentation. However, in his later writings
Prior took Łoś’s contributions into serious consideration. Prior appreci-
ated several of Łoś’s findings, but he wanted to defend an approach to
31
the field that went much further that the approach suggested by Łoś.
Keywords: Temporal logic, tense-logic, A.N. Prior, Jerzy Łoś.
1 Introduction
A.N. Prior is commonly regarded as the founding father of modern tem-
poral logic. However, Marcin Tkaczyk and Tomasz Jarmużek (2018,
[13]) have recently argued that temporal logic was in fact invented and
indeed founded by Jerzy Łoś (1920–1998), since he “constructed, de-
scribed and examined the first mature calculus of temporal logic” (p. 1,
[13]). Furthermore, Tkaczyk and Jarmużek havemaintained that “Prior
was aware of and inspired by Łoś’s ideaswhen beginning his ownworks
in the field”. As sources of the claim that Prior is the founding father
of temporal logic, the authors mention a number of publications by
Øhrstrøm and Hasle (and only those), but it should be pointed out that
they share this role with many others. For instance, in their authorita-
tive article on ‘Temporal Logic’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Goranko andGalton [1] briefly discuss Prior’s inspiration from classical
and medieval discussions on determinism, foreknowledge, etc., and go
on to observe that
From the early 1950s Arthur Prior set out to analyse and for-
malise such arguments, leading him, inter alia, to the inven-
tion of formal Temporal Logic, several versions of which are
discussed below. Prior’s seminal work, partly influenced by
important precursors such as J. Findlay, H. Reichenbach and
J. Łukasiewicz, initiated the modern era of temporal logical
reasoning. (Goranko and Galton 2015, [1])
Before critically examining the contentions of Tkaczyk and Jarmużek
(2018, [13]), it should be acknowledged that their paper is a valuable
reminder about Łoś and his importance, and especially his early ideas
about time and logic. It should certainly be conceded that it would have
been an improvement toworks such as (Øhrstrøm andHasle 1993, 1995,
2006a, 2006b, [14-17]), as well as other works involving the history of
temporal logic, if they had included reference to Jerzy Łoś. It will for fu-
ture works with this subject matter be proper and worthwhile to point
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out that Łoś (1947, [4]) contained a detailed and important presenta-
tion of the “Ut p notation” as Prior calls it in his Time and Modality (1957,
p. 20, [9]]) dealing with statements like Ut p (p is satisfied in t). There
is no doubt that this work should be seen as a remarkable contribution
in the very early history of modern temporal logic. It is also true – as
made quite clear several places in Prior (1957, [9]) - that Prior by then
was acquainted with Łoś (1947, [4]) and considered these ideas. Cer-
tainly Prior did not attempt to hide the fact that at least by 1955, he had
learned about the Ut p notation suggested by Łoś. Although an English
version of the 1947 paper had to wait until 1977 [5], H. Hiż published
an English review of Łoś’s paper in 1951 [2]. However, to concede these
points is very far from conceding that Łoś could or should be regarded
as the founding father of temporal logic. First and foremost, we have to
clarify two issues: the very notion of temporal logic, and the degree of
influence Łoś could have had on Prior’s development of temporal logic.
In Section 2 it will be argued that according to a straightforward and
commonly accepted understanding of “temporal logic”, Prior should
clearly be regarded as the inventor of modern temporal logic. In sec-
tion 3 it will be pointed out that in Prior’s very first presentation of
temporal logic in August 1954 Łoś’s work was not mentioned. It is un-
known whether he at that time was acquainted with Hiż’s brief review
from 1951, but nothing indicates that Łoś’s work has had any significant
influence upon Prior’s first presentation of temporal logic. However,
later on he clearly took Łoś’s work into serious consideration. He appre-
ciated many of Łoś’s ideas, but he felt that he would rather put them
into a much broader temporal context.
2 The Notion of Temporal Logic
According to Goranko and Galton (2015, [1]) the term “temporal logic”
is sometimes simply identified with “tense-logic”, whereas the term un-
derstood in a broader sense covers “all approaches to representation
and reasoning about time and temporal information within a logical
framework”. In otherwords, in this broader sense temporal logic should
offer a formal language rich enough to deal with all philosophical and
scientific discussions that take the temporal aspects of reality into ac-
count. Following Prior’s historical analysis (1957, p. 104 ff, [9]) this kind
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of logic may be conceived as a re-invention of the view of logic in An-
tiquity and the Middle Ages, now with the added power (but also new
challenges) of symbolic logic. According to this view the central tenets
of Medieval logic with respect to time and tense can be summarised in
the following way:
(1) tense distinctions are a proper subject of logical reflection, and
(2) what is true at one time is in many cases false at another time, and
vice versa.
Understood in this manner a logical framework should fulfill both (1)
and (2) in order to qualify as temporal logic. Among other things, tem-
poral logic should offer a conceptual framework for the famous discus-
sions regarding McTaggart’s A- and B-series and their mutual relations.
It is worth noting that (1) and (2) run counter to well-established post-
medieval ideas: namely (a) that logic should be developed as a time-
less science, and (b) that propositions are really incomplete without an
explicit time-reference (thus “Socrates is sitting” would be regarded
as incomplete until a time-reference was supplied) (cf. Øhrstrøm and
Hasle 1995, pp. 109–117, [15]). It was part of the goal of Prior’s work to
overturn these well-entrenched positions (i.e. (a) and (b)).
In Hiż’ review, Łoś’s basic idea was presented in the following man-
ner: “The main purpose of this paper is to analyse Mill’s canons as
rules of operation for a part of the language of physics. To do it the
author builds up an axiomatization of a fragment of the physical lan-
guage.” (Hiż 1951, p. 58, [2]) The suggestion seems to be that the Ut p
notation can serve as a precise representation of the reasoning about
time as needed in physics. The paper by Łoś is certainly interesting
and important. And the Ut p notation is, of course, an important el-
ement in a fullfledged temporal logic. However, there is no genuine
analysis of tenses in Łoś’s paper – probably because tenses do not ap-
pear to be needed in physics. Marcin Tkaczyk and Tomasz Jarmużek
state: “The only formal tool Łoś’s work [1947] lacks of is represent-
ing tenses by means of modal connectives. This idea Prior took from
Findlay.” (Tkaczyk and Jarmużek 2018, p. 16 [13) This means that al-
though Łoś’s 1947 paper fulfills a version of (2) above, it does not live
up to (1). As indicated by Tomasz Jarmużek andAndrezej Pietruszczak
(2004, [3]), what Jerzy Łoś did in the field was that he “proposed an op-
erator that referred sentences to temporal moments” (2004, p. 147, [3]).
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The lack of a proper representation of tenses is in fact crucial. However,
the re-introduction of tenses into logic is an utterly essential feature of
Prior’s work. It may not be needed in physics as we know it, but Prior
wanted to go beyond physics and he insisted that tenses are needed
in order to deal with the notion of existence and indeed with the very
understanding of time. In passing, it should be noted that the statement
‘This idea Prior took from Findlay’ is an exaggeration, Prior’s generous
references to Findlay notwithstanding (cf. Øhrstrøm and Hasle, 1995,
pp. 170–71, [14]).
Prior wanted to develop a logic based on tenses, p (it was the case
that…) and F (it will be the case that (or in themetricized version, Pn (it
was the case n time units ago that …) and Fn). As quite explicitly stated
in Prior 1957 [9], it was in this connection also his ambition to show that
the content of Łoś’s Ut p notation can be formulated in terms of a rather
simple system of tense-logical postulates (p. 20, [9]). In other words,
what Prior wanted was to formulate ideas that could supplement the
approach to temporal reasoning normally used in physics.
3 Prior and Łoś
Prior first presented his temporal logic at a conference in Wellington
in August 1954. This very first presentation of his ideas on temporal
logic was later published in Prior (1958, [10]). We don’t know exactly
when Prior became aware of Łoś’s work, but it was briefly mentioned in
the last section of Appendix 1 in Prior’s Formal Logic, where Łoś’s ideas
are introduced under the headline “Logic of Assertion and Formalized
Physics” (Prior 1955, p. 313, [8]). Furthermore, there is a reference to
the review by Hiż in Prior’s Time and Modality (1957, p. 20, [9]). As
pointed out by Tkaczyk and Jarmużek (2018, [13]), Hiż did a brilliant
condensation of Łoś’s work in his review, but even so it was very brief.
In Past, Present and Future, Prior stated that “I only know the paper [i.e.
Łoś’ 1947, [4]] through Hiż’ review” (cf. Prior, 1967, p. 212, [11]), and
in any case Łoś’ paper was as already noted not available in English
before 1977. Prior’s 1954 presentation does not contain any reference
either to Łoś or to Hiż. The presentation contained a discussion of a
logic similar to the Ut p notation suggested by Łoś, but the term used by
Prior is the l-calculus (referring to “later”) and furthermore he used ‘px’
to stand for ‘p at x’. If Prior had in fact read and been influenced by the
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review of Łoś’s system before August 1954 as suggested by Tkaczyk and
Jarmużek, he would by any reasonable assumption have made a refer-
ence to Łoś in the paper. For one thing, he treasured Polish logic very
much and promoted it throughout his life; for another thing, it would
have been advantageous to refer to this Ut p notation instead of mak-
ing up his own “px notation”. Indeed, had Prior been acquainted with
Hiż’ review’ at that time, he would have had every reason to use this
reference. Apart from the fact that Prior was conscientious, sometimes
almost to excess, about crediting his influences, he needed all the power-
ful references he could draw onwhenmaking his case for a formal logic
of time. This idea was in 1954 not only unorthodox but also somewhat
contentious.
From the historical perspective, it is also worth pointing out that
Prior had entertained ideas about time and logic as early as 1950/51. In
1951, he submitted the mammoth manuscript The Craft of Formal Logic
to Oxford University Press. (The manuscript was never published in its
1951-form, but was replaced by Prior’s Formal Logic [8]). In her recent
investigation, Aneta Markoska-Cubrinowska observes:
Arthur Prior’s unpublished manuscript “The Craft of For-
mal Logic”, written in 1950–51, contains his early ideas about
time as a semantic concept. Years before he would publish
his tense logic, Prior contemplated the construction of a se-
mantic theory of propositional logic in which propositions
are interpreted as functions of time instants. These ideas
are born from reviewing historical material, and particularly
from his analysis of Diodorus’s conditional and Boole’s pro-
positional algebra. He suggests that ‘P entails Q’ could be
expressed formally as ‘∀i(Pi → Qi)’, where ‘i’ stands for an
instant of time, and ‘Pi’ stands for ‘p is true at i’.
(Markoska-Cubrinowska 2017, p. 29 [6])
In the paper’s conclusion, Aneta Markoska-Cubrinowska sums up the
paper’s results as follows:
Prior’s unpublishedmanuscript “TheCraft of Formal Logic”,
written in 1950–51, reveals that his development of temporal
semantics had begun at least three years before he first pub-
licised his tense logic.
(Markoska-Cubrinowska 2017, p. 39 [6])
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Apart from the considerable historical interest that this investigation car-
ries, it also implies another striking point. Prior himself dated the begin-
ning of his development of tense-logic, respectively, temporal logic, to
1953, when he came across Findlay’s footnote (cf. Øhrstrøm and Hasle
1995, pp. 170–71, [14]). Thus he did not even see his own earlier ideas
about time and logic – involving instants, quantification over instants
and the notion ‘p is true at i’ – as a proper anticipation of his develop-
ment of tense-logic from 1953 and onwards.
In his Time and Modality, Prior clearly recognized Łoś as the first
scholar to develop the Ut p notation. Furthermore, in this book Prior
presented a detailed analysis of the axiomatic account of the Ut p nota-
tion as it was suggested by Łoś (Prior 1957, pp. 19-21, [9]). In his dis-
cussion of the conceptual and philosophical aspects of Łoś’s logic Prior
wrote: “Even Łoś’s logic is not, indeed, a tense-logic but rather an un-
analysed date-and-interval logic, but it is at least a logic in which the
time-reference is made by an operator which takes whole ‘predications’
as its arguments.” (Prior 1957, p. 107, [9]) Prior also noted that Łoś’s
date-and-interval logic may be seen in the light of his earlier discussion
of a ‘logic of assertion’, i.e. the logic of statements of the form ‘x asserts
that p’. Prior appreciated Łoś’s findings and stated: “[…] he has found,
as no one before him seems to have found, an appropriate symbolism
for this type of subject-matter, and he sees that the logic of dates and in-
tervals and the logic of assertion both require a symbolism of this kind.”
(Prior 1957, p. 122, [9]).
In Chapter 1 of his Past, Present and Future, Prior (1967, [11]) names
and discusses important precursors of modern tense-logic. Unfortu-
nately, Łoś’ contribution is not included in this chapter. However, in
Appendix B of Past, Present and Future, Prior himself characterizes this
omission as a mistake. As a kind of compensation, Prior includes a
whole section in the appendix dedicated to the works of Łoś (1967,
pp. 212-213, [11]). Here Łoś is not only acknowledged as a precursor
of modern tense-logic, but also as a precursor of the logic of instants –
and in fact also of what we now call hybrid logic. In particular, Prior
emphasizes the importance of the so-called clock axiom, which was in
fact mentioned already in the brief section in Formal Logic (Prior 1955,
p. 313, [8]). According to this axiom there is a proposition p for any in-
stant a, so that for any instant b, the proposition p holds at b if and only
if a is identical with b, i.e.
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∃p∀b : T bp ≡ (a = b)
Prior states: “Łoś regarded it as ‘our only weapon against themetaphys-
ical and extrasensual conception of time’. His point of view seems in fact
to have been very close to that of Sections 3 and 4 of this appendix. The
clock axiom, one might say, might justify (or might reflect) our identi-
fication of an ‘instant’ with a proposition true at that instant only […]”
(Prior 1967, p. 213, [11]).
4 Conclusion
The paper by Tkaczyk and Jarmużek is a welcome reminder that there
was a well developed anticipation of a highly important part of tempo-
ral logic, theUt p notation, available in 1947 – of which Jerzy Łośwas the
author. This reminder could and should enrich future expositions of the
development of temporal logic, andwe can only be thankful for this con-
tribution. However, the paper definitely fails in establishing that Jerzy
Łoś should be regarded as the founding father of temporal logic. The
preceding conceptual and historical analyses are certainly the most im-
portant arguments in this matter, but one may also stop to ponder for a
moment what it rightfully means to be ‘founding father’. The history of
science is full of examples of great intellectuals arriving independently
at similar or even identical ideas at various times. However to be recog-
nized as founder one also has to be the one who develops these ideas
and establishes them in the scientific community. One has to hold a
crucial role in what is called in German the “Wirkungsgeschichte”, i.e.
the history or process of influence. Jerzy Łoś regrettably did not follow
up his brilliant version of the Ut p notation, but left the idea in favour
of other intellectual pursuits. There is no evidence that he exerted any
influence on the development of temporal logic before Prior’s Time and
Modality, and as already stated this influence was mainly confined to
the discussions of theUt p notation. One could compare with the contri-
bution of Hans Reichenbach, also from 1947. Reichenbach’s work also
contained brilliant ideas on time and logic and has had considerable
influence in later discussions. While Reichenbach’s proposals were far
less developed than Łoś in terms of formal maturity, he however had a
keener eye than Łośwhen it came to the finer details of temporal distinc-
tions. But noone has ever argued that Reichenbach, in this respect Łoś’
38
exact contemporary, should be seen as the founding father of temporal
logic. He was, as was Łoś, a precursor.
Seeing modern temporal logic as a re-invention of the logic in An-
tiquity and the Middle Ages but now developed in terms of symbolic
logic, Prior’s account of the history of tense-logic suggests that the rise of
temporal logic would take place in two steps corresponding to the steps
that characterized the downfall of medieval tense-logic (cf. Øhrstrøm&
Hasle 1995, p. 109, 15]). However, in the context of the rise of modern
temporal logic one should expect that the two stepswould appear in the
reverse order of the order discernible during the downfall of medieval
tense-logic, i.e. the order of the resurgence should be expected to be
(2) what is true at one time is in many cases false at another time, and
vice versa.
(1) tense distinctions are a proper subject of logical reflection.
As noted earlier, in order to discuss all aspect of temporal reasoning (in-
cluding important conceptual distinctions on time as for example those
found in McTaggart’s paradox), both (2) and (1) are needed. It is evi-
dent that the logic of dates and intervals suggested by Jerzy Łoś in 1947
fulfills (2), but not (1). In this way Łoś’s logic may qualify as an impor-
tant anticipation of the re-introduction of temporal logic. On the other
hand, we have no evidence that A.N. Prior was aware of this when he
in August 1954 for the first time presented a modern and symbolic logic
fulfilling both (2) and (1).
Despite the qualities of the achievements of Łoś in 1947 as a precur-
sor of tense-logic and even hybrid logic, it is obvious that Prior retains
the honour of being the founding father of modern temporal logic.
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Abstract
We care not only about what experiences we have, but when we have
them too. However, on the B-theory of time, something’s timing isn’t
an intrinsic way for that thing to be or become. Given B-theory, should
we be rationally indifferent about the timing per se of an experience? In
this paper, I argue that B-theorists can justify time-biased preferences for
pains to be past rather than present and for pleasures to be present rather
than past. In support of this argument, I appeal to the doctrine of tempo-
ral parts or “four-dimensionalism” for short. When held in conjunction
with a certain evaluative principle about whose experiences matter, four-
dimensionalism reconciles B-theory with some time-biased preferences.
Keywords: B-theory, time bias, four-dimensionalism.
1 Introduction
When were you last in great pain? That might not be worth remem-
bering. For what it’s worth, that’s all in the past now—or so the saying
goes. According to the B-theory of time, however, that might not be say-
ing much. B-theory denies that something’s timing is an intrinsic way
for that thing to be or become. Instead, B-theory holds that when some-
thing happens is not metaphysically importantly different from where
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it’s happening. Yet in conceiving time and space as parallel metaphysi-
cal dimensions, must B-theory also conceive them as parallel evaluative
dimensions?
All else equal, we should be and typically are rationally indiffer-
ent about a pain’s whereabouts. Being in pain here, wherever I am,
wouldn’t be evaluatively importantly different from being in pain there,
wherever you are. Call this spatial neutrality about experiences. Dissim-
ilarly, some philosophers disagree that we should be rationally indiffer-
ent about a pain’s timing. They believe that being in pain now, in the
present, is importantly different from being in pain earlier, in the past.1
Indeed, it seems most people prefer their pains to be past rather than
present and their pleasures to be present rather than past. These prefer-
ences exemplify temporal value asymmetries, or “time biases” for short,
which represent the various ways in which we care not only about what
experiences we have, but when we have them too.
Many philosophers have claimed that B-theory undermines the ra-
tionale for being time biased and strengthens the rationale for temporal
neutrality: roughly, the thesis that we should be rationally indifferent
about an experience’s timing per se.2 The arguments from B-theory to
temporal neutrality might have something like the following premises
as their common ground. According to B-theory, time has an ontolog-
ically homogeneous structure, i.e., being past, present, and future are
extrinsic ways for things to be or become. If something’s timing is an
extrinsic way for it to be or become, then we should care about when
an experience happens per se to the same extent that we should care
about where an experience happens per se. But we shouldn’t care about
where an experience happens per se. Therefore, according to B-theory,
we shouldn’t care about when an experience happens per se.
However, I will argue that B-theory does not necessarily predict that
all time biases are irrational. This argument requires that B-theorists
maintain a certain view about diachronic identity: namely, four-dimen-
sionalism. According to four-dimensionalism, persistence through time
is like extension through space. Thismeans that facts about us over time
are given by facts about our temporal parts at various times, in the same
vein that facts about us at a time are given by facts about our spatial parts
1See Prior (1959, [16]), Parfit (1984, [13]), and Hare (2007, [7]; 2009, [8]).
2See Cockburn (1998, [2]), Zimmerman (2008, [20]), Greene and Sullivan (2015,
[5]), and Pearson (2018a [13], 2018b [14]).
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at that time. In the next section, I’ll explicate an infamous objection
against B-theory’s compatibility with reasons for being time biased. In
turn, I’ll develop and outline my argument from four-dimensionalism
for B-theory’s compatibility with reasons for being time biased.
2 Thank Goodness That's Over
Some philosophers doubt that the correct semantic analysis for an area
of inquiry indicates the correct ontological analysis for that area, but
some B-theorists took this for granted in their arguments for their view.3
These arguments appealed to certain reductive analyses of linguistic
tense, but it is in effect an argument from parsimony. The argument’s
main premise is that the linguistic category of tense is available for pa-
raphrase in entirely tenseless, but synonymous language. And that pre-
mise is supposed to support the conclusion that what it is for something
to be past, present, or future just is for that thing to stand in certain tense-
less, frame-relative relations: respectively, the earlier-than, simultane-
ous-with, or later-than relations. Whatever that parsimony argument’s
validity, the main premise has come under fire. And in that connection,
most of the smoke has come from an objection made familiar by A. N.
Prior:
One says, e.g. “Thank goodness that’s over!” … [which] cer-
tainly doesn’t mean the same as, e.g. “Thank goodness the
date of the conclusion of that thing is Friday, June 15, 1954”,
even if it be said then. (Nor for that matter, does it mean
“Thank goodness the conclusion of that thing is contempora-
neouswith this utterance”. Why should anyone thank good-
ness for that? (Prior 1959, p. 17, [15]).
Initially considered, Prior’s objection is that tenseless analyses of tense—
for example, the date and token-reflexive analyses—fail to preserve the
cognitive relations between tensed propositions and the proposition-
al attitudes which embed them. Therefore, arguments in support of
B-theory from the semantic eliminability of tense are unsound. But
there’s another objection against B-theory to which Prior gestures to-
3See Dyke (2007, [4]).
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wards when, at the end of the foregoing passage, he raises the question:
“Why should anyone thank goodness for that?”
When we fill in the anaphora, what Prior seems to be asking is this:
“Why would a tenseless fact about the timing of an experience ever give
someone a reason to value it differently?” In the next section, I’ll offer
a novel answer to the question that I take Prior to be raising against
the B-theorist. Subsequently, I’ll compare my answer to, and defend its
superiority against, comparable answers due to D. H. Mellor [10-11],
Murray MacBeath [9], and Heather Dyke and James Maclaurin [4].
3 Thank Goodness That's No Longer Me
According to four-dimensionalism, people are temporally extended
wholes whose lifetimes are given by their moment-bound temporal
parts. More specifically, four-dimensionalismmaintains that there exist
moment-bound things, i.e., temporal “parts” or “stages,” just as there
exist spatial parts of things. These temporal parts are what comprise
temporally extended things, i.e., continuants, and facts about continu-
ants supervene on facts about the temporal parts of the continuant.4
Four-dimensionalists candisagree aboutwhat continuants are, whet-
her they have their properties derivatively, and the kind of relations that
underlie the various facts about our properties over time. Worm theo-
rists, or “perdurantists,” maintain that the continuants over which we
quantify and talk about are aggregates ofmoment-bound individuals or
“worms” who derive their properties from the properties their tempo-
ral parts have. Stage theorists, or “exdurantists,” agree that spacetime
worms exist, but they identify the continuants over which we quantify
and talk about with the individual stages of the worm, who have prop-
erties at other times by standing in particular counterpart relations to
other stages of the worm at other times.5 For the intents and purposes
of reconciling B-theory and the rational permissibility of some kinds of
time biases, not much weighs on the ontological and semantic differ-
ences between perdurantism and exdurantism. That said, I’ll be rais-
ing my argument according to the perdurantist’s account of diachronic
4See Balashov (2010, [1]) for a scientifically informed investigation into the debate
about persistence.
5Balashov (2010, p. 13, [1]).
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identity.
The first substantive premise ofmy argument is that B-theory in con-
junction with four-dimensionalism entails that any experience that is
over at a time for some temporal part also has the property of not belong-
ing to that temporal part at that time. To illustrate, imagine that all of
yesterday someone—Student—suffered from a mild headache, which
is over today. According to B-theory, for Student’s headache to be over
just is for that headache to conclude simultaneously with respect to
some frame of reference. And according to four-dimensionalism, for
Student’s headache to conclude today just is for that headache to belong
to Student’s temporal parts yesterday, but not to Student’s temporal
parts today. Student’s temporal parts yesterday—Student-Yesterday—
is not numerically identical to Student’s temporal part today, Student-
Today. Therefore, for Student’s headache to be over at a time, if that is a
tenseless feature of the headache, is also for the headache to belong to
Student-Yesterday rather than Student-Today.
The second substantive premise of my argument involves a certain
evaluative principlewith respect to pleasures and pains inspired byCas-
par Hare’s [7, 8] work on biases towards our own favor or “self-bias” for
short. The principle provides the normative reason for which onemight
“thank goodness” for the fact that some pain is past if that is merely a
tenseless fact:
Mild Egocentric Hedonism (MEH): All other things being
equal, one should prefer a pain that is not one’s own rather
than one’s own. Conversely, one should prefer a pleasure
that is one’s own rather than not one’s own.
It is tempting, but incorrect, to confuse MEH above with this principle
below:
Egocentric Schadenfreude (ES):All other things being equal,
one should prefer a pain that is someone else’s. Conversely,
one should prefer a pleasure that is no one else’s.
Here’s the difference between the two. Imagine a group of restaurant
workers drawing straws to decidewho should clean the restrooms. Mild
egocentric hedonists prefer not to draw the short straw themselves. Sure,
by preferring not to draw the short straw, one prefers by extension that
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someone else does. But it’s the schadenfreuder who finds preference ful-
fillment not only in not drawing the short straw, but also in someone else
drawing it. If theywere able to choose, themild egocentric hedonist can
consistently prefer that no one, including them, have some negative ex-
perience. In contrast, the egocentric schadenfreuder is satisfied by the
thought that someone experiences something unpleasant.
With MEH in tow, my argument for the reconciliation between B-
theory and time biases continues as follows. For convenience, I put the
argument in premise-conclusion form.
Premise 1, B-theory: What it is for one’s pain to be over is
for its conclusion to be simultaneous with some current ref-
erence frame (e.g., an utterance).
In turn, we assume four-dimensionalism:
Premise 2, 4D: Continuants are temporally extended beings
who exist at various times with different qualities over time
in virtue of having temporal parts of different qualities who
exist at various times.
The sub-argument for the next premise was provided earlier.
Premise 3: Any experience that is over at a time for some
temporal part also has the property of not being experienced
by that temporal part.
And the next premise provides the reason for which an experience that
is over at a time is something for which one should thank goodness,
given B-theory and four-dimensionalism.
Premise 4, MEH:Whatever painful experience has the prop-
erty of not belonging to some temporal part at a time would
satisfy that temporal part’s mild egocentric hedonism.
From the foregoing premises we have this to conclude:
Conclusion: Acontinuant should thank goodness that some
pain is over at a time, if that is a tenseless fact, because that
continuant has a temporal part at some timewhosemild ego-
centric hedonism is fulfilled in virtue of that tenseless fact
obtaining.
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Finally, it’s worth illustrating my argument’s logic. Consider Dentistry:
Student is scheduled for a routine checkup with their den-
tist, Dentist. Of course, Student dislikes seeing the dentist.
To provide them with some relief, Dentist says: “It’ll all be
over soon.” As a B-theorist, however, Student puts Dentist’s
time bias into question: “And why should anyone thank
goodness for that?” Dentist replies: “Because then it will no
longer be your problem!”
4 Prospects for Temporal Relativity
Call my argument in the previous section the “Thank Goodness That’s
No Longer Me” argument. Not only does it answer Prior’s question,
but it also addresses a family of objections against the normativity of B-
theory. Consider, for instance, the objection that David Cockburn raises:
To show how anything like our current emotional life might
be consistent with the claim that ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’
events all have exactly the same kind of reality…His prob-
lem, that is, is to show how familiar ways in which we offer
‘the fact’ that something has happened, is happening, or will
happen as a reason for actions and feelings can be acceptable
if ‘there are no tensed facts’.
(Cockburn 1998, p. 85, [2])
More recently, Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan imply that, for the
purposes of rational evaluation, when an experience happens per se is
not importantly different from where it is happening per se:
Given the B-theory of time, distinguishing between past and
future experiences can seem just as arbitrary as distinguish-
ing between experiences that happen here and experiences
that happen there.
(Greene and Sullivan 2015, p. 953, [6])
The claims being made in the foregoing passages have a common de-
nominator. Since B-theory implies that there is no intrinsic or absolute
way to distinguish between past, present, and future events, it seems
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that there is no reason to be responsive to an experience’s timing for the
purposes of rational evaluation. However, even if there is no intrinsic
way to distinguish between past, present, and future events, neverthe-
less there may be some feature about an experience’s pastness, present-
ness, or futurity—if those are tenseless ways for an experience to be—
that’s evaluatively relevant; that is what my Thank Goodness That’s No
Longer Me argument shows.
To show the unique contributionmy argumentmakes, it isworth dis-
cussing how the argument interacts with similar arguments in the liter-
ature on the compatibility between B-theory and temporal value asym-
metry. In response to Prior, among other A-theorists, MurrayMacBeath
(1994, [9]), with D. H. Mellor concurring (1993, [11]), presented an ac-
count of tensed propositional attitudes that distinguishes their formal
objects from the content that constitutes them. On this account, the for-
mal object of our relieving belief that a pain is over is a tenseless proposi-
tion or fact about that pain. But the object of one’s relief in the belief that
a pain is over is that belief’s irreducibly tensed content. One thus has
reason to feel relief in the belief that a pain is over rather than present
or forthcoming not because that belief’s formal object is an irreducibly
tensed fact, but because of that belief’s irreducibly tensed content.6
Heather Dyke and James Maclaurin (2002, [3]) have also presented
an account of the compatibility between B-theory and temporal value
asymmetry. They claim that our reasons for being time biased stem
from considerations about natural selection, which themselves are
ultimately responsive to the tenseless fact that the direction of causa-
tion is from earlier to later.7 On their account, time-biased behaviors
typically confer certain evolutionary advantages and fitness-enhancing
effects due to causation’s tenseless asymmetric direction. One thus has
reason to feel relief in the belief that a pain is over not only because
that belief’s object or content is tensed, in contrast to Mellor and Mac-
Beath, but also because relief is the evolutionarily useful attitude to have
towards a past pain, and dread is the evolutionarily useful attitude to
6Let us illustrate the distinction. Suppose you are about to get into what looks like a
fatal car accident. Of course, you scream in terror in the belief that you will die. Fortu-
nately, you will not die. The object of your belief is a false proposition. But the object of
your terror in the belief that you’ll die is not the false proposition, rather it’s that belief’s
terrifying content—the way the world would look like if the object of your belief were
true.
7See Dyke and Maclaurin (2002, p. 285, [4]).
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have towards a future pain.
Unlike my Thank Goodness That’s No Longer Me argument, how-
ever, MacBeath and Mellor’s argument, as well as Dyke and Maclau-
rin’s, seem to confuse an important distinction between what we have
motivational reason to do andwhat we have normative reason to do. That
is, their arguments mistake what we are under psychological pressure
to do with what we are under rational pressure to do. Indeed, recon-
sider MacBeath and Mellor’s account. If the object of one’s relief about
past pains is some irreducibly tensed content, then the objects of relief,
among other such tensed attitudes, are based on misrepresentations of
reality if B-theory is true. But attitudes that are based onmisrepresenta-
tions of reality are unjustified. Therefore, if B-theory is true, the various
tensed attitudes that embody our temporal value asymmetries are un-
justified.
In a similar vein, Dyke and Maclaurin’s account also seems to im-
ply that our tensed attitudes are unwarranted. Their account says that
natural selection pressures explain why there are reasons to act in time-
biased ways. But these natural selection pressures do not always track
the truth. Being time biased may be a better way for a species to sur-
vive. That said, being a better way for a species to survive is not always
a justified way for a species to behave. Unless there is an intrinsic con-
nection between such natural selection pressures and the reasons that
we have to evaluate experiences in certain ways rather than others, an
evolutionary account of time bias seems to raise skepticism against the
claim that being time biased is justified.
Finally, it is worth discussing a potential limitation of my view, but
also foregrounding a potential solution. I have offered a tenseless ac-
count of some time biases. But as it stands, my account does not seem
to justify our bias in favor of the future over the past with respect to
pleasure and our bias in favor of the past over the future with respect
to pains. Indeed, my argument only establishes that there are reasons
to prefer present rather than non-present pleasures, and non-present
rather than present pains. But both past and future pains are also non-
present pains, so on my account distinguishing between them is arbi-
trary for the purposes of rational evaluation. Yet there seems to be some-
thing importantly different about a pain being future rather than past.
To be sure, we are constantly under great psychological or evolutionary
pressure to treat matters future and past differently. But being under
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such pressure does not justify bias towards the future for the same rea-
sons it does not justify bias towards the present.
In order to justify future bias in a manner compatible with B-theory,
theremust be something importantly different between the past and the
future in virtue of which we have normative reason to prefer pleasures
to be located in our future and pains to be located in our past. In this con-
nection, there may be a parity argument according to which our tempo-
ral value asymmetries between the past and future are not importantly
different from our personal value asymmetries between people with
whom we are in variously intimate relationships. On this argument,
just as it is not arbitrary to be more concerned about the experiences
of certain relatives rather than others, i.e., one’s nuclear rather than ex-
tended family, similarly it is not arbitrary to be more concerned about
experiences that occur in certain parts of my lifetime rather than others,
i.e., the future rather than past. In other words, in the interpersonal con-
text, it seems our asymmetric attitudes between others are justified by
the variously intimate relationships that we stand in with others, and
the reasons that we have for standing in those relationships with them.
Likewise, in the intertemporal context, it may be that our asymmetric
attitudes between the past and the future are justified by the variously
different metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical relations that we
stand in with ourselves in the future rather than the past.
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Abstract
This paper is a partial defence of presentism against the argument from
cross-time relations. It is argued, first, that the Aristotelian view of causa-
tion and persistence does not really depict these phenomena in terms of
relations between entities existing at different times, and indeed excludes
the possibility of such cross-time relations obtaining. Second, it is argued
that to reject the existence of the past—and thereby be unable to ground
the truth of claims about the past—does not lead to any absurd conse-
quences.
Keywords: Presentism, cross-time relations, grounding objection, causa-
tion, persistence.
1 Introduction
Presentism—the view that only the present exists, the future not yet, the
past no longer—is currently a focal point of contemporary philosophy
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of time. It is still by no means the favoured view, and yet undeniably an
equally hot topic among those who promote it (see, for instance, Crisp
2005, [10]; Bourne 2006, [4]; Markosian 2004, [22]; Ingthorsson 2017,
[17]), and those who oppose it (see for instance, Oaklander 2010, [26];
Mozersky 2015, [24]; Torrengo 2017, [34]).
I am not entirely sure why presentism is getting all this attention.
It may be related to the growing realisation that presentism is immune
toMcTaggart’s Paradox and the problem of temporary intrinsics (Craig 1998,
[8]; Cameron 2015, [6]; Ingthorsson 2016, [16]) and therefore emerges
as the most promising version of the A view of time. As a consequence
contemporary philosophy of time gravitates towards presentism, and
in particular its weak spot, which is undeniably the problem of cross-time
relations (Bigelow 1996, [3]; Crisp 2005, [10]). I suspect that a contri-
buting factor is also a growing dissatisfaction with the B view of time,
i.e. its failure to convincingly accommodate for enduring particulars
and more generally to account for the dynamic features of experience
(Prosser 2016, [28] is possibly the best attempt yet).
The argument from cross-time relations goes as follows. If the future/
past do not exist, then relations popularly believed to hold between
the present and the future/past, do not exist either. Since cross-time
relations have come to figure centrally in the formulation of a range of
metaphysical notions, like causation and persistence, and metaphysical
cum semantic relations such as truth (albeit only the truth of proposi-
tions about the past and future), truth being central to our understand-
ing of knowledge, then presentism is taken to entail the absurd conclu-
sion that there is no causation, nothing persists, no claims about the
past/future are true, and therefore we have no knowledge of the fu-
ture/past.
The argument from cross-time relations would be a reductio ad absur-
dum, if presentists were unable to offer viable alternatives, but they can.
In this paper I will first present contemporary versions of presentism
and how they propose to deal with the problem of cross-time relations
(Section 2). Then I will paraphrase what I have argued elsewhere, no-
tably that a presentist can accept that there can be no true propositions
about the past and future, and yet argue that we can have justified be-
lief about the future and past (Section 3). Whether that is enough for
having knowledge, is a controversial issue, but it seems to me that this
already is a controversy even for that part of temporal reality whose ex-
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istence we all agree about—the present—and even if it be assumed that
the future and past exist in parity with the present. The controversy,
briefly, is that if knowledge is assumed to be fallible, then this is to as-
sume that beliefs about the world can count as knowledge even if they
are false. If only those beliefs count as knowledge that are actually true
and justified, we have decided to confine the sphere of knowledge to
things that are infallible.
Finally, I will argue that the presentist can easily provide an alter-
native account of causation and persistence, one that does not involve
cross-time relations (Section 4). They need not invent one from scratch,
because they can make use of the old Aristotelian conception of causa-
tion, which did not represent causation as a two-place, cross-temporal,
relation. Indeed, most neo-Aristotelian powers-based accounts—which
depict causation as the production of change through the interaction of
powerful particulars—are already viable presentist accounts of causa-
tion (Ingthorsson 2002, [14]).
2 Presentism
In the contemporary literature, presentism is seldom described bymore
than a single phrase such as ‘only present objects exist’, or ‘existence is
confined to the present’, before the discussion turns to the problems
of upholding that belief. Authors often make up for the brevity of their
presentation by appealing to the reader’s intuitive understanding of the
thesis, claiming that the confinement of existence to the present is a part
and parcel of the lived experience of every human being (Bigelow 1996,
[3]).
Nevertheless, one can discern a number of alternatives, all of which
arise from concerns about the reference and truth of expressions about
the future and past. Indeed, all of them deploy what I have elsewhere
called the relocation strategy; to argue that the entities we naively believe
to be in the past or future, are actually in the present (Ingthorsson 2017,
[17]). I will focus on the past, since the lack of truth-values for past
tensed expressions is a much greater problem than the lack of truth-
values for future tensed expressions.
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GLOBAL PROPERTY PRESENTISM
One version of presentism, sometimes called global property presentism
(Kierland 2013, [20]), is usually traced back to Arthur Prior’s sugges-
tion that claims about the past, even those that have the grammatical
structure of singular statements, do not refer to any particular existing
state of affairs, but to some general feature of the world as it is now:
the fact thatQueenAnne has been dead for some years is not,
in the strict sense of ‘about’, a fact about Queen Anne; it is
not a fact about anyone or anything—it is a general fact. Or if
it is about anything, what it is about is not QueenAnne—it is
about the earth, maybe, which has rolled around the sun so
many times since there was a person who was called ‘Anne’,
reigned over England, etc. (Prior 1962, p. 13, [27])
Please note that by ‘fact’ Prior means something like true proposition,
while whatever facts are ‘about’ refers to the existent state of affairs that
makes that proposition true. Anyway, for Prior, facts about the past
constitute the set of beliefs that are putatively true and thus in need
of truthmakers. The problem is that the past does not exist, according
to Prior’s presentism, and hence he tries to find plausible candidates
in the present to act as referents and truthmakers for claims about the
past. Prior admits he isn’t too sure what exactly these the truthmak-
ing features are, and suggests that it could even be some feature of the
earth as a whole, which is why this position is called global property
presentism.
Prior’s point is not grammatical but ontological. He is not arguing
that the true grammar of past tensed expressions implies that we are
really talking about general features of the earth. I am sure he recog-
nises that the grammar of ‘Queen Anne is dead’ is most naturally read
as the attribution of something to some particular entity. But his
appraisal of the ontology of time, i.e. that the past does not exist, convin-
ces him that the grammar of past tensed expressions must be misleading,
and consequently suggests another way of understanding them.
Prior’s position can be criticised for being too vague. Surely, the
claim ‘Queen Anne’s death was peaceful’ and ‘dinosaurs roamed the
Earth’ are made true by different things, but his suggestion doesn’t give
much guidance as to which features of the present this would be. Very
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plausibly, Prior means to say that Queen Anne’s death must have left a
mark on reality, to contribute somehow to what it is like today. How-
ever, he doesn’t give any details about how such marks are left, and
where to find them. I’ll venture to offer more detail. We find out about
Queen Anne’s death by checking what is documented in historical re-
cords. So, the historical record, and its endurance in the present from
the time of her death until now, is a much better suggestion than the
earth as a whole about what it is about the present world that justifies
our belief that there indeed was such a things as Queen Anne’s death.
Fossilised remains of dinosaurs represent the particular marks left on
reality by the dinosaurs of the past, preserved in what could be called
the natural record of the past. We then have two distinct features of the
present world to support our belief in the death of Queen Anne and in
the prehistoric existence of dinosaurs. But do such entities really make
our beliefs true, as opposed to simply constituting our grounds for be-
lief? Well return to that question later.
ABSTRACT ENTITY PRESENTISM
Others have suggested, as truthmakers for past tensed expressions, vari-
ous abstract entities that are not to be understood as properties of
the concretely existingpresent. For instance, that expressions like ‘Socra-
tes was wise’ refers to an individual essence of Socrates, a kind of abstract
entity that could exist even if Socrates’ has physically ceased to exist
(Craig 2000, p. 199, [9]). I find this suggestion too arbitrary and epis-
temically uninformative. It’s very easy to postulate that everything that
comes to be in the present leaves an incorporeal trace of itself that some-
how endures in the present thereafter—and to appeal to such incor-
poreal entities to support one’s belief that P is true—but it is difficult
to identify those traces and extract any information about the past
from them. Furthermore, this strategy converts presentism from one
of the sparsest ontological doctrines of all, into something much less
sparse; in addition to the present being constituted by the current state
of the world, it also consists in the incorporeal individual essences left
by every becoming in the history of the universe. I don’t have a knock
down argument against such a view. The best I can do is to challenge
the need to postulate it.
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Another option is ersatz presentism. Instead of postulating individual
abstract entities for each concrete particular and/or event that
ever existed, ersatz presentism postulates that at each present moment,
there exists, for every future and past time, a set of propositions repre-
senting the state of the world at those times (Bourne 2006, [4]; Crisp
2007, [11]). Now, sometimes it appears that such ersatz times are only
postulated for representational purposes, to allow us to talk about
the future and past (Wüthrich 2012, p. 445, [35]), but of course this
would not go a long way towards answering any objections to presen-
tism. On the other hand the same writers claim that ersatz presentism
represents a promising solution to the problem of reference and truth
(Wüthrich 2012, abstract, [35]).
Like Mozersky (2015, p. 44, [24]), I worry that if ersatz times are
assumed to have a truthmaking function this threatens to reverse the
ontological priority of the present. The core idea of presentism, as I
understand it, is that reality is grounded in the concretely existing
present. Ersatz presentism instead construes times as abstract proposi-
tions, which then somehow make true anything expressed about con-
crete events at various presents. Now, obviously it is possible to argue
that the ersatz times that represent the past are marks left by the past, in
the sameway individual essences are, but this won’t work for the future,
because it has yet to make a mark on the present.
In addition, ersatz presentism doesn’t explain either how these er-
satz times figure in our epistemic practices and so cannot be used to
support our beliefs about the past. It is still the case that we learn about
dinosaurs from fossils in the ground and not by accessing a realm of
abstract propositions. Furthermore, none of the options that postulate
abstract entities address at all the issues we have about causation and
persistence.
The main worry about these general, incorporeal, and abstract enti-
ties that presentists are postulating is that they are entities that do not re-
ally come with a story of genesis; how do they come into being, if at all?
Nor do they come with a story about how they figure in our epistemic
practices. They are difficult to understand as marks on present reality
that could somehow inform us about the past. They appear instead as ar-
bitrary postulations about the world having whatever feature required
to make some or other expression about the past true. In other words,
the preferred procedure seems to be that we first decide—on sheer in-
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tuition it seems—which propositions about the past are true, to then
infer that the world must at present bear some truthmaking features
that make those propositions true. This just isn’t in conformity with
what we actually do in our epistemic practices. We justify our beliefs
about the past by appealing to the historical and natural record. These
records exist concretely in the present in the form of various man made
artefacts (books, audio recordings, photos, films, archaeological arte-
facts, etc.) and natural remains such as fossils, layers of soil and rock,
oil, etc. Nobody says that Socrates waswise because this is evident from
his individual incorporeal essence, but because of what we learn from
the historical record.
LUCRETIAN OR NOMIC PRESENTISM
A more concrete suggestion about what counts as a mark of the past
in the present, is the concrete and determinate state of the world at
any given time. The basic idea is that when things are alive and kick-
ing, they leave a concrete mark on enduring reality; we have scars left
as reminders of former times, and we find fossils in the ground. John
Bigelow tells us that this is a core idea in Stoic presentism, and he cites
Sextus Empiricus as saying: “if this man has a scar, this man has had
a wound” (1996, p. 41, [3]). If we perceive that a man has a scar
now we can infer that he has had a wound in the past. It isn’t clear to
me whether Empiricus intends to say that we actually ascribe the prop-
erty of ‘having had awound’ to the scarredman, but at least he is saying
that we can infer from the state of things now, how something was in
the past. This satisfies my qualms about howwe find out about the past.
The question is if our grounds for believing p, must be the same as what
actually makes p true.
The name ‘nomic presentism’ (Kierland 2013, [20]), as far as I can
tell, really denotes the same basic idea, but is more concerned with the
modern idea that that on the basis of our knowledge of the qualitative
state of theworld at any given present, and our knowledge of the laws of
nature, we are able to infer what the world was like in the past (and pre-
dict how it will be in future). To do this we don’t need to postulate the
existence of incorporeal, general, or abstract entities existing somehow
parallel to the existing qualitative state of concrete reality. The laws of
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nature are in turn perfectly befitting a presentist ontology, because the
world instantiates them at any given time.
Now, I like nomic presentism as a view of the world and of how we
find out about the world, but not as a way to make our claims about
the past true. First, as a thruthmaking theory it requires the world to
be causally determined, in order that each state of the universe passes
on—in an unbroken chain—information not just about itself and each
immediately preceding state, but about every preceding stage. If the
world was like that, it would certainly allow us to extract information
about the past, but also makes the future as fixed and determined as the
past. I find this to be an unwanted consequence.
The second problem is that even if we grant causal determinacy and
ignore the problems of a fixed future, I still don’t see how the present
+ laws can ground the truth of our beliefs about the past; not on any
extant theory of truth. The present + the laws of nature, doesn’t look in
any way like the past, so it can hardly make our beliefs about the past
true by corresponding to them. Appeal must be made to a completely
different notion of truth.
There are theories about truth that do not require the existence of
whatever it is a proposition is about, but I can’t see that they will do the
nomic presentist any good. The coherence and pragmatic theories of
truth do not make truth reliant on what the world is like at all. The de-
flationary theory arguably rejects truth altogether, and the identity the-
ory construes truth as an identity of a belief to a true proposition, not to
the world (for a more detailed discussion of various truth-theories, see
Ingthorsson, forthcoming [18]). The identity theory may work for some
forms of erzats presentism, but not nomic presentism. The suggestion
will only work if we understand ‘making true’ in some altogether new
and primitive way. I have yet to see presentists take a stand on this issue
and won’t speculate further on this issue here. Instead I will consider
the alternative most presentists do not consider at all; why not simply
deny that expressions about the past have truth values? I for my own
part am perfectly satisfied as long as it is possible for a presentist to jus-
tify her beliefs about the past, say, that dinosaurs roamed the earth.
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3 True vs. Justified Beliefs about the Past
Presentists deny the existence of the past, but they acknowledge the
existence of everything that any scientific discipline has ever de facto
appealed to in their justification of theories/hypotheses about the past—
man made documentation, fossils, evolution theory, knowledge of the
laws of nature—because they all obtain now. Consequently, justifica-
tion is obviously no problem at all. But, the beliefs we justify about the
past cannot correspond to anything. Does this mean that we cannot say
that we have knowledge about the past? Well, it does at least imply
that our knowledge about the past is at best hypothetical and fallible,
which is what is already acknowledged about our knowledge about the
present. If knowledge is justified belief that is also true, knowledge is
by definition infallible. A belief that is true, will not just never happen to
be falsified; it cannot be falsified (it can only be falsely falsified by some
experimental mistake).
More than anything, this problem revolves around the philosophi-
cal question of how exactly to understand knowledge. It does not really
concern the epistemology of the past or our current epistemic practices.
No A- or B-theorist argues that we find out about the past in any other
way than by inferring it from the historical and natural record as it exists
at any given time. That simply is the way science works. Accordingly,
this discussion only concerns our general attitude towards the past—do
we believe it exists or not—and with our understanding of knowledge
generally speaking. I will focus on the latter question, which I under-
stand to be a question of whether we can allow knowledge to come in
degrees; is some knowledge both justified and true, and is some knowl-
edge only justified?
The first thing to note that a conception of knowledge about the past
as only justified but not true, is not equal to a conception of knowled-
ge about the present as only justified but not true. If we believe some-
thing about the present on the basis of the available evidence, but it fails
to correspond to reality because the available evidence was incomplete,
then our belief is false because it represents reality as it really isn’t. How-
ever, if we believe something about the past on the basis of the avail-
able evidence but it fails to correspond to reality because the past has
ceased to exist, this does not mean that the belief represents the past
as it really wasn’t. Sure, to make this argument really stick, one would
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have to develop a theory of falsemaking, which I will not do here.
However, I think the point is intuitively clear enough for my present
purposes, notably that lack of truthmakers for past tensed expressions
does not make our ideas about the past into misrepresentations of
the past, but the lack of truthmakers for present tensed expressions will
inevitably mean that these expressions misrepresent reality.
Second, the idea that knowledge has to be true and justified is al-
ready too strict to comply with received views about what counts as
knowledge. We generally call everything knowledge that strikes us as
justified on the basis of the available evidence, never mind whether it
actually is true. We even call some things knowledge that we know is
false. Take classical mechanics as an example. We know that classical
mechanics is at best a useful approximation to reality, but it continues to
be a staple in physics education and continues to be called knowledge.
It continues to be a part of the curriculum because it is so useful and
much easier to apply in the situationswhere it is known to give the same
results as quantum mechanics and theory of relativity respectively.
At the very least, our beliefs about the past that are justified by the
historical recordwould continue to be called knowledge even ifwe agree
it cannot correspond to a past that no longer exists. Otherwise put,
the concept of knowledge that is already in use, is one that allows of
degrees.
On a related note, some may worry that the lack of truth-values
for expressions about the past implies that the past is indeterminate.
Statements about the past are popularly believed to have determinate
truth-values because once things happen in a certain way in the present
there is no way to undo or change it. However, I can’t see that truth
has much to do with determination. For mind-independent reality to
be determinate, it is not required that there be propositions about it with
determinate truth-values, nor is it required that the past be determinate
for it to be true that whatever happens in the present is determinate
and can never be undone. It is enough to know that what happens
in the present is always determinate for us to know that what happened
in the past also was determinate, because when it happened it was pre-
sent and thus determinate. This conclusion holds whether or not we
know anything about the past. The intuition that once things have hap-
pened, they can never be undone, is satisfied perfectly well by the
consideration that once things have happened and ceased to exist, they
62
cannot be undone; you cannot go back to a non-existent past to undo
it. And anyway, it is supposed to be the case that propositions have
determinate truth-values because reality is determinate, not the other
way around.
So, would it be so outrageous to suggest that the idea of knowledge
being true justified belief may perhaps be useful as a regulative idea for
what we ideally strive towards, but fails to demarcate between what is
today counted as knowledge andwhat doesn’t. All things considered, it
would seem a little thing to allow our beliefs about the future and past
to be called knowledge, if the available evidence justifies them, even if
they cannot in principle correspond to anything. I take it to be an open
question still, in epistemology, whether knowledge is to be demarcated
in terms of true justified belief or not. Consequently, philosophy of time
should not decide in favour of one particular theory of time on the basis
of a premature stance on what is the correct view of knowledge. That
would be a case of letting one epistemic position override anymetaphys-
ical concerns, to settle a metaphysical issue.
What I have so far argued with regards to knowledge and truth
does not of course prove anything. It just serves to show that the con-
sequences of denying that past and future tensed propositions can be
true, are not so serious as to make that option unthinkable. It does not
have any implications for our current epistemic practices, nor diminish
our prospects of justifying our beliefs. Let me now turn from truth and
knowledge, to persistence and causation.
4 Persistence and Causation are Not Cross-Time
Relations
Can persistence and causation be explicated in presentistic terms, i.e.
without invoking cross-time relations? The answer is yes, and this
should not be news to anyone. The Aristotelian account of change, per-
sistence, and causation already is presentistic. Let us briefly consider
the Aristotelian account of change, in contrast to the contemporary char-
acterisation of change as “simply difference or nonidentity in the fea-
tures of things” (Mortensen 2016, sect. 1, [23]). The latter is sometimes
cashed out more formally in terms of a conjunction of (or difference
between) two states, i.e. ‘a-is-G-at-t’ and ‘a-is-not-G-at-t∗’, which can
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very easily be interpreted as a cross-temporal characterisation of change,
notably as a relation between the temporal parts of a which are G and
not-G respectively. This is what Johanna Seibt calls the ‘state analysis
of change’, which she argues is one of many unquestioned presupposi-
tions inwhat she calls the ‘paradigmof substance ontology’ (1996, [31]).
But the substance ontology she has in mind is not the Aristotelian ontol-
ogy; it is the ontology favoured in 20th Century analytic philosophy, by
philosophers that notoriously resist primitive notions.
Far from being a relation across times between two states of a thing,
the Aristotelian account of change in terms of alteration, i.e. a material
substance ceasing to manifest one quality and beginning to manifest
another contrary quality, excludes that change can involve any such rela-
tion. Since the two states of a thing, before and after the change, are con-
trary states of one and the same entity that endures through the change,
the existence of one state excludes the existence of the other. Change
simply cannot be a relation between existent states, located (existing)
at different times, at least if we accept the idea that relations can only
hold between existent entities.
As I have argued elsewhere (2001, [13] and 2016, ch. 7, [16]) the
problem of temporary intrinsics—which is meant to show that things
cannot really endure—arises only when it is first assumed that all times
exist in parity; it is only on the assumption that ‘a-is-G-at-t’ and ‘a-is-not-
G-at-t∗’ are equally existent and real entities located at different times
that we get the conclusion that a is equally G and not-G. Indeed, David
Lewis admits that presentism, which denies temporal parity, avoids the
problem (1986, p. 222ff, [21]). Accordingly, the only thing the prob-
lem of temporary intrinsic establishes is that the attempt to combine
endurance and eternalism leads to contradiction; ergo, things cannot
endure in tenseless time (for a more detailed argument, see Ingthors-
son 2009, [15]).
Otherwise put, the Aristotelian account does not portray a succes-
sion of states as constituents of change—it is not what change consists
in—but a consequence of change, i.e. of the alteration of something from
one state to a contrary state while remaining numerically the same. The
state analysis can really only be understood either as a description of
the appearance of change (we first observe a to be G, and later we ob-
serve it to be not-G) or it is a statement of what change must be like if
one assumes eternalism to be true.
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Indeed, persistence, and causation cannot possibly be cross-temporal
relations either on the Aristotelian account, for the very same reason
change cannot be a cross-temporal relation (admittedly, this is not as ob-
vious in the case of causation). Persistence cannot be a cross-temporal
relation if, as the Aristotelian assumes, things persist by enduring; i.e.
if they pass from one time to another and in that process cease to exist
at the time it passes from. On this view, an object existing wholly at t1
cannot stand in a relation to itself at other times because it doesn’t exist
at any other time. Indeed, already Aristotle addressed the problem of
temporary intrinsics, which he attributed to the Sophists, notably the ar-
gument that Chrysippus in the market place is not identical to Chrysip-
pus in the gymnasium, because some things hold true of the former that
does not hold for the latter (Physics: Bk. 4, Part 11, [2]). Aristotle’s so-
lution is that Chrysippus remains numerically the same while loosing
and acquiring properties as he saunters from the market place to the
gymnasium. When in the market place, there is no Chrysippus in the
gymnasium, and vice versa.
Another interesting example of when prior commitments affect the
appreciation of philosophical views—and which helps to understand
why contemporary philosophers are not comfortable with presentism—
is that it is difficult to deal with presentism in the language of first or-
der predicate logic. At least if first order predicate logic is meant to
function like Quine prescribed, notably to specify our existential com-
mitments (for arguments to this effect, see Øhrstrøm and Schärfe 2004,
[36]; Seibt 2016, [33]). Sure one can introduce temporal operators, but
on Quine’s understanding, such operators must operate on something
existing, wherefore the use of past tense operators to talk about Chrysip-
pus in the market place is still to quantify over existents (there exists an
x such that Px). Indeed, as Øhrstrom and Schärfe argue, it was concerns
about Quine’s idea about ontology that drove Arthur Prior to develop
a temporal logic of a different kind.
Now, I do not want to get entangled in the details of the endurance
vs. perdurance debate. I have nothing to add to what I have elsewhere
argued (2001, [13]; 2009, [14] and 2016, ch. 7, [15]). The important
point for this paper is simply to point out that the problem of cross-time
relation is not a reductio ad absurdum of presentism because alternative
explanations of persistence and causation are available. The alternatives
may well be problematic in many respects, but those who appeal to the
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problem of cross-time relations do not often take any such problems
into consideration; they typically assume that no options exist.
Let us now consider causation, and again turn to Aristotle, at least
initially. As with the case for change, there is a tension between the
Aristotelian account of causation and what I take to be the received
view in philosophy today, notably, that causation is at rock bottom a
relation between temporally distinct events. The latter has become so
well entrenched in the philosophical tradition that there is little or no
awareness of alternatives. Consider that Jonathan Schaffer’s entry on
‘The Metaphysics of Causation’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy (2016, [30]) is written entirely on the assumption that all extant
views portray causation as a relation, and that the controversies about
causation only revolve around the nature of the relata or of the rela-
tion. Schaffer does discusses various problems with what he calls causal
processes, but deals with them as if they are composed of sequences of
stages and/or events. Schaffer seems unaware of the fact that philoso-
phers like Salmon (1984, p. 139ff [29]) and Seibt (2000, [32]), explic-
itly reject an event ontology of processes, and likewise that Ingthorsson
(2002, [14]), Chakravartty (2005, [7]) and Mumford and Anjum (2011,
[25]) explicitly argue that causation should be thought of as a process
instead of as a relation. Clearly there are non-relational conceptions of
causation also in contemporary philosophy, but let us here focus on the
traditional Aristotelian view.
Note however, that the account I offer is not Aristotle’s original view.
It is a paraphrase of a viewwidely attributed to theAristotelian school of
thought. It comes very close to the account stated byHobbes in the very
early beginnings of empiricism (1656, ch. IX–X, [12]). Bunge (1959, ch.
2, [5]) and Johansson (1989, p. ch. 12, [19]) offer similar paraphrases
of the causal realist tradition they trace back to Aristotle. The main dif-
ference from the original view, is that it does not include final causes.
Indeed, alreadyHobbes argued against final causes (1656, p. ch. X, sect.
7, [12]), although his account is roughly Aristotelian in many other re-
spects
According to the roughlyAristotelian view I have inmind, then, new
states of affairs are producedwhen an already existingmaterial body, or
complex of bodies, changes due to an external influence without which
the change would never have come about and the new state of affairs
never exist. The kernel of this view comes out clearly in the slogan
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‘whatever comes to be is necessarily born by the action of a cause’; very
probably a paraphrase of Aristotle’s claim that “everything that comes
to be comes to be by the agency of something and from something and
comes to be something” (Metaphysics, bk. 7, part 7, [1]). Typically, the
external influence, or cause, is depicted in terms of an ‘extrinsic mo-
tive Agent’ (or, simply Agent, i.e. an object possessing an active causal
power), which exerts that power upon another object. The latter objects
is typically called Patient since its role in the interaction is to passively
receive the influence exerted by an Agent and change in some specific
way in accordance to its passive power, i.e. an ability to change in some
specific way in response to the influence of the active power. Accord-
ingly, a cause is the exertion of influence by an Agent upon a Patient and
an effect is the resulting change in the Patient.
When I say that a cause is the action of an Agent upon a Patient, then
one should not understand a cause asmerely the action of theAgent, but
as the interaction between Agent and Patient. It is this interaction that I
identify with a process of production, and there are two salient features of
this process that need emphasis, because they stand in stark contrast to
the relational view of causation. The first point is that causal influence is
something that is exerted by anAgent on a Patient. In otherwords—and
this is critical for understanding the main point of this paper—actions
occur between persistent objects, not between events or states. It is not the
cause that acts on or influences the effect, indeed, that is impossible. If
the effect only comes into existence by being produced by the cause, i.e.
by the action of the ‘efficient cause’, the effect cannot be subject to the
very same action that is supposed to produce it. To assume the effect
is subject to the action that produces it, is to assume the effect already
existed when it is acted upon, and thus could not have been produced
by that very same action. Indeed, we see in the following passage from
Hobbes a clear statement both of the idea that actions occur between
persistent objects, and that the effect only comes into being as a conse-
quence of actions between persistent objects:
A body is said to work upon or act, that is to say, do some-
thing to another body, when it either generates or destroys
some accident in it: and the body in which an accident is
generated or destroyed is said to suffer, that is, to have some-
thing done to it by another body; as when one body by put-
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ting forwards another body generatesmotion in it, it is called
an AGENT; and the body in which motion is so generated,
is called the PATIENT; so fire that warms the hand is the
Agent, and the hand, which is warmed, is the Patient. That
accident, which is generated in the Patient, is called the EF-
FECT (Hobbes 1656, part II, ch. IX, sect 1, [12])
The second point is that the Aristotelian view depicts effects as the prod-
uct not of the action of the Agent alone, but of a total cause of a certain
kind; it is a product of the way two or more material bodies act on each
other in virtue of their powers to produce a change in those very bodies.
Again we can appeal to Hobbes as witness:
[…] an entire cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both
of the agents how many soever they be, and of the patient,
put together; whichwhen they are all supposed to be present,
it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the
same instant; and if any one of them be wanting, it cannot
be understood but that the effect is not produced.
(Hobbes 1656, ch. X, sect. 3, [12])
Joining now together the Aristotelian account of change, persistence,
and causation, there is not much conceptual space left to think of cau-
sation as a two-place relation between two existents existing at differ-
ent times. Whatever material entities there exist at one time will pass in
their entirety to the next by virtue of enduring, whether it be unchanged
or changed by any occurring causal influence. Furthermore, an event or
state existing at one time does not cause the next by somehow standing
in an unanalysed and/or primitive relation of ‘production’ to the later
event/state. Causal production is analysed in terms of a change in a
complex of objects provoked by an influence exerted between those ob-
jects. Since the influence is exerted between objects, and the temporal
relation between those objects is permanently synchronous, there never
is a diachronic relation of influence between anything. In particular,
the relation of production cannot be such a diachronic relation because
whatever produces anything ceases to exist in that process.
The Aristotelian view I have described seems to me to be in accor-
dance to all major schools of thought before the rise of empiricism (in
68
the particular respects considered here). In Atomism, Stoicism, Scholas-
ticismaswell as in the corpuscular viewendorsed by the natural philoso-
phers of the early enlightenment, the common assumption is that in-
fluence is exerted between two material objects whose relation is syn-
chronous. Indeed, as far as I can tell, this is still a standard understand-
ing in particle physics. All the fundamental forces of nature are exerted
between persistent entities (some of them do persist very briefly, that
is true, but persist nevertheless). In the Large Hadron Collider they are
not accelerating events to make them smash into other events; they ac-
celerate particles to make them smash together to break each other up.
In chemistry the assumption is that various substances react with each
other. Oxygen reacts with some fuel to combust; oxygen does not react
with combustion. Furthermore, the common sense conception is that
bodies act on each other: the leaden ball dropped upon a pillow acts on
the pillow to make a hollow (the falling doesn’t act upon the forming
of a hollow); the horse pulls the cart (not: the motion of the horse that
pulls themotion of the cart); the brick hits the window (not: themotion
of the brick hits the breaking of the window).
5 Conclusion
The very humble conclusion that this paper leads up to, is simply that
presentists would not be absurdly out of touch with reality were they to
suggest that future and past tensed propositions just are not true, or to
deny that persistence and causation are at rock bottom cross-time rela-
tions. They should argue that while future and past tensed expressions
just can’t be technically true, we still have all the reasons we ever have
had to believe what the past used to be like and what the future will be.
No loss epistemically to deny the existence of the future and past. And
they should point out that the idea that persistence and causality are
cross-temporal relations is a peculiarly Humean/empiricist conception
that doesn’t resonate with the Aristotelian view of things.
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on research in the project “Scientific Essentialism:
Modernising the Aristotelian View”, funded 2015–2018 by Riksbankens
69
Jubileumsfond: Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences,
Grant-ID: P14-0822:1.
Bibliography
[1] Aristotle (Metaphysics). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Ross, W.D. (ed.).
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924.
[2] Aristotle (Physics). Physics. In: Wickstead, P.H. and Cornford,
F.M. (transl.): Aristotle. Vol. IV. Cambridge Massachusetts: Har-
vard University Press, 1957.
[3] Bigelow, J. (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Per-
spectives 10: 35–52.
[4] Bourne, C. (2006). A Future for Presentism. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
[5] Bunge, M. (1959). Causality. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press.
[6] Cameron, R. (2015). The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and
Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[7] Chakravartty, A. (2005). Causal Realism: Events and Processes.
Erkenntnis 63(1): 7–31.
[8] Craig, W.L. (1998). McTaggart’s Paradox and the Problem of Tem-
porary Intrinsics. Analysis 58: 122–7
[9] Craig, W.L. (2000). The Tensed Theory of Time. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
[10] Crisp, T.M. (2005). Presentism and “Cross-Time” Relations. Amer-
ican Philosophical Quarterly 42(1): 5–17.
[11] Crisp, T.M. (2007). Presentism and the Grounding Objection.
Noûs 41: 90–109.
[12] Hobbes, T. (1656). Elements of Philosophy Concerning Body. In: W.
Molesworth (ed.): The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmes-
bury. London: Bohn, 1839.
[13] Ingthorsson, R.D. (2001). Temporal Parity and the ProblemofChange.
SATS–Northern European Journal of Philosophy 2(2): 60–79.
[14] Ingthorsson, R.D. (2002). Causal Production as Interaction. Meta-
physica 3(1): 87–119.
[15] Ingthorsson, R.D. (2009). Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time?
SATS–Northern Europe Journal of Philosophy 10(1): 79–99.
70
[16] Ingthorsson, R.D. (2016). McTaggart’s Paradox. New York: Rout-
ledge.
[17] Ingthorsson, R.D. (2017). Challenging the Grounding Objection
to Presentism. Manuscrito 40(1): 87–107.
[18] Ingthorsson, R.D. (forthcoming). There’s No Truth-Theory Like
the Correspondence Theory. Discusiones Filosóficas.
[19] Johansson, I. (1989). Ontological Investigations: an Inquiry into the
Categories of Nature, Man, and Society. New York: Routledge.
[20] Kierland, B. (2013). Grounding Past Truths: Overcoming the Chal-
lenge. In: Ciuni, R., Miller, K. and Torrengo, G. (eds.): New Papers
on the Present—Focus on Presentism. Philosophia Verlag: pp. 173–
209.
[21] Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Black-
well.
[22] Markosian, N. (2004). A Defense of Presentism. Oxford Studies in
Metaphysics 1(3): 47–82.
[23] Mortensen, C. (2016). Change and Inconsistency. In: Zalta, E.N.
(ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archves/win2016/entries/change/.
Accessed Nov 12, 2018.
[24] Mozersky, J.M. (2015). Time, Language, and Ontology. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
[25] Mumford, S. and Anjum, R.L. (2011). Getting Causes from Powers.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[26] Oaklander, L.N. (2010). McTaggart”s Paradox and Crisp”s Presen-
tism. Philosophia 38(2): 229–41.
[27] Prior, A.N. (1962). Changes in Events and Changes in Things. Law-
rence, Kan.: University of Kansas Press.
[28] Prosser, S. (2016). Experiencing Time. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
[29] Salmon, W. (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of
the World. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
[30] Schaffer, J. (2016). The Metaphysics of Causation. In: Zalta, E.N.
(ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/
causation-metaphysics/. Accessed Nov 12, 2018.
[31] Seibt, J. (1996). Existence in Time: From Substance to Process.
In: Faye, J., Scheffler, U. and Urs, M. (eds.): Perspectives on Time.
71
Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer: pp.
143–82.
[32] Seibt, J. (2000). The Dynamic Constitution of Things. Poznan Stud-
ies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 76: 241–78.
[33] Seibt, J. (2016). Process Philosophy. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.): The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/
process-philosophy/. Accessed Nov 12, 2018
[34] Torrengo, G. (2017). The Myth of Presentism’s Intuitive Appeal,
Phenomenology and Mind 12: 50–56.
[35] Wüthrich, C. (2012). Demarkating Presentism. In: de Regt, H.
Okasha, S. and Hartmann, S. (eds.): EPSA Philosophy of Science:
Amsterdam 2009. Dordrecth: Springer: pp. 441–50.
[36] Øhrstrøm, P. and Schärfe, H. (2004). A PrioreanApproach to Time
Ontologies. In: Wolff, K.E. et al. (eds.): International Conference
on Conceptual Structures 2004: Conceptual Structures at Work, Dor-
drecht: Springer: pp. 388–401.
72
Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s
Paradox and the R-theory
of Time
L. Nathan Oaklander
University of Michigan-Flint, USA
lno@umflint.edu
Abstract
In his provocative book, McTaggart’s Paradox (2016, [9]), R.D. Ingthors-
son argues that McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time rests on
the principle of temporal parity according to which all times or events in
time exist equally or co-exist in a sense that is compatible with their being
successive. Moreover, since temporal parity is also an essential tenet of
the B-theory, McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time can also
be used to undermine the B-theory. Ingthorsson argues further that only
by adopting an ontologically frugal presentist metaphysics can one avoid
McTaggart’s paradox and account for identity through time and change.
The aim of this paper is to clarify Russell’s authentic view of time in con-
trast to the B-theory which is McTaggart’s misrepresentation of Russell
and argue that temporal parity it is not a fundamental tenet of the Rus-
sellian (R-) theory. For that reason, the R-theory is immune to objections
that are based on temporal parity. I shall then offermy own interpretation
of McTaggart’s paradox that renders Ingthorsson’s version of presentism
subject to it.
Keywords: McTaggart’s Paradox, A-series, B-series, temporal parity,
Russellian (fact) ontology, substance ontology, presentism.
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1 Introduction
In his valuable book on McTaggart’s Paradox, R.D. Ingthorsson (2016,
[9]) makes some provocative claims regarding the scholarship on
McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time. Most notable is his
claim that the key assumption that McTaggart employs in his argument,
namely, the principle of temporal parity—the view that all times (whe-
ther A-times or B-times) exist equally or co-exist—is a basic tenet of the
B-theory and therefore, McTaggart’s paradox cannot be used to support
the B-theory. In other words, McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of
the A-series rests on a premise that also undermines the B-series, and
the B-theory of time. Ingthorsson expresses this point as follows: “But,
in the end, the central question still is, do all times exist in parity or not?
If they do [as the B view maintains], then how should we understand
such a reality as temporal? That is, wherein lies the temporality of ear-
lier than and later than?” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 141, [9]).
A further provocative claim Ingthorsson makes is that virtually all
commentators on McTaggart’s philosophy of time have failed to recog-
nize the connection between his a priori metaphysics, that is, his view
of Absolute Reality, and his view of Present Experience. Ingthorsson
maintains McTaggart’s argument for time’s unreality is intended to
demonstrate that time as it is given to us in experience, as stated in
the chapter “Time,” in (1927, [14]), is incompatible with his view of
Absolute Reality found in (1921, [13]). For that reason, Ingthorsson is
highly critical of Broad (1933, p. 9, [3]) who claims that McTaggart’s
paradox is a stand-alone argument that is not dependent on the results
in the first part of his inquiry.
Another controversial thesis of Ingthorsson’s book is that McTag-
gart is not concerned with the language of time, but the ontology of
time. McTaggart’s argument is not based on the proper semantic analy-
sis of sentences which record the facts of temporal becoming, such as “It
is raining,” and “It’s raining has been future and will be past,” but with
their ontological analysis. Ingthorsson argues that given the principles
that underlie McTaggart’s substance ontology, the ontological ground
of time as we experience it and express it in ordinary language can-
not exist, and since McTaggart believes that only what exists is real, he
concludes that time is unreal. Thus, it is a mistake to claim as Broad
(1938, p. 317 [4]), Lowe (1987, [11]) and others have done that McTag-
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gart’s argument is based on linguistic confusions.
At the outset, I would like to say that I applaud Ingthorsson’s empha-
sis on the ontology that underlies McTaggart’s argument, and given the
ontology he attributes toMcTaggart, I would not contest that he demon-
strates that time is unreal. So, I wholeheartedly agree with his emphasis
on the ontology and not the language of time. However, I shall argue
that a textual case can also be made for questioning the claim that Mc-
Taggart’s a priori metaphysics developed in (1921, [13]) is what he em-
ploys to demonstrate the unreality of time in (1927, [14]). There is an
important difference between the ontology Ingthorsson attributes toMc-
Taggart, and the ontology McTaggart employs to generate his paradox.
Indeed, the ontology presupposed by McTaggart’s argument (the doc-
trine of external relations) is inconsistent with his prior commitments.
Therefore, not only is Ingthorssonmistaken aboutMcTaggart basing his
argument on his prior ontology, I will show that McTaggart is incon-
sistent in that he bases the argument on an incompatible (Russellian)
ontology.
Furthermore, I would also question whether McTaggart’s argument
for the unreality of time shares a common assumption with Russell’s
view that McTaggart claims to be critiquing in the chapter on “Time,”
that the B-series alone constitutes time. Ingthorsson claims that just as
McTaggart’s ontology implies that all temporal positions whether past,
present or future co-exist equally even if they are not present, on the B-
theory all times co-exist equally even if they are not simultaneous, but
successive. Indeed, it is the co-existence of past, present and future that
is common to McTaggart and the B-theorists. As he puts it,
To illustrate the fundamental difference between A theorists,
on the one side, and McTaggart and the B theorists on the
other [we can say:] The former cannot understand why we
should think of the future and past as an existing reality—at
least not one separate from what exists in the present—and
thus fail to see why we should interpret claims about the
future and past as claims about something non-present and
yet existing, whereas the latter cannot understand how we
can fail to think of the future and past as co-existingwith the
present, even though they are not co-located in time.
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 89, [9])
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Ingthorsson’s thesis is that the only adequate A-theory is presentism,
since it rejects temporal parity, whereas all other theories followMcTag-
gart and B-theorists in accepting temporal parity, and thereby fail. Thus,
Ingthorsson maintains that the fundamental debate is not between A-
and B-theorists, but between those who adopt the temporal parity the-
sis (McTaggart and B-theorists and others),1 and those who deny it
(presentists). I shall argue, however, that there is a third alternative
that involves a Russellian (or R-theoretic) ontology of time that differs
from presentism, McTaggart and the B-theory, as Ingthorsson under-
stands them. The debate between R-theorists and Ingthorsson’s version
of presentism is between those who view the spatio-temporal universe
as the sole purview of reality and those who view the world as greater
than the universe, including non-spatial and non-temporal objects. The
fundamental debate, in other words is between naturalists and ontolo-
gists to use terms that Reinhardt Grossmann (1992, [8]) did to distin-
guish a fundamental philosophical divide.
To explainwhat I consider to bewrongwith how Ingthorsson charac-
terizes the fundamental agreement between McTaggart and the B-theo-
rists it will be necessary to distinguish McTaggart’s understanding of B-
relations and the B-series fromaRussellian understanding of R-relations
and the R-series.2 Given the incommensurability between McTaggart
and Russell’s analyses of the “B-series” it is a mistake to believe that
the temporal parity thesis in McTaggart’s argument against the A- and
B-series can also be employed against the R-series to demonstrate that
“the conception of temporal reality as a series of events […] related as
earlier/later than each other […] is a conception of a changeless real-
ity and consequently not a conception of a temporal reality” (Ingthors-
son 2016, p. 92, [9]). I shall proceed by briefly summarizing in section
II, McTaggart’s ontology as Ingthorsson understands it, and how it dif-
fers from Russell’s ontology. Then, in section III, I will explain key ele-
ments of the Russellian or R-theory of time and the principle of temporal
parity, demonstrating how they differ. In the fourth section, I discuss
McTaggart’s paradox and showhow it not only undermines theA-series,
but that it is also applicable to presentism as Ingthorsson conceives of
1Ingthorsson tends to include A-B hybrids, moving spotlight theorists, and even
growing blockers among those who accept temporal parity.
2I contrast the B-theory and the R-theory below (pp. 9–11). See also, Oaklander,
2016, 2015, 2014a, 2014b and 2012 [17–21].
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it. Since his paradox can be interpreted to show that succession, con-
strued R-theoretically, is the ground of the passage of time, and since
presentism rejects cross-temporal relations, McTaggart’s argument un-
dermines Ingthorsson’s presentism as well.
2 McTaggart’s Substance Ontology and Russell’s
Fact Ontology
According to Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s metaphysics “is the ultimate
substance ontology and alluring in its simplicity. Reality is grounded in
the existence of substances that bear properties and stand in relations”
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 15, [9]). Regarding substance McTaggart claims:
There is a substance which contains all existent content, and
of which every other substance is a part. This substance is
called the Universe. A universe contains all existent content.
Or we can define the Universe as a substance of which all
other substances are parts.
(McTaggart 1921, sect. 135, p. 148, [13])
As Ingthorsson interprets him,
McTaggart presupposes that time, if real, is a compound
whole whose every part is equally existent and real. […]
Since existence and reality coincide, and every existing thing
is in time, then by time he includes thewhole of reality. There
is no distinction to be drawn between existence, reality and
time, in terms of their constituents. […] In other words, time
cannot be external to existent reality but must be an existing part
of it.
(Ingthorsson 2016, pp. 23–24, 29, [emphasis added], [9])
McTaggart says that if any reality is in time, then it must exist. That
may be true, but it does not follow, that time itself is in time, that time
is an existent somehow in the universe; the realm of concrete objects.
Clearly, there are things in the universe that change, but time which is
necessary for change, need itself not be in the universe and it need not
change. There may be a content greater than the universe; there may be
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a world that contains constituents that exist but are not in time. I shall
argue that in such a world temporal relations and temporal facts (and all
other relations and facts) exist. These relations and facts do not change
but are what make change possible. Thus, it is a mistake to argue, as
McTaggart does, that since the relations between events in a time-series
do not change and the fact that say, an apple is green before it is red does
not change, there is no time or change, unless A-change or becoming is
introduced. To see what is involved in these points, it will be useful
to consider a distinction that Ingthorsson blurs, between the notion of
“fact” in McTaggart’s substance ontology and in Russell’s fact ontology.
On a substance ontology, the only ontological categories are substan-
ces, qualities and relations. Facts do not belong to a category of their
own, and so must be understood as being either a substance, quality or
relation. This is McTaggart’s view, according to Ingthorsson:
We need to become familiar with McTaggart’s understand-
ing not only of the general nature of the fundamental
building blocks (substances, qualities, relations), but also
of whatever has to do with the distinction and connection
between thought and reality, such as beliefs, assumptions, as-
sertions, facts, truth and falsity. With respect to the latter, one
must understand that they do not form a separate category of
entities distinct from substances, qualities, and relations.
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 16 [emphasis added], [9])
On the other hand, Ingthorsson also claims that
McTaggart’s account of facts is in fact very similar to the account
given by the logical atomists of an atomic fact, notably that it
consisted “either in the possession by aparticular of a charac-
teristic, or in a relation holding between two ormore particu-
lars” (Urmson 1960: 17).
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 28, [emphasis added], [9])
Surely, these two notions of “fact” although verbally similar—both are
called “states of affairs”— are ontologically quite different.
In a fact ontology, such as logical atomism, there are particulars, non-
relational and relational universals, and facts. If a particular exemplifies
a non-relational quality, those two different kinds combine to form a fact
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which is an entity over and above its constituents. It is a unity with com-
plexity. If some particular stands in a relation to another, for example,
if a is earlier than b, there is a temporal relational fact. Facts do not exist
in time (or space), and the relational universals that are constituents in
them do not exist in time (or space) either, although the terms (partic-
ulars) of temporal relations do exist in time.
The philosophy of logical atomism and the notion of an atomic fact
is associatedwith Russell. He treats facts as a category of their own over
and above their constituents when he says,
Facts are […] plainly something you have to take account of
if you are going to give a complete account of theworld. You
cannot do that by merely enumerating the particular things
in it: youmust alsomention the relations of these things, and
their properties, and so forth, all of which are facts, so that
facts certainly belong to an account of the objective world.
… and the things and their qualities or relations are quite
clearly in some sense or other components of the facts that
have those qualities or relations.
(Russell 1918, pp. 191–192, [27])
A Russellian fact is a single (unity), yet complex entity that cannot be
reduced to its constituents, and for that reason forms a separate category
of entities distinct from substances (particulars), qualities and relations.
Despite Ingthorsson’s attributing a substance ontology to McTag-
gart and his subsequent denial of the separate category of facts, McTag-
gart seems to recognize the category of fact and, like Russell, construes
(some) facts as timeless even before his denial of the reality of time, since
he says:
When the subjective belief is eliminated, it seems to me that
the truth goes with it and that we find ourselves left, not
with a timeless, non-existent, and true proposition, but with
nothing but the fact, which is not true (though it determines
the truth of beliefs), which may or may not be timeless, and
which, as we have seen above, is always in one way or anoth-
er, existent.
(McTaggart 1921, sect. 38, pp. 35–36, [13])
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In the context of discussing the question of whether there are entities
that are real, but non-existent, McTaggart distinguishes substance, qua-
lity and relations categorically:
Qualities and relations are very different from substances,
and the fact that a substance cannot be both existent and non-
existent does not prove that qualities and relations—which
are universal, and not particular as substances are—could not
be existent in one aspect, and non-existent in another. (Mc-
Taggart 1921, sect. 5, p. 6, [13])
Although McTaggart ultimately rejects the reality of qualities and rela-
tions as real, but non-existent (unexemplified) he accepts Russell’s dis-
tinction between universals and particulars. McTaggart claims “I am
aware of an object or am acquainted with an object—the phrases are
used synonymous—when ‘I have a direct cognitive relation to that
object’” (McTaggart 1921, sect. 44, p. 40, [13]). He then approvingly
quotes Russell:
When we ask what are the kinds of objects with which we
are acquainted, the first and most obvious example is sense-
data. When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have direct ac-
quaintance with the colour or the noise. […] But in addition
to the awareness of the above kind of objects, which may
be called awareness of particulars, we have also […] what
may be called awareness of universals. And universal rela-
tions, too, are objects of awareness; up and down, before and
after, resemblance, and so on, would seem to be all of them
objects of which we can be aware.
(Russell 1912, pp. 209–212, [emphasis added].
In: McTaggart 1921, sect. 44, pp. 40–41, [13])
This is striking because Russell used direct acquaintance with before and
after as grounds formaintaining that they are primitive, simple temporal
relations.
Further evidence that McTaggart takes qualities and relations to be
ultimate, and indefinable, ineliminable universals and distinct from par-
ticulars is his appeal to Russell’s argument against reducing the com-
mon quality of two particulars to the simple relation of exact likeness
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between them. McTaggart (1921, sect. 83, fn. 1, p. 83, [13]), cites Rus-
sell’s argument in “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,” to
justify the irreducibility of qualities as universals because the argument
against qualities requires relations as (timeless) universals:
Likeness at least, therefore, must be admitted as a universal,
and, having admitted one universal we have no longer any
reason to reject others. Thus, the whole complicated theory,
which had no motive except to avoid universals, falls to the
ground. […] There must be relations which are universals
in the sense that (a) they are concepts, not percepts; (b) they
do not exist in time; (c) they are verbs, not substantives.
(Russell 1911–12, p. 9, [24])
So, we can say that in certain respectsMcTaggart’s ontology has similari-
ties with Russell’s. There exist substances (particulars) that stand in
relations and have non-relational qualities. Qualities and relations are
universals (they do not exist in space or time) and substances are parti-
culars in that, if time exists, are the terms of temporal relations and so
exist in time. Surprisingly, then, in (1921) Russell’s influence on Mc-
Taggart is apparent in his treatment of relations, although there is also
a fundamental difference.
McTaggart claims that the conception of relations is indefinable, since
it is impossible to substitute for it any other concepts which can be taken
as equivalent (McTaggart 1921, sect. 80, p. 80, [13]). He notes that the-
ories have been put forth to demonstrate “that relation, though valid of
existence, was not ultimate, but definable in terms of quality, so that state-
ments about relations could be translated into statements about qualities”
(McTaggart 1921, sect. 80, p. 81, [emphasis added], [13]). McTaggart
maintains, however, that these theories aremistaken. “No fact which can
be stated in terms of relations between substances can ever be stated in
terms which omit the conception of relation” (McTaggart 1921, sect. 82,
pp. 82–83, [13]). In other words, McTaggart initially rejects the view that
relations can be reduced to or eliminated by the qualities of one or both
of the terms of the relation.
Although McTaggart argues that relations are indefinable, irreduci-
ble and ineliminable in terms of qualities, he does say that if there are
relations then there are qualities generated in each of the terms of the
relation. McTaggart summarizes these points in the following passage:
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The conception of relation, then, must be accepted as valid
of the existent. But it might be admitted to be valid, and yet
denied to be ultimate and indefinable. It might be said that
it really was true that substances were in relations, but that
the fact expressed in this way could be expressed in terms
of qualities only, without bringing in relations. But this also
is false. […] A relation may no doubt be based on a quality
in each of its terms. But this does not mean that it can be
reduced to those qualities. If A is larger than B, this relation
may depend on the fact that A covers a square mile, and B
covers an acre. […] But a statement of the size of A and a
statement of the size of B are not equivalent to a statement
that A is larger than B, though the lattermay be a certain and
immediate conclusion from them.
(McTaggart 1921, sect. 82, pp. 82–83, [13])
It is quite clear therefore thatMcTaggart (1921, [13]) accepts the existen-
ce of relations, including temporal relations, and in his discussion of
cognition (1921, [13]), he quotes Russell who maintains that we are ac-
quainted with them.
Thus, there are three views of relations that McTaggart considers.
First, that relations are definable, reducible or eliminable in terms of
qualities; a view McTaggart consistently rejects in (1921, [13]). Sec-
ond, that relations are not definable or reducible to the qualities of their
terms but depend on them;McTaggart’s view in the passage just quoted.
Third, Russell’s view that relations are indefinable and irreducible to
qualities and are not dependent on the qualities (temporal or otherwise)
of their terms. McTaggart seems to have some sympathy with this Rus-
sellian view in his discussion of cognition quoted above. In the next sec-
tion I shall argue that McTaggart’s argument against the B-series, the
A-series, and thus against the reality of time does not depend on the
principle of temporal parity as Ingthorsson understands it, but on his
changing analysis of temporal relations. For that reason, McTaggart’s
argument in (1927, [14]) should or at least could, as Broad maintained,
be understood as a stand-alone argument that does not depend on his
a priori metaphysics in (1921, [13]).
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3 The R-theory and the Principle of Temporal
Parity
Richard Gale refers to Russell as “the father of the B theory” and in-
deed, there is a good reason for him to do so, since McTaggart claims
that “Mr. Russell’s time-series […] is identical with our B series […]
and the relation which unites the terms of the B-series is the relation of
earlier and later” (McTaggart 1927, sect. 351, p. 31, [14]). However, the
ontology of the B-series as McTaggart understands it is not the same as
the Russellian time series as it should be understood. It will be useful,
therefore to clarify Russell’s authentic view in contrast to the B-theory
which is McTaggart’s misrepresentation of Russell but has nevertheless
been accepted generally as Russellian.3 A brief discussion of some of
the differences between the Russellian theory of time (“R-theory” for
short), and standard B-theoretic accounts as understood by defenders
and critics alike is in order.
On typical interpretations, the ontology of B-time is construed as
anti-realist because it denies that temporal passage is an objective, mind-
independent feature of reality. For that reason, B-relations and the B-
facts they enter, that alone constitute the foundation of the B-theory
of time, are “nontransient” and static in that what appears to be the
flow and flux of events in time —time’s dynamism—is an illusion that
would not exist without consciousness.4 On the other hand, R-relations
as given in experience are not static, but dynamic, and are the basis of our
experience of transition and the passage of time.5 Since the R-theory re-
3For a good discussion of McTaggart’s misinterpretation of the Russellian view see
Tegtmeier (2012, [32]).
4Not all B-theorists think of B-relations as static. See, for example, Savitt (2002, [30]),
Deng (2013a, 2013b, [5–6]), Leininger (2014, [10]), and Mozersky (2015, [15]). For a
critique of those who claim that the A-series, temporal passage and the dynamic aspect
of time are illusions see Boccardi and Perelda (2017, [1]).
5Russell gives a colorful example of our experience of the earlier than relation in the
following passage: “Immediate experience provides us with two time-relations among
events: they may be simultaneous, or one may be earlier and the other later. These two
are both part of the crude data; it is not the case that only the events are given, and their
time-order, within certain limits, is a much given as the events. In any story of adven-
ture you will find such passages as the following: ‘With a cynical smile he pointed the
revolver at the breast of the dauntless youth. “At the word three I shall fire,” he said.
The words one and two had already been spoken with a cool and deliberate distinct-
ness. The word three forming on his lips. At this moments a blinding flash of lightning
83
jects the common view that B-time is a static, block universe, this last
point deserves attention.
I have the knowledge that time has passedwhen, for example, I reflect
on successive changes along my life’s way (when I got married, when
my first child was born, when my first grandchild was born and so on),
or when I see that the position of the minute hand on my watch has
changed its position. There is, however, amore immediateway inwhich
we know that time is passing. This occurs when we are directly aware of
passage, when we experience change in a single act of awareness. For
example, if we look at a second hand of a watch or a flickering flame,
we see the moving second hand at one place on the watch before the
other, or one flicker of the flame occur before another in a single act
of awareness. These are cases where we experience two stages of the
second hand or flame occur in succession, one earlier than the other,
and in so doing we are directly aware of a temporal transition or pas-
sage from one stage to the other. Similarly, when we hear the successive
notes of a tune or feel the successive taps of a physician on our abdomen
during a physical, we directly experience that time is passing.
On the R-theory, an appeal to the direct experience of succession in
a single act of awareness is the basis for grounding our most basic ex-
perience of the flow or passage of time on mind-independent temporal
earlier/later than relations alone; a view Iwill call the temporal relational
theory or Russellian theory. On the R-theory, the commonsense belief
that time passes is to be understood in terms of the relation of succes-
sion between earlier and later temporal objects. Thus, the passage of
time consists in the succession of events throughout the history of the
universe; one event – the earlier – being followed by another – the later.
Returning to the differences between B- and R-theorists, on standard
(reductionist) B-theories, B-relations are analyzable in terms of causal
relations whereas the R-theory takes R-relations as primitive and unan-
alyzable, relational universals that can be directly experienced. Russel-
lian temporal relations are external relations, since “there are such facts
as that one object has a certain relation to another, and that such facts
cannot be reduced or inferred from, a fact about the one object only to-
rent the air.’ Here we have simultaneity—not due, as Kant would have us believe, to
the subjective mental apparatus of the dauntless youth, but given as objectively as the
revolver and the lightening. And It is equally given in immediate experience that the
words one and two come earlier than the flash’.” (Russell, 1914, pp. 116–117, [25]).
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gether with a fact about the other object only: they do not imply that the
two objects have any complexity, or any intrinsic property distinguish-
ing them from two objects which do not have the relation in question”
(Russell 1966, pp. 139–40, [28]). For that reason, R-relations are neither
analyzable in terms of A-properties of their terms nor do they depend
on A-properties. Indeed, on the R-theory there are no such properties.
A last difference is particularly important for the discussion to fol-
low. The B-theory is often identified with McTaggart’s (1927, [14]) mis-
interpretation of Russell, according towhich B-relations are unchanging
and B-facts are permanent in that if a is ever (at any time) earlier than b,
then a is always earlier than b. In contrast, R-theorists do not believe that
either R-relations or R-facts exist in time, much less at every time, as Mc-
Taggart’s interpretation implies. Earlier than is a timeless yet dynamic tem-
poral relation. It is timeless because it does not exist in time; as a term of
a temporal relation. It is dynamic because it is the ground of our experi-
ence of the passage of time; of successively existing temporal objects that
exist tenselessly, that is, without tensed or A-properties. Similarly, time,
understood as a Russellian series composed of a conjunction of R-facts,
is timeless or atemporal. This view gives somemeaning to an aphorism
I favor, namely, time is timeless, or eternal in just this sense: though time
contains temporal relations, time does not exemplify them.
Ingthorsson argues thatMcTaggart’s paradox rests on a premise that
can also be used to undermine the B-theory of time. The only view left
standing is presentism. The premise is the “temporal parity thesis,” the
view that all times exist equally or co-exist, in a sense that is compatible
with their being successive and not simultaneous or timeless. I disagree
and shall argue thatMcTaggart’s argument rests on a premise other than
temporal parity whose implications refutes the B-series (as McTaggart
understands it), the A-series (whose terms are past, present and future)
and theA-theory including presentism, butwhen the dust settles, leaves
the R-theory unscathed. This is a surprising conclusion, but true none-
theless, or so I shall argue.
The premise that plays a crucial role in McTaggart’s argument
against the B-series, the A-series and for the unreality of time is not the
principle of temporal parity as Ingthorsson understands it, but McTag-
gart’s analysis of “earlier than.” He states that analysis in the following
passage:
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The series of past, present and future is what we have called
the A series, on which the B series of earlier and later is de-
pendent. The term P is earlier than the term Q, if it is ever past
while Q is present, or present while Q is future.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 610, p. 271, [emphasis added], [14])
This premise is nowhere argued for but is assumed in his argument
against the B-series and the A-series. Moreover, it is incompatible with
his account of relations in (1921, [13]), and so incompatible with the a
priori metaphysics found there. Recall, that in (1921, [13]) he argued
that relations are indefinable, and that while the terms of relations have
qualities on which they may be based, they cannot be reduced to those
qualities. However, in a footnote accompanying the passage above, Mc-
Taggart is claiming that “earlier than” can be defined in terms of tempo-
ral qualities (or relations to a term X outside the A-series). I shall ar-
gue that this analysis is crucial to his argument for the unreality of time
but is incompatible with the temporal parity thesis, and his earlier view
of relations. For that reason, McTaggart’s (1927, [14]) argument can
be construed as a stand-alone argument not dependent on his a priori
metaphysics in (1921, [13]).
We shall see, even more importantly, McTaggart defends his anal-
ysis of earlier than by appealing to his rejection of the B-series, but his
rejection of the B-series implicitly appeals to his analysis, and so mas-
sively begs the question against an R-theoretic interpretation of the B-
series. It also implies an understanding of the temporal parity thesis
that underscores a difference between McTaggart and R-theorists, even
if McTaggart and B-theorists can be grouped together. To see what is
involved in these points, let us return to McTaggart’s text.
One problem with McTaggart’s account of “earlier than” is that the
word “while” implies that each of the disjuncts exist in time and thus
the analysis is circular. For if P is past at t1, and Q is present at t1, then
that is reducing “is past at” and “is present at” to the relations “is ear-
lier than” and “is simultaneous with.” If he denies absolute time, then
“while” would imply simultaneity. Then Socrates is past is just as real as
or is simultaneouswithOaklander is present. In that case, temporal parity
implies co-existence in the sense of simultaneity, and that is incompat-
ible with co-existing terms being successive. Finally, if “while” means
co-present or existing at the same NOW, then we still haven’t grounded
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for example, Socrates existing earlier than Oaklander because Socrates
being past, and Oaklander being present are both facts that exist now.6
Leaving that problem aside, McTaggart says that there seems to be
a counterexample to his account of “earlier than” since in a durational
presentwe are acquaintedwith the earlier than relationwhere both terms
are present and thus are neither past or future. His reply is instructive:
Two termsmay both be present together, although one is ear-
lier than the other. This is due to the fact that the present is a
duration, and not an indivisible point. But the statement in
the text remains an adequate definition of ”earlier than,” for
although P and Q may at one time be in the same present, yet,
before that, P is present while Q is future and after that, P is
past while Q is present.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 610, fn. 1, p. 271,
[emphasis added], [14])
McTaggart’s response to the alleged counterexample is that if it is ever
the case that P is past while Q is present, or P is present while Q is fu-
ture,” then P is earlier than Q, and the antecedent is satisfied because
before P and Q are both present, P is present while Q is future, and after
they are both present P is past while Q is present. Thus, McTaggart says
that the statement in the text remains an adequate definition of “earlier
than.” However, to avoid an objection to his definition of “earlier than”
by appealing to “before” and “after” is obviously circular. We saw that
his appeal to “while” in his statement of the analysis of ‘earlier than’ is
also problematic. This is important because it shows the need for prim-
itive R-relations to account for the phenomenology and ontology of the
earlier than relation and temporal passage. Indeed, McTaggart paradox
results if we attempt to ground time without them, as we shall see.
McTaggart raises another objection to his analysis of “earlier than”
that mirrors Russell’s analysis of the tenses in “Our Experience of Time”
(1915, [26]), that McTaggart was obviously familiar with. McTaggart
says that since we can perceive the earlier than relation without percei-
ving theA-properties of pastness and futurity, perhapswe can take earlier
6Hope Sample has suggested to me that “while” could be understood in an atem-
poral sense of co-exist, but then co-existence would imply that each of the terms in
each disjunct exist “eternally” and not successively, raising the specter of McTaggart’s
paradox.
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than as primitive (as the R-theorist would have it) and define the future
as what is later than the present, and the past as what is earlier than the
present. He says:
Since the present comprises different terms, of which any
onewill be earlier or later than any other, it might be thought
that the fact that P was earlier than Q would be perceived
when they were both present, and that “earlier than” need
not be defined in terms of the A series. After this, it might be
thought, the future may be defined as what is later than
the present, and the past as what is earlier than the present.
Thus, the A series would be defined in terms of the B series, instead
of the B series in terms of the A series.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 610, fn. 1, p. 271,
[emphasis added], [14])
In other words, McTaggart considers the view that the B-series alone
constitutes time and that the A-series is not needed in a complete ontolo-
gy of time given that we are directly acquaintedwith earlier thanwithout
being acquainted with A-properties.
McTaggart’s response is familiar since it harkens back to his argu-
ment against the B-series in his chapter on “Time” (1927, [14]). He
replies to the above argument by saying that to suppose that the B-series
alone constitutes time
[…] would be a mistake. For the series of earlier and later
is a time series. We cannot have time without change, and
the only possible change is from future to present, and from
present to past. Thus, until the terms are taken as passing
from future to present, and frompresent to past, they cannot
be taken as in time or as earlier and later; and not only the
conception of presentness, but those of pastness and futurity,
must be reached before the conceptions of earlier and later,
and not vice versa.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 610, fn. 1, p. 271,
[emphasis added], [14])
McTaggart’s argument against a B- or R-theoretic reduction of A-deter-
minations is that earlier and later are temporal relations that generate a
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time-series, only if their terms formanA-series and changeA-properties
with the passage of time. His justification is the argument quoted above
that nothing changes in the B-series alone, since there is no temporal
passage, and without events changing their A-determinations there are
no temporal relations. I shall show, however, that this does not con-
stitute an argument against the R-theory, since it mischaracterizes the
R-series as a B-series and construes the B-series in a way that assumes
McTaggart’s definition of “earlier than.” McTaggart’s argument against
the B-series also shows that temporal parity takes the terms of the B-
series to be simultaneous, sempiternal or timeless, and not successive,
and so cannot be employed against the R-theory. To seewhat is involved
considerMcTaggart’s argument against the view that there can be a tem-
poral series without the A-series. McTaggart argues that since the rela-
tions between the terms of the B-series are permanent, nothing changes
on the B-series by coming into and going out of existence:
If N is ever earlier than O and later than M, it will always be,
and has always been, earlier than O and later than M since the
relations of earlier and later are permanent. N will always
be in the B series. And as, by our own hypothesis, a B series
by itself constitutes time, N will always have a position in a
time-series, and always has had one. That is, it always has
been an event, and always will be one, and cannot begin or
cease to be an event.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 310, p. 12, [14])
Generally, McTaggart says what he means, andmeans what he says. He
does not say that “if it is ever true that N is earlier than O and later than
M, it always will be true and always has been true that […].” He is not
talking about beliefs, but about facts, about time itself. So, the principle,
if it is ever that case that P, then it is always the case that P, is stating
a truth about the universe (the existent) that requires an ontological
ground that always exists.7
7Although Ingthorssonwould disagreewithmy literal interpretation of this passage
(see Ingthorsson, 2016, p. 39, [9]), he does say “McTaggart consistently stays in object-
language mode, assuming that he is talking about the world, and only ever takes a
step back to talk about our talk of the world when he thinks that his particular use of
words invites the risk of misunderstanding” (Ingthorsson 2016, pp. 89–90, [9]), and
that would support my interpretation.
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McTaggart’s argument against the B-series and for the A-series
(whether construed as terms having A-properties or standing in A-rela-
tions to a term outside the series)misinterprets the R-theory and assum-
es the existence of the A-series. McTaggart’s argument misinterprets
Russell since on the R-theory, temporal relational facts are timeless in the
sense that they do not exist in time, i.e., they do not occupy moments
(since there are none), they do not exemplify non-relational temporal
properties (since there are none), and they do not stand in temporal
relations (since relations of the first order can only have particulars as
terms). On McTaggart’s analysis of the B-series, however, B-relations
between terms are permanent, they always have been and always will be.
In other words, B-facts and the terms of those facts always exist; they
exist at every time. “If N is ever earlier than O and later than M, it will
always be, and always has been, earlier than O and later than M” (McTag-
gart 1927, sect. 310, p. 12, [emphasis added], [14]). This contradicts
the notion of R-relations and R-facts, since if R-relations and R-facts do
not exist in time then they cannot be permanent, and therefore cannot
exist at every time. Why, then, in an argument against Russell would
McTaggart assume that the B-series is permanent or always exists?
It is at this point that McTaggart’s assumption of his definition of
“earlier than” comes into play. If B-relations are analyzed in terms of dif-
ferent substances/events having incompatible A-properties at the
same time (P is presentwhileQ is future) or (P is pastwhileQ is present),
and so on, then the B-series would exist at every time. The B-series
would be a permanent fact whose terms exists at every time with differ-
ent temporal A-properties. Thus, without A-properties the series of
the terms of the B-series would not be successive but either a simulta-
neous, sempiternal block, or timeless. Admittedly, on such an interpre-
tation of the B-series nothing would change by coming into and going
out of existence or by acquiring and losing a property. However, in
an argument against R-relations, that are primitive, unanalyzable and
indefinable relations, it obviously misunderstands R-relations (or the
B-series as a Russellian would understand it) and begs the question.
McTaggart’s argument that the characteristics of pastness, present-
ness and futurity must be relations to a term outside the time series and
not qualities supports my reading of temporal parity as excluding co-
existing yet successive times:
90
Let us first examine the supposition that they are relations.
In that case only one term of each relation can be an event or
a moment. The other term must be something outside the
time-series. For the relations of the A series are changing
relations, and the relation of terms of the time-series to one
another do not change. Two events are exactly in the same
places in the time-series, relatively to one another, a million
years before they take place,while each of them is taking place,
and when they are a million years in the past. The same is
true of the relation of moments to each other. Again, if the
moments of time are to be distinguished as separate realities
from the events which happen in them, the relation between
an event and a moment is unvarying. Each event is in the
same moment in the future, in the present, and in the past.
(McTaggart 1908, p. 467, [emphasis added], [13])
Thus, forMcTaggart, to say that a is earlier than bdoes not changemeans
that they are in the same position in the time series before they take place,
after they take place and when a and b are happening. However, if B-
series facts exist at every time, then their constituents, a and b, always
exist, and so are simultaneous or sempiternal, and not successive. Thus,
NOW a is earlier than b, and it always has been the case and always
will be the case that a is earlier than b. This is the ground of B-series
facts always existing, but obviously, that cannot be an argument against
the existence of the R-series without the A-series, unless it assumes an
analysis of the B-series in terms of the A-series and confuses the R-series
with the B-series.
Interestingly, some of the textual evidence that Ingthorsson gives
to support his attributing the temporal parity principle to McTaggart
implies, it seems to me, that past, present and future events do all co-
exist, but simultaneously, and not successively. McTaggart says, “Now
tomorrowsweather is existent, for existence is asmuch a predicate of the
future and past as of the present” (McTaggart 1921, sect. 6, fn. 1, p. 7,
[13]). I think it is important to note that this quote implies not only that
“Now tomorrows weather is existent,” but also that “Now yesterday’s
weather is existent,” and “Now, today’s weather is existent.” In other
words,McTaggart’s assertion of temporal parity—that past, present and
future exist equally or co-exist—does imply that all the tensed facts in a
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single A-series are now, hence simultaneous, and does not support that
they exist successively.
McTaggart is not claiming that a single event is past present and fu-
ture simultaneously, but that say, Socrates is past, Oaklander is present,
and the 100th president of the US is future, are all contents in a single
A-series, and thus all exist NOW, at the same time or simultaneously.
Thus, there is no ground for the different terms of a single A-series being
successive even though they are equally real or co-existent. For McTaggart
(1927, [14]) temporal parity does not allow for all times to be co-existent
and still be successive. McTaggart’s notion of co-existence as applied
to the terms of the A-series is simultaneity or timelessness, and there-
fore the temporal parity thesis is not something that McTaggart and
R-theorists have in common. Thus, it is a mistake to claim that for the
R-theorist “Socrates is in reality just as existent and real as we are now,”
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 83, [9]) since for the R-theorist, Socrates is past,
and Oaklander is present, are not facts that exist now because they do
not exist in time at all.
By treatingMcTaggart and B-theorists on a par in accepting the prin-
ciple of temporal parity, Ingthorsson fails to see that there is a fundamen-
tal difference between McTaggart and R-theorists. For McTaggart two
objects/facts in an A-series cannot co-exist unless they are both NOW,
and so exist at the same time. The R-theorist need not accept temporal
parity in that sense. The R-theorist does not accept that Socrates is just
as real and existent as we are now, that there is a sense in which Socrates
“still exists.”
It might be objected that if R-relations are atemporal, then that is one
notion of “permanence” and in this context to be permanent means to
exist independently of any change. Thus, McTaggart could be making
the point that the B-series does not involve change since the relations
that generate it do not change. But it is a mistake to suppose that the basis
of change must itself change; that the ground of temporality in the world must
itself be temporal in the sense of existence in time.8
8For a fuller discussion of this point including a reply to the “No change” objection
to the R-theory in the context of Ingthorsson’s critique of the B-theory, see my review of
Ingthorsson’s book (Oaklander, forthcoming 2019, [23]). For an account of emerging
and passing away consistent with the R-theory see Tegtmeier (1999, [31]).
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4 McTaggart’s Paradox
To begin our discussion of McTaggart’s paradox9 let me call your atten-
tion to an ambiguity, already alluded to, in the notion of the A-series.
The A-series may be a single A1-series, or the A-series can be an A2-
series of A1-series. Consider the following quotewhereMcTaggart char-
acterizes an A1-series:
We must begin with the A series, rather than with past, pre-
sent, and future, as separate terms. And we must say that a
series is an A series when each of its terms has, to an entity
X outside the series, one, and only one, of three indefinable re-
lations, pastness, presentness, and futurity, which are such
that all the terms which have the relation of presentness to
X fall between all the terms which have the relation of past-
ness to X , on the one hand, and all the terms which have the
relation of futurity to X , on the other hand.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 328, p. 20, [emphasis added], [14])
A single A-series has terms that each co-exist, and Ingthorsson claims
that co-existence is compatible with their existing in succession, but
that is incorrect since each term in a single A-series is NOW either past,
present, or future. It is correct that a, b, c exist equally, but not that they
exist in succession.
There are two reasons why a single A1-series is not a genuine tempo-
ral series whose terms exist in succession. First, because there is no
change in a single A-series because there is no term that has a prop-
erty and then loses it. Second, although his definition of “earlier than”
would suggest that a single A-series whose terms have different A-pro-
perties is a temporal series, that is not in fact the case for if P is pastwhile
Q is present, then P and Q exist at the same time either simultaneously, if
in B-time, presently, in A-time, or at t1, if time is absolute. Thus, there is
no ground for P is earlier than Q in a single A-series, for to generate a tem-
poral series that contains “real change” there must be temporal passage
and that requires a series of A-series. An A2-series of A1-series in which
each different A1-series have termswith incompatible A-properties. For
example, in one A1a-series, e is present and e′ is future, and in another
9For my earlier account of McTaggart’s Paradox see Oaklander (2002, [16]).
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A1b-series e is past and e′ is present. Of course, an A2-series of such a
conjunction of A1 series is not yet a temporal series for unless we intro-
duce time in some way the A2-series is contradictory. What, then, is to
be done? McTaggart’s answer is startling:
When we say that the B series is a series of changes, we do
not, of course, mean that the terms change their places in the
series. If one term is ever earlier than another, it is always
earlier than that other. But the B series is a time-series, and
time involves change. And the change in the terms of the B
series is that they are successively present (passing from fu-
turity to presentness, and from presentness to pastness). It
is first an earlier term which is present, and then a later one.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 698, p. 347, [emphasis added], [14])
What is key here is that the groundof the passage of time from the future
to the present is the relation of succession. The A2 series of A1-series is
a temporal series because the generating relation is earlier than since “it
is first an earlier term [in an A1a -series] which is present, and then a
later term (in an A1b-series) that is present.” In other words, A-theoretic
change or temporal passage presupposes succession.10 It is not sufficient for
change that one and the same event/object/time have incompatible
temporal properties, they must have them successively.
However, the appeal to succession to ground the passage of time gives
rise to either the unreality of time, due to a vicious infinite regress
if succession is analyzed A-theoretically in terms of McTaggart’s defi-
nition of “earlier than,” or the R-theory of time if succession is analyzed
R-theoretically, since thenR-relations aremore fundamental thanA-pro-
perties, and temporal passage and temporal becoming are grounded in
R-relations.
To put this point slightly differently, let’s go back to his definition:
“The term P is earlier than the termQ, if it is ever past while Q is present,
or present while Q is future” (1927, sect. 610, p. 271, [14]). Since neither
disjunct alone could ground P is earlier than Q (even if each could entail
it), the disjunction should be a conjunction. In that case, P is pastwhileQ
is present, and P is present while Q is future. If “while” is non-temporal,
10This point is also argued for in Boccardi [2].
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then a contradiction exists since P and Q would timelessly have incom-
patible properties. On the other hand, if “while” is temporal, then it is
assuming time and so wemust ask, what more is needed to give us time
and change? McTaggart answers that question, and his answer is quite
revealing. To repeat:
And the change in their terms of the B series is that they are
successively present (passing from futurity to presentness,
and from presentness to pastness). It is first an earlier term
which is present, and then a later one.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 698, p. 347, [14])
In other words, the ground of change in the B-series is the transition
from one present to another; the transition from one A1a-series to an-
other A1b -series is that the terms of the A2-series are successively pre-
sent! However, if succession is a primitive R-relation and the basis of
temporal passage or temporal transition then McTaggart’s definition of
“earlier than” in terms of A-properties is undermined. On the other
hand, if succession from one present to another is analyzed in terms of
his definition of “earlier than,” that would give rise to another third
level A3-series whose terms are a series of A2-series, with incompati-
ble A-properties, that is contradictory and static without introducing
succession and thus leading to a vicious infinite regress. Thus, with-
out R-relations and the R-series as the basis of passage, the result is a
contradiction or a vicious infinite regress, but with R-relations, the A-
series is not needed for time to pass. For that reason, the significance of
McTaggart’s argument is not that time is unreal, but that time requires
temporal passage which can only be grounded by appealing to a primi-
tive R-relation of succession.
McTaggart’s argument can also be applied to presentism. For sup-
posewe consider his definition of “earlier than” and say that only one of
the disjuncts, that is, only oneA-series exists, the one that is now. Since it
is the case that say, P is pastwhileQ is present, we can thenmaintain that
“while” designates the present time. The seemingly advantage of presen-
tism in this case is that all tensed judgments, including those about the
future and the past for example, “It will rain” and “It did snow” and
“It is now sunny,” are all grounded in the present. The single A-series
that is present. Moreover, given his definition of “earlier than,” a single
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A-series presumably also grounds the existence of that relation. Impor-
tantly, there is no contradiction since no single term of an A-series has
incompatible A-properties. These are all advantages of a McTaggartian
conception of presentism.
Nevertheless, these apparent advantages for presentism come to
naught since a single (present) A-series is not sufficient to constitute
time. To have time there must be passage and for that presentism must
account for continual becoming or absolute becoming. Passage involves
a transition from the existence of one single A-series to the existence of
another single A-series. In other words, one present (a single A-series)
must go out of existence and another come into existence. However,
transition is from existence to non-existence/existence (existence of an
A1a -series to ceasing to exist of A1a and coming to exist of A1b), and
that involves succession.
In other words, a single A-series presupposes a series of A-series
since, as Richard Gale has noted:
It can easily be shown that if there is one A-series there must
be a series of A-series. Assume that the A-series consist of
events M, N and O, which are respectively past, present and
future. A past (future) event by definition is one which was
(will be) present. Thus, if there is one A-series there is be-
coming—a series of A-series; and if the A-series is objective
then so too is becoming. (Gale, 1969, p. 190, [7])
Note, however, that McTaggart’s point is that a sequence of A-series
does not constitute a temporal sequence or series unless the generating
relation is a temporal relation. Thus, if P(Q) is ever past (present) then
at an earlier time P(Q) had to be present (future). In other words, a sin-
gleA-series is not itself a temporal series since it does not involve change.
What is needed to generate time is passage, but passage requires a suc-
cession of present A1-series or at least a succession of present times for
different A1 series to become present at. Thus, without a primitive no-
tion of earlier than a single A-series whose terms are past, present and
future, could not exist. Of course, with a primitive earlier than relation
there would not be an A-series either since a primitive earlier than re-
lation is nothing other than the R-relation which therefore must exist,
and an R-relation being an external relation does not have terms with
A-properties.
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Clearly, Ingthorsson would reject this McTaggartian understanding
of presentism because he rejects A-properties (past and future events),
and “denies that tensed passage occurs at all” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 128,
[9]). Nevertheless, I think the line of argument I have developed in
interpreting McTaggart applies to his form of presentism as well. For
although Ingthorsson rejects tensed passage, he undoubtedly accepts
temporalpassage since he believes that the ordinary conception of change
is dependent on it. He says,
Change is a difference in the properties of an object that re-
mains numerically identical through the change, i.e., ‘gen-
uine change’. This conception of change requires that things
persists by enduring, i.e., that they come to exist at many
times by passing as numerically identical three-dimensional
bodies through time. […] It is the view that ordinary mate-
rial objects are three-dimensional things that move as numeri-
cal wholes through a succession of times.
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 94, [emphasis added], [9])
Ingthorsson highlights the need for temporal passage in endurantism
when he says: “It is indeed some form of temporal passage that is sup-
posed to allow three-dimensional objects to come to exist at many times
and yet exist completely and only at each of those times., i.e. without
having parts ‘lying around’ at other times” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 95,
[emphasis added], [9]). Ingthorsson makes it clear that temporal pas-
sage is “what allows three-dimensional particulars to be at many times
in succession” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 99, [9]) and to be wholly present
at those times. His form of presentism involves “permanent” material
substances that do not come into being or go out of being, but “‘remains’
continuously in the present” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 138, [9]) as they pass
through the flow of time and change.
There are several problemswith this analysis that lead us once again,
it seems to me, to the R-theory. Ingthorssonmaintains that just as an ob-
ject canmove from one place to another only if it passes as a whole from
one place to another, an object can pass from one moment to another
only if it is wholly contained in each moment through which it passes
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 99, [9]). The first point I want to make is that the
analogy assumes the existence of times that exist before and after a sub-
stance arrives at them, just as spatial places must exist before and after
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an object leaves and arrives at them. The idea of motion assumes that
the placewherewe left from still exists and the place that we aremoving
to already exists. So, if an object, x, leaves one time, arrives at another
time, and moves toward another time, this implies that more than the
present time exists. Thus, the notion of temporal passage, as Ingthors-
son unwittingly conceives of it, involves the co-existing of times that are
either not successive (if only the present exists), but are simultaneous,
or they are successive but then it is not the case that only the present
exists and is incompatible with his denial of cross-temporal relations.
Thus, Ingthorsson is faced with a dilemma. If the passage of objects
through time is grounded in the succession of times through which ob-
jects move, then since succession is a cross-temporal relation and ev-
erything cannot be grounded in the present. Moreover, it treats the
time-series as a series through which objects move leading to all the
problems of the moving spotlight view, and further undermining pre-
sentism. Similarly, if a substance moves from one time to another time,
then those times must exist (or permanently remain in existence) for
substances to move toward and away from. If moments permanently
remain in existence, however, then they are simultaneous and sempiter-
nal and so are not successive, unless one accepts McTaggart’s definition
of “earlier than” with the subsequent vicious infinite regress to follow.
On the other hand, if past times no longer exist and future times
do not yet exist, then the notion of passing from one time to another
makes no sense, since there are no times or a temporal series through
which an object moves. If a substance comes to exist at a certain time, it is
moving towards something that already exists “waiting” for the substance
to arrive. A substance cannot move to a time and thus come to exist at
that time unless there is something it is moving toward. The best it can do
is come into existence, through absolutely becoming, at a time that also
comes into existence. That would preserve presentism, but it would do
away with temporal passage because the notion of moving successively
from one time to another has no ground if there does not exist a temporal
series, that is, if only the present time exists.
Ingthorsson claims that if there is no passage, as on the B-theory,
then everything remains permanently at its own temporal position. But
that implies that without passage the world is a totum simul. The result
is that there are no temporal relations. However, McTaggart’s point is
that temporal passage requires succession. Both the presentist and the
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R-theorist reject temporal passage as tensed property change. The Rus-
sellian rejects it because there are primitive temporal relations whose
terms do not exemplify A-properties. Ingthorsson rejects tensed proper-
ties and R-relations (cross-temporal relations) because the past and the
future do not exist but puts nothing in their place. Therefore, succession
has no ontological ground in his universe and therefore, the positions
that his substances move through are not temporal positions or times,
but spatial positions that are sempiternal or timeless positions. Certain-
ly, they are not successive.
Change for Ingthorsson is “the objective loss and acquisition of pro-
perties by an enduring portion of matter. When something changes a
qualitative state ceases to exist as another begins to exist, and never is
there a cross-time relation between two qualitative states of the same
substance existing at different times. […] Change is “one state goes out
of being while another begins to be” (Ingthorsson 2016, pp. 135–136,
[9]). However, if the time at which a qualitative state of a substance
wholly present comes to exist is simultaneous with the substances’ ar-
rival, and a qualitative state of that “same” substance ceases to exist at
the same time as the substances’ arrival, then it is not the same substance
that loses and acquires a qualitative state. If a time comes into existence
absolutely, then everything at that time must also come into existence
absolutely. There is no temporal passage from one time to another, but
just creation ex nihilo at that time. For if there is no passage, no succes-
sion of times though which substances move, then not only the quali-
tative state, but the substance having that qualitative state, goes out of
existence and the substance that comes into existence with a qualitative
state is not the same as the substance that ceased to exist with a different
qualitative state. Thus, there is not a single substance that changes from
one present to another.
Ingthorsson claims that,
The alterations that take place are a question of qualitative
states coming into and going out of being, and they are pro-
voked by the influence exerted between different portions of
matter. Here we find presentism thoroughly embedded in
a metaphysics of material nature. And it is the most sparse
ontology I know of. (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 138, [9])
Indeed it is, or seems to be, a naturalist ontology where everything ex-
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ists in space and time. This is reinforced by his claim that “The core
idea of presentism, as standardly formulated, is that the concretely ex-
isting present is meant to ground everything” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 135,
[9]). How, then, can there be a succession of times that substances pass
through? Surely Ingthorsson cannot ground the succession of times in
a concretely existing present unless he acceptsMcTaggart’s definition of
succession that we have seen, leads to a vicious infinite regress, that is,
McTaggart’s paradox. For the R-theorist, on the other hand, in order to
“ground everything” we must recognize not only the concrete particu-
lar existent, but the abstract non-spatial and non-temporal realm. Thus,
the dispute between presentism and the R-theory is a debate between
the naturalist and the ontologist à la Grossmann.
5 Conclusion
My understanding of McTaggart’s refutation of the A-theory including
presentism, also enables us to understand the overarching point of Mc-
Taggart’s main argument for the unreality of time. After arguing for the
existence of A-change, he claims that the obvious reply to the attribution
of incompatible A-properties/relations to events is that they have those
properties successively. What, then, we must ask “does it mean to say
that events or moments of time have A-properties successively?” His re-
ply appeals to moments of time and A-properties (has been, will be, and
is now) as he later claims in his definition of “earlier than” in section 610.
Obviously, that does not work, as he will subsequently show, since the
passage of time involves different events/times successively becoming
present. Thus, if succession is analyzed in terms of a single A1-series,
or an A2-series of A1-series, or an A3-series of A2-series, the analysis
either does not yield change, or yields a contradiction, that cannot be
removed without appealing to succession and the subsequent infinite
regress.
McTaggart summarizes his argument in the following passage:
The attribution of the characteristics past, present, and fu-
ture to the terms of any series leads to a contradiction, unless
it is specified that they have them successively. This means, as
we have seen, that they have them in relation to terms specified
as past, present, and future. These again, to avoid a like con-
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tradiction, must in turn be specified as past, present, and
future. And, since this continues infinitely, the first set of
terms never escapes from contradiction at all.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 332, p. 22, [emphasis added], [14].)
We see then that his argument in 1927 does not depend on the temporal
parity as Ingthorsson understands it, or the a priorimetaphysics of 1921,
but on his analysis of succession that is not argued for but assumed. In
a footnote to the passage just quoted, McTaggart makes it clear that the
vicious infinite regress arises from the attempt to avoid the contradic-
tion in the attribution of incompatible A-characteristics to the terms in
eachA1-series by appealing to succession and then analyzing succession
in terms of incompatible A-characteristics. This passage is important
enough to quote at length:
It may be worthwhile to point out that the vicious infinite
does not arise from the impossibility of defining past, present,
and future, without using the terms in their own definitions.
On the contrary, we have admitted these terms to be indefin-
able. It arises from the fact that the nature of the terms in-
volves a contradiction, and that the attempt to remove the
contradiction involves the employment of the terms and the
generation of a similar contradiction.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 332, fn. 1, p. 22,
[emphasis added], [14].)
To conclude, I believe to have shown three things. First, that McTag-
gart’s argument against Russell begins by assuming his analysis of the
“earlier than” relation as stated in 1927 section 610, and he uses that
analysis in his main argument against the B-series. This has given rise
to an A-theoretic misunderstanding that distorts the R-theory. Second,
McTaggart’s analysis of “earlier than” undermines all versions of the
property and the presentist versions of the A-theory, as his argument
for the unreality of the A-series sought to demonstrate. Third, since Mc-
Taggart is clear that the passage of time and the possibility of change
requires succession, I conclude that McTaggart has shown that given his
analysis of “earlier than,” time and change are unreal. Therefore, to pre-
serve the reality of time and change, we must reject McTaggart’s anal-
ysis of “earlier than,” recognize that it presupposes a primitive notion
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of succession and assert that the relation that generates change is the
simple, unanalyzable R-relation of earlier than.
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Abstract
MichaelDummett’s paper “ADefence ofMcTaggart’s Proof of theUnreali-
ty of Time” put forward an ingenious interpretation of McTaggart’s
famous proof. My aim in this discussion is not to assess the cogency of
McTaggart’s reasoning, but to criticise Dummett’s interpretation of Mc-
Taggart.
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1 Introduction
The reasoning of McTaggart’s 1908 article ‘The Unreality of Time’ runs
as follows. We distinguish positions in time in two ways: a permanent
B-series (in which events and facts are distinguished using the relations
of earlier than and later than) and a dynamic A-series (in which events
and facts are future, then present, then past). Both series are essential
to time, yet the A-series is more fundamental since only it allows for
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change. (McTaggart 1908, p. 458, [2]). This concludes the first part
of McTaggart’s reasoning: his argument for the fundamentality of the
A-series.
Having established this conclusion, McTaggart then claims that the
A-series “[…] involves a contradiction.” (McTaggart 1908, p. 466, [2]).
His argument for the contradiction is seemingly straightforward: past,
present and future are “incompatible determinations” yet “[…] every
event has them all.” (McTaggart 1908, p. 469, [2]). This argument is
typically known as McTaggart’s Paradox. McTaggart is aware of a nat-
ural rejoinder to his argument. No event, it will be urged, is simulta-
neously past, present and future, only successively, and from this no
contradiction follows. But, claims McTaggart, this rejoinder entails ei-
ther a vicious circle or a vicious infinite regress, and so the contradiction
is not removed.
In sum, McTaggart’s first argument establishes that the A-series is
fundamental to time. His paradox then establishes that the A-series is
contradictory. From these conclusions it follows that time is unreal. My
aim here is not to assessMcTaggart’s reasoning, but to call into question
Michael Dummett’s well-known interpretation of McTaggart’s proof of
the unreality of time. (Dummett 1960, [1]).
In his paperDummett does not use the terms ‘A-series’ and ‘B-series’.
Instead, he talks of “facts of kind (a)” viz., facts into the statement of
which tensed expressions enter essentially. (Dummett 1960, p. 500, [1]).
Presumably, facts of kind (b) would be facts into the statement of which
no tensed expressions enter (or do so inessentially). Clearly, facts of
kind (a) - tensed facts - are meant to correspond to A-series facts (e.g.,
the fact that Hitler’s death is past), and facts of kind (b) - tenseless facts
- are meant to correspond to B-series facts (e.g., the fact that Hitler’s
death is later than Caesar’s death).
2 McTaggart’s argument
Having thus set things up, Dummett begins by making the following
claim. With regard to McTaggart’s arguments, “[p]art two depends
upon part one […]” (Dummett 1960, p 500, [1]). That is, the success of
McTaggart’s Paradox, a plausible rendering ofwhichDummett sketches
in his opening pages, depends upon the success of McTaggart’s argu-
ment for the fundamentality of theA-series. Thismight seem a puzzling
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claim. Could not one hold that the A-series is contradictory even if it is
not fundamental?
However, I take it that Dummett’s point is that McTaggart’s Paradox
(part two) is directed against the A series as understood by the A-theo-
rist. That is, McTaggart’s Paradox is intended to show that the A-series
is contradictory on the assumption that tensed facts are fundamental
and (hence) irreducible. No one thinks that the A-series is contradic-
tory if tensed facts are taken to be reducible to B-theoretic facts (e.g., it’s
not contradictory for X to be earlier than t2 but later than t1). McTag-
gart’s Paradox is directed against the A-theory of time, i.e., the theory
according to which the A-series is fundamental and consistent. So un-
derstood, Dummett’s claim is correct: McTaggart’s proof of the incon-
sistency of the A-series presupposes the fundamentality of that series.
This explains why Dummett continues as follows:
[…] it is because the analogue of part one does not hold for
space or for personality that the analogue of part two for
space or for personality has no force.
(Dummett 1960, p. 500, [1])
The analogue of part one does indeed fail for space and personality. Spa-
tially and personally token-reflexive expressions (‘here’, ‘there’, ‘I’, ‘you’,
etc.,) need not feature in a full description of reality. A description using
only spatial co-ordinates and personal proper names would suffice.
The conclusion of McTaggart’s first argument - that the A-series is
fundamental to time - implies the tensed thesis (as we can call it) that
what is in time cannot be fully described without the use of tensed ex-
pressions. Dummett is sympathetic to this A-theoretic thesis and offers
his own argument for it. Consider any description of events contain-
ing no tensed expressions. We can, he says, always ask the question
“And which of these events is happening now?” This question, Dum-
mett thinks, deserves an answer, yet can be given one only if tensed
expressions are added to the description. Hence, the tensed thesis is
true. (Dummett 1960, p. 591, [1]).
This argument is unconvincing. Unlike the A theorist, the B-theorist
rejects the tensed thesis and accepts instead the tenseless thesis that what
is in time can be fully described without the use of tensed expressions.
According to the B-theorist, Dummett’s question is either illegitimate
or else can be answered in tenseless terms. If Dummett’s question is
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asked from ‘outside time’, it makes no sense, just as the question ‘What
is happening here?’, asked from ‘outside space’, makes no sense. For
the B-theorist, a question containing a temporal indexical can only be
asked and answered from a position in time. In that case, the answer to
Dummett’s question (“And which of these events is happening now?”)
is straightforward: those events whose occurrence is simultaneous with
the posing of that very question.
3 Temporal versus spatial immersion
Dummett takes the tensed thesis to be equivalent to the temporal immer-
sion thesis that a description of events in time can only be “[…] given
by someone who is himself in that time.” (Dummett 1960, p. 501, [1]).
Dummett iswell-disposed towards this thesis, but unhesitatingly rejects
the spatial immersion thesis that a description of objects in space can only
be given by someone who is himself in that space. He writes:
[…] the use of spatially token-reflexive expressions is not
essential to the description of objects as being in a space.
That is, I can describe an arrangement of objects in space
although I do not myself have any position in that space.
An example would be the space of my visual field. In that
space there is no here or there, no near or far: I am not in
that space. We can, I think, conceive, on the strength of
this analogy, of a being who could perceive objects in our
three-dimensional physical space although he occupied no
position in that space. He would have no use for any spa-
tially token-reflexive expressions in giving a description of
the physical universe, and yet that description might be a
perfectly correct description of the objects of the universe as
arranged in space. (Dummett 1960, pp. 500-501, [1])
Dummett’s reasoning in this passage is somewhat convoluted. He
cites the space of one’s visual field as a counterexample to the spatial
immersion thesis. On the basis of the analogy with the space of one’s
visual field, we can imagine a being who could perceive objects in our
three-dimensional physical space without occupying any position in
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that space. Such a being could give a full description of objects in physi-
cal space without occupying any position in that space, thus yielding
another counterexample to the spatial immersion thesis.
The spatial immersion thesis maywell be implausible, but the analo-
gy with the space of the visual field does not help Dummett’s case. If
the objects of my visual field are non-physical sense-data, they occupy
no space. In that case, the ‘space’ of my visual field is irrelevant to the
spatial immersion thesis. If, instead, the objects of my visual field are
those objects in my immediate physical environment, then I am in the
same space as them. Again, we have no counterexample to the spatial
immersion thesis. (Thomson 2001, pp. 243-247, [3]).
4 Observer-independence
With regard to part two of McTaggart’s argument, Dummett asks “[…]
does not the objection we considered - that McTaggart’s attempt to un-
cover a contradiction rested on a neglect of the obvious properties of
token-reflexive expressions - at least invalidate part two of the argu-
ment?” (Dummett 1960, p. 501, [1]. Rightly or wrongly, Dummett
uses ‘token-reflexive’ interchangeably with ‘indexical’.) The objection
Dummett is alluding to holds that, ifMcTaggart’s argument for a contra-
diction in the A-series were sound, we could equally well argue for the
inconsistency of space and personality by showing that every place can
be both ‘here’ and ‘there’, and every person can be both ‘I’ and ‘you’.
Since the latter arguments are confused, so is McTaggart’s.
It is odd that Dummett asks this question at this point since he al-
ready has the means to answer it, viz., by appeal to the falsity of the ana-
logue of part one for space and personality. However, instead of giving
this answer, Dummett takes a new tack and ascribes to McTaggart the
assumption that:
[…] reality must be something of which there exists in prin-
ciple a complete description. I can make drawings of a rock
from various angles, but if I am asked to say what the real
shape of the rock is, I can give a description of it as in three-
dimensional space which is independent of the angle from
which it is looked at. The description of what is really there,
as it really is, must be independent of any particular point
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of view. Now if time were real, then since what is tempo-
ral cannot be completely described without the use of token-
reflexive expressions, there would be no such thing as the
complete description of reality.
(Dummett 1960, p. 503, [1])
According to Dummett’s use of ‘complete’, a complete description is
“independent of any particular point of view”, i.e., observer-indepen-
dent. Dummett thus ascribes toMcTaggart the observer-independence the-
sis that there can be an observer-independent description of temporal
reality.
As the above quote makes clear, Dummett takes the tensed thesis to
imply the falsity of the observer-independence thesis. If what is tempo-
ral cannot be completely describedwithout the use of perspectival terms
such as ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’, then what is temporal can only
be fully described from the perspective of a being in time. This seems
correct. Dummett takes McTaggart to endorse both the tensed and ob-
server-independence theses, and hence to be (knowingly) in the grip of
a contradiction which can be avoided only by declaring time to be un-
real. Hence, McTaggart is forced to his infamous conclusion that time
is unreal.
However, Dummett offers no textual support for this interpretation
of McTaggart. No passage is cited in which McTaggart endorses the
observer-independence thesis. It is, in addition, a strange and self-stulti-
fying argument. Any supporter of the tensed thesis will automatically
reject the observer-independence thesis, and vice-versa. Moreover, the
observer-independence thesis has no theory-independent plausibility.
Its acceptance could only be motivated by a belief in the tenseless thesis
(i.e., the denial of the tensed thesis). For these reasons, then, Dummett
has given us no reason to revise the standard, and textually-grounded,
interpretation ofMcTaggart’s argumentwhich emphasises the role play-
ed by McTaggart’s well-known (if ill-understood) proof of the self-con-
tradictory nature of the A-series, as that series is understood by the
A-theorist.
Furthermore, the argument which Dummett himself endorses –
(contra McTaggart) time is real; the tensed thesis is true; so observer-
independence is false – is an argument that any A-theorist should
endorse. Evidence that this is Dummett’s argument can be seen from
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the following remark: “If this last piece of reasoning, to the effect that
the belief that time is unreal is self-refuting, is correct, thenMcTaggart’s
argument shows thatwemust abandon our prejudice that theremust be
a complete [observer-independent] description of reality.” (Dummett
1960, p. 504, [1]).
Note that rejection of the ‘prejudice’ that there must be an observer-
independent description of reality sits comfortablywith the central idea
of Dummett’s anti-realist programme in semantics and epistemology
(the idea that reality cannot outrun what we can, in principle, know).
Finally, we can now see that the title of Dummett’s article is something
of a misnomer. Dummett is not defending McTaggart’s proof of the
unreality of time, but arguing that it can be transformed into a (quite
different) proof of the falsity of the observer-independence thesis.
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to provide a conceptual
analysis of the so called moving spotlight theory of time, highlighting its
underlying metaphysical assumptions; on the other hand, to develop a
semantics for a temporal logic which allows us to grasp the philosophical
background of this theory.
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1 Introduction
The moving spotlight theory of time, MST for short, can be best under-
stood in terms of Broad’s lucky metaphor (see [1]):
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We are naturally tempted to regard the history of the world
as existing eternally in a certain order of events. Along this,
and in a fixeddirection, we imagine the characteristic of pres-
entness as moving, somewhat like the spot of light from a
policeman’s bull’s-eye traversing the fronts of the houses in
a street. What is illuminated is the present, what has been il-
luminated is the past, andwhat has not yet been illuminated
is the future. ( p. 59, [1])
Ironically, Broad himself did not advocate this view, being a growing
block theorist, but the image of the policeman patrolling the neighbour-
hood became notorious in the successive debate.
It is worth noting that MST is a metaphysically rich theory that as-
sumes both the cumbersome support of all eternal facts and the elusive
dynamics of the present. Usually, metaphysical costs are to be justified
in the light of high explanatory power and in order to identify this power
it is necessary to offer a very precise conceptual characterization of the
view at stake. In our opinion, in spite of the publication of very good
and interesting recent works on this subject 1, such a characterization is
still lacking, and so our first aim is to provide both a conceptual analy-
sis of the main tenets of MST and a formal model of the semantics of its
temporal operators. Thus, in the first part of this work, we focus on
the main metaphysical assumptions of the spotlight theory of time. In
particular, we stress its “double” core, which combines elements from
a static view of time, namely the assumption of a block-like eternal uni-
verse, with elements from a dynamic view of time, namely the assump-
tion of a moving-light present instant. The third section is then devoted
to the development of amodel of temporal logic rich enough to allow us
to account for the dynamics of the present. The logical device we will
use to do that is given by what we call dynamical models, i.e. models
constituted by a chain of variants ofmore standard staticmodels. In con-
structing such models, we remain agnostic about the topology of time,
so that our models allow for both forward and backward branching.
The main advantage provided by introducing dynamical models is that
they enable us to characterize the present and to distinguish two funda-
mental modalities concerning the past and two modalities concerning
1See[2,3,5]
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the future. In more details, we introduce a pair of modalities acting as
quantifiers on a thin past and a thin future, and a different pair ofmodali-
ties acting as quantifiers on a thick past and a thick future. The basic idea
is then roughly the following: to exist in the thin past coincides with
being located before the instant of reference, while to exist in the thick
past coincides with being located before the instant of reference and, in
accordance with the spotlight metaphor, to have been illuminated by
the light of the spotlight. Furthermore, as far as the future is concerned,
things are not entirely symmetrical. In fact, while it is possible for some-
thing to exist at a thin future, since to exist at the thin future coincides
with being located after the instant of reference, it is problematic to say
that something exists at the thick future, since the thick future could be
non-existent. In other terms, something is actually at the thick future
only retrospectively, that is, only from the point of view of the past. In-
deed, with respect to the actually present instant, there is no thick future,
since the present instant is the instant now illuminated by the spotlight,
so that no successive instant can have been illuminated.
The present framework has interesting philosophical applications.
The first one concerns the possibility of distinguishing two kinds of
change. On the one hand, a “static” kind of change, corresponding
to the fact that something, an apple say, which is red at a time t1, is
brown at a time t2 following t1. On the other hand, a “dynamic” kind
of change, corresponding to the fact that something, which is now red,
becomes brown, as a consequence of the fact that the present instant it-
self is changing. A second, natural, application concerns the extension
and the adaptation of the dynamicalmodel to other A-theories currently
debated in philosophy of time, like presentism and the growing block
theory. Due to space limitation, we plan to study these applications in
further works. Finally, it is important to note that in what follows we
are not engaged in a defense of MST. Hence, we will not present any
direct argument for the truth of this view of time. However, it is fair
to say that many criticisms against MST, and, generally, against similar
theories of time, depend on the opacity, or unintelligibility, of such the-
ories. In the light of this, the clarification of the metaphysical basis and
the logical structure of MST we are going to provide can be intended
as a contribute on the behalf of the advocates of dynamical theories of
time.
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2 The main features of MST
MST contains elements from the two traditional conceptions of time.2
From B-theory it inherits the structure of the space-time manifold,
which is constituted by all present, past, and future facts. From A-theory
it inherits two elements: the real, objective existence of a tensional trait
of the universe, i.e. the present, and its dynamics.
Before starting to investigate these points, a clarification on our con-
strual of the concepts of instant of time, fact, and universe is in order.
A block universe can be regarded either as a collection of facts, namely
the collection of all existent facts, or as a giant fact, the fact including all
existent facts as parts. The difference between these two views depends,
in our opinion, on what is considered to be fundamental. Thus, if the
universe is assumed to be the fundamental reality, then it seems to be
more appropriate to regard individual facts, if there are any, as parts of
this fundamental reality. By contrast, if individual facts are assumed to
fundamentally exist, then it seems to be more appropriate to regard the
universe as the collection of them. We do not want to take a stand on
this issue and nothing in what follows depends on that. Once a block
universe is given, we can think of time as a certain relational structure
connected with it. This connection can be conceived of in twoways. We
can assume either that this structure exists independently of the uni-
verse, and that different parts of the universe are located at different
instants in it, or that the existence of the structure is dependent on the
existence of the universe in as much as temporal relations are just rela-
tions between parts of the universe. In the first case, time is a substan-
tial entity, with instants of time bearing temporal relations with other
instants of time and relations of location with facts, so that two facts are
simultaneous preciselywhen they are located at the same instant. In the
second case, time is a relational entity, with parts of the universe bear-
ing temporal relations with other parts of the universe. Still, also in this
second case, it is possible to introduce a relation of temporal location
by stating that an instant of time is a complete collection of simultane-
2A terminological note. We will be rather relaxed about the use of the terms ”A-
theory” and ”B-theory”; generally, we will consider A and B-theories always from a
metaphysical point of view – that is, with no reference to the problem of tensed / tense-
less propositions – andwewill classify the A-theories (or A-views) of time as dynamical
metaphysical frameworks as opposed to static metaphysical frameworks (B-theories).
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ous facts and that a fact is located at a certain instant of time precisely
when it is part of the collection constituting that instant. Again, we take
a stand neither on this issue nor on the metaphysical status of the rela-
tion of simultaneity. Accordingly, we will freely use temporal relations
as well as relations of location and we will characterize both instants of
time and facts as existent and as past, present, and future.
So, we can characterize the spotlight theory as defined according to
four basic tenets, respectively concerning: the ontological status of in-
stants of time; the ontological status of the present instant; the substan-
tial aspect of the universe; the dynamical aspect of the universe. In par-
ticular:
1. Eternalism: all the instants of time, past, present, and future, exist,
where the concept of existence is to be intended as univocal and
tenseless.3
2. Absolutism: the instants of time can be divided into past, present,
and future in an absolute way; in particular, there is a matter of
fact about which instant is present.
3. Block universe: the state of the universe is fixed except for what
instant of time is the present instant; hence, the identity of the uni-
verse as a block is fixed.4
4. Dynamism: the division of the instants of time into past, present,
and future is constantly changing; in particular, what instant of
time is the present instant is not fixed.
The richness ofMST is not always kindly considered. On the one hand, it
is economically disadvantageous both with respect to presentism, since
3Here the concept of existence is to be intended in accordance with the main theses
proposed in [7]. In sum, there is a unique concept of existence, which (i) coincides with
the concept of being, (ii) is not a concept concerning an activity, and (iii) is completely
captured by the existential quantifier of first order logic.
4This assumption is not shared by all proponents of a spotlight theory of time. See
[4] for a version of the theory which, instead of adopting a block universe as a sub-
stratum of change, introduces a variant of the growing block universe. It is also worth
noting that this assumption is not implied by eternalism, since it is possible for all the
instants of time to exist eternally, even though what obtains at such instants changes as
time goes by. On this view, there are always past, present and future facts, but they are
not always the same facts.
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it adds a plethora of non present, but existing, facts, and with respect to
the block-universe theory, since it adds the real and dynamical property
of presentness. On the other hand, it seems to be theoretically disadvan-
tageous, since, as highlighted by [6], this view “combines the least com-
monsensical consequence of the B-theory (eternalism) with the most
scientifically problematic consequence of the A-theories (the privileged
present)”. This notwithstanding, in the last few years, two book-length
contributions5 and a series of papers6 have been producedwhich are de-
voted to the analysis and defense of various versions of MST, thus wit-
nessing an increasing interest for this non-standard A-theory of time.
However, up to now, no standard version of this theory is available,
and the best attempt to characterize our intuitions on the moving spot-
light (which is [5] in our opinion) is not sympathetic towards this view.
Hence, in the following section, we offer our contribution to this trend
by providing a formal model able to grasp the main features of MST.
3 A Model for MST
STATIC AND DYNAMICAL MODELS
In this section, we introduce the temporal language we consider appro-
priate for describing the dynamics of the present and define the models
capturing the structure of a universe with a moving spotlight.
Definition 1. Language for the moving spotlight theory of time.
The languageL of themoving spotlight theory of time contains a count-
able set {pi} of propositional variables, two static temporal operators
〈P〉 and 〈F〉, two new dynamic temporal operators 〈P!〉 and 〈F!〉, and
a modality [now]. The set Fm(L ) of formulas of L is then defined as
follows.
ϕ ::= pi | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ψ | [now]ϕ | 〈P〉ϕ | 〈P!〉ϕ | 〈F〉ϕ | 〈F!〉ϕ
The other propositional connectives and the dual modalities are
defined in the standard way. Intuitively, pi states that a basic state of
affairs is true at the time of evaluation, without further assumptions on
5See [2] and [5].
6See for instance, [3].
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the set of basic states of affairs. [now]ϕ states that ϕ is true at the actually
present instant; 〈P〉ϕ states that ϕ is true at some instant that precedes
the instant at which that proposition is evaluated, while 〈P!〉ϕ states
that ϕ is true in the actual past, that is at some instant that precedes both
the instant at which that proposition is evaluated and the present instant
along the actual history; analogously, 〈F〉ϕ states that ϕ is true at some
instant that is preceded by the instant at which that proposition is eval-
uated, while 〈F!〉ϕ states that ϕ is true in the actual future, i.e. at some
instant that is preceded by the instant at which that proposition is eval-
uated but is in the actual part of the history, which is the part of the
history travelled by the spotlight.
Definition 2. Temporal Frame.
A temporal frame is a pair (T,≤), where
(i) T 6=∅
(ii) ≤ is a reflexive and transitive relation on T .
Intuitively, T is the set of instants, or moments, of time, while ≤ is
the relation that a instant x bears to a instant y just in case either x = y
or x precedes y. It is worth noting that we are not assuming that T is a
chain andwe allow both forward and backward branching. Themodels
for the language of the spotlight theory of time are based on a temporal
frame and are subdivided into static and dynamical models.
Definition 3. Static model.
A static model is a tuple M = (T,≤,P,V ) where
(i) (T,≤) is a temporal frame
(ii) P = {t}, for some t ∈ T
(iii)V : {pi}→℘(T )
Intuitively, in a temporal frame, P is the extension of the property of
being present, so that it contains the unique element of T that coincides
with the present instant, while V is a function that assigns to proposi-
tions the sets of instants at which the propositions hold true.
Definition 4. Present instant in a static model.
The present instant tM in a static model M = (T,≤,P,V ) is the unique
instant of T that is contained in P .
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Definition 5. Variant of a static model centered at a time.
A variant of a static model M = (T,≤,P,V ) is a tuple Mt = (T,≤
,Pt ,V ) where Pt = {t}, for t ∈ T .
Thus, a variant of M is a model Mt = (T,≤,Pt ,V ) that coincides with M
except for the instant that has the property of being present, i.e. except
for the now. This is in line with both the eternalist and the dynamical
traits of the spotlight theory. What changes is the point that is present,
the point where the present is located, while all the instants of time are
held fixed.
Corollary: tMt = t.
As straightforward consequences of this definition we obtain that (i) ev-
ery model is a variant of itself, since M = MtM ; (ii) if Mt1 and Mt2 are
variants of M, then Mt1 is a variant of Mt2 , since Mt1 = (Mt2)t1 .
Therefore, being a variant is an equivalence relation and induces a
partition on the class of all the static models.
Definition 6. Dynamical model.
A dynamical model D(M) based onM= (T,≤,P,V ) is a set of vari-
ants of M satisfying the following conditions:7
(i)M ∈ D(M)
(ii) if Mt ∈ D(M), then t ≤ tM
(iii) if Mt1 ,Mt2 ∈ D(M), then t1 ≤ t2 or t2 ≤ t1
The basic idea here is that a dynamical model based on M contains the
present model of the universe, which is M, together with a chain con-
stituted by models of the past of the universe with respect to M. A
dynamic model then represents the course of the universe up to the
present time: this course is indeed a chain, but it is represented not as
a chain of instants, but as a chain of models, which are precisely the mod-
els of the universe at the instants that have been actually present in the
past, thus constituting the actual history up to tM. In addition, all these
models give rise to past dynamical models since, if Mt1 ∈ D(M), then
D(Mt1) = {Mt2 ∈ D(M) | t2 ≤ t1} is a dynamical model based on Mt1 , be-
ing constituted by Mt1 plus a chain of models for the past of the universe
with respect to Mt1 .
7In what follows M is the static model on which the dynamic model is based.
120
INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE
The truth conditions of the propositions of L are now definable as fol-
lows, where M varies over elements of a dynamical model D(M).
Definition 7. Truth at an instant of M in D(M).
M, t |= pi ⇔ t ∈V (pi)
M, t |= ¬ϕ ⇔ M, t 6|= ϕ
M, t |= ϕ ∧ψ ⇔ M, t |= ϕ and M, t |= ψ
M, t |= [now]ϕ ⇔ M, tM |= ϕ
M, t |= 〈P〉ϕ ⇔ M, t ′ |= ϕ , for some t ′ < t
M, t |= 〈F〉ϕ ⇔ M, t ′ |= ϕ , for some t < t ′
M, t |= 〈P!〉ϕ ⇔ Mt ′ , tMt′ |= ϕ , for some t ′ < t
M, t |= 〈F!〉ϕ ⇔ Mt ′ , tMt′ |= ϕ , for some t < t ′ ≤ tM
The first condition states that pi is true at t in M just in case pi is true
according to V . Since V is the same for all the models in D(M), the
truth of pi at t is fixed in all the models in D(M), in accordance with the
intuition that the universe is a fixed block. As to the modal operators:
• [now]ϕ is true at t in M precisely when ϕ is true at the present in-
stant of time tM in M;
• 〈P〉ϕ is true at t in M precisely when ϕ is true at some instant that
precedes t;
• 〈F〉ϕ is true at t in M precisely when ϕ is true at some instant that
is preceded by t;
• 〈P!〉ϕ is true at t in M precisely when ϕ is presently true in some
variant of M that precede Mt in the dynamical model;
• 〈F!〉ϕ is true at t in M precisely when ϕ is presently true in some
variant of M that lies between Mt and M in the dynamical model.
Importantly, the truth of 〈P!〉ϕ implies that [now]ϕ has been true in some
instant of the actual past of M, and hence of M, and the truth of 〈F!〉ϕ
implies that [now]ϕ has been true at some instant of the actual future of
t in M, and hence again in the actual past of M, since the actual instants
lie in the past of the present instant of M.
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Note 1 The significance of the distinction between standard temporal
modalities and bang temporal modalities becomes evident if we consid-
er the truth-conditions of 〈P〉ϕ and 〈P!〉ϕ . While 〈P〉ϕ is true at t in M
just in case there is a possible past instant, relative to t, at which ϕ is true,
〈P!〉ϕ is true at t in M just in case there is an actual past instant, relative to
t, at which ϕ is true. Therefore, in terms of the spotlightmetaphor, while
the truth of 〈P〉ϕ is determined by the state of the block universe, the
truth of 〈P!〉ϕ is determined by the path followed by the light through
the universe.
Note 2 The present framework provides us with the resources to ex-
press the possible indeterminateness of the past and the future with
respect to a dynamic model D(M).
Definition 8. Being indeterminate in M at t.
(i) in M, the past is indeterminate at t := M, t |= ¬〈P!〉>
(ii) in M, the future is indeterminate at t := M, t |= ¬〈F!〉>
Thus, it is always true that the future is indeterminate at the present
instant, since M, tM |= ¬〈F!〉>, given that there exists no variant of M
in D(M) which is indexed at an instant that is in the future of tM.
Note 3 In accordancewith our intuition on the structure of the dynam-
ical universe, there exists no actual future for the present instant. This
condition allows us to introduce the following classification of instants.
(1) in M, t is actually past := M, t |= 〈F!〉>
(t is actually past: it has an actual future)
A time in the actual past is a timewith respect towhich there is an actual
future, since the future is not determinate for both the present and every
time that follows the present.
(2) in M, t is in the future := M, t |= 〈P〉¬〈F!〉>
(t is in the future: it comes after the actual present)
A time in the future is a time that follows the present. Still, for every time
t that follows the present there is a past instant, between the present and
t, which has no determinate future.
(3) in M, t is actually present := M, t |= ¬〈F!〉>∧¬〈P!〉¬〈F!〉>
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(t is actually present: it has an actual past, but no actual future)
The present time tM, like any time that is not in the actual past, has no
determinate future. In addition, the present time is the unique time
that is preceded by all the times with respect to which there is an actual
future. As expected then, the present turns out to be definable as the
unique instant that lies on the edge of the actual history, so that the
previous proposition uniquely identify tM in the dynamical model.
The following picture synthesizes these definitions.
actual past
actual present
live future
Note 4 A last significant upshot is the possibility of expressing the fact
that something is a lost possibility.
Definition 9. Being a lost possibility, in M at t.
We define ϕ to be a lost possibility, in M, at t, if and only if:
M, t |=〈P!〉〈F〉ϕ ∧¬〈P!〉ϕ ∧ [now]¬〈F〉ϕ
Hence, in the present framework, a formula like 〈P〉〈F〉ϕ ∧¬〈F〉ϕ is not
appropriate for expressing that ϕ is a lost possibility, since an instant of
time can be in the future of a past instant without being in the future of
an instant which is in the actual past of the instant of evaluation. By con-
trast, a formula like 〈P!〉〈F〉ϕ ∧¬〈P!〉ϕ ∧ [now]¬〈F〉ϕ states that, in the
actual past, ϕ could have obtained, even if, at the instant of evaluation,
it has not obtained and it is no longer the case that it can obtain.
4 Conclusion
The main contributions of this paper can be summed up as follows.
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1. To put forward a logical characterization of MST by providing a
formal model of it.
2. To put forward a precise characterization of the concept of present-
ness and its dynamics.
3. To show how some basic notions in the philosophy of time can be
defined in this framework.
In a future work, the main results of this paper could be extended to
other A-theory of time such presentism or growing block theory. Of
course, appropriate changes are needed in order to deal with the differ-
ent ontology of facts of these A-theories.
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Abstract
We consider sentences inwhich “now” occurs in initial position and show
that the meaning they convey differs from the meaning of sentences that
are otherwise identical except for “now” occurring in final position. We
argue that the occurrence of “now” in initial position triggers a particular
kind of modal reading for the sentence to which the adverb is prefixed.
A general notion of modal forcing is proposed to provide a uniform ac-
count of this kind of reading. Armed with this account, we offer a solu-
tion to two tense-modal puzzles, which have to do with fatalism and the
possibility of a changing past.
Keywords: Now,Modal forcing, Time adverbs, Tense andmodality, Tense-
modal puzzles, Fatalistic argument, Changing past.
1 Two little puzzles
It is September 13, 2017. Paris has just been declared host city of the
2024 Olympic Games by the International Olympic Committee. Right
after the declaration, you can felicitously and truthfully utter (1):
(1) Now Paris will host the 2024 Olympic Games.
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Let t be the time of your utterance. By uttering (1) at t, it seems that you
convey the implicature that (2) was false at some time preceding t:1
(2) Paris will host the 2024 Olympic Games.
Let us observe, however, that (1) entails (2). As a consequence, (2)must
also be true at t. From this, assuming the platitudes (P1) and (P2) about
the meaning of (2) and the natural ordering of times, we can conclude
that (2) was true at any time before t.
(P1) Sentence (2) (considered at time t) says that Paris hosts the 2024
Olympic Games at some time in the future (relative to t).
(P2) If a time is in the future of t, then it is in the future of any time
preceding t.
Therefore, your utterance of (1) at t both implicates that (2) was some-
times false before t and entails that (2) was always true before t. In other
terms, what your utterance implicates clashes with what your utterance
entails.
Notice that this clash should make your utterance of (1) infelicitous,
for essentially the same reason that (3) sounds infelicitous:
(3) ??Mary has two children. She has given birth to one boy and two
girls.
Arguably, what is wrong with the discourse (3) is that one of its impli-
catures (the scalar implicature that Mary has exactly two children) is at
odds with something that (3) entails (that Mary has at least three chil-
dren). In contrast, your utterance of (1) is perfectly felicitous. How is
this possible?
A similar puzzle arises with a sentence about the past. Consider the
following scenario. An ex post facto law L is enforced at t; L classifies
certain actions as criminal, while the same kind of actions were previ-
ously regarded as lawful. Moreover, Bill had performed such an action
on a certain day d, before t. At t, as law L is enforced, you can felici-
tously and truthfully utter (4):
1When we speak of a sentence as being true or false at a time, we only mean to say
that the sentence is true or false as evaluated at that time. All we say is meant to be
consistent with a tenseless conception of (propositional) truth.
128
(4) Now Bill committed a crime on day d.
Your utterance of (4) entails (5):
(5) Bill committed a crime on day d.
Therefore, (5) must also be true at t. From this, assuming the platitudes
(P3) and (P4) about the meaning of (5) and the natural ordering of
times, we can conclude that (5) was true at any time between day d
and t.
(P3) Sentence (5) (considered at time t) says that Bill commits a crime
at some time in the past (relative to t), which falls within day d.
(P4) If a time t ′ is in the past of t, then it is in the past of any time
between t ′ and t.
Moreover, your utterance of (4) at t conveys the implicature that (5)was
false at some time between day d and t. Therefore, your utterance of (4)
has an entailment and an implicature that contradict each other. This
should make your utterance infelicitous, contrary to the facts. Again,
how is this possible?
We believe that the puzzle about the future has a very natural solu-
tion – so natural that it was often anticipated by our audiences at previ-
ous presentations of this work. The solution is based on the following
observation: sentences about the future sometimes have a reading in-
volving some planning (a plan reading, for short) , that is, they are used
to talk about events that are expected to occur in the future given certain
present plans. Prototypical examples of such sentences are the so-called
“futurates” [see, e.g., 9, 8], such as:
(6) Paris hosts the 2024 Olympic Games.
(7) Paris is hosting the 2024 Olympic Games.
However, the existence in English of dedicated tense-aspect forms to ex-
press a plan reading, as in (6)–(7), does not exclude that future tense
sentences like (2) can occasionally convey the same kind of reading.
Now, if (2) does convey a plan reading in the context of (1), what (2)
says in that context can be expressed as in (2′):
(2′) There is an official plan according to which Paris is to host the
2024 Olympic Games.
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Clearly, (2′) can be false at t even if there is a time following t at which
Paris hosts the 2024 Olympic Games.2 What your utterance of (1) im-
plicates, in the plan reading of its component sentence (2), is that (2′)
(andnot the proposition that (2) expresses according to (P1)was false at
some time before t. In other words, your utterance of (1) at t implicates
that at some time t0 before t it was false that there was a (then valid) offi-
cial plan according to which Paris was to host the 2024 Olympic Games.
Importantly, this implicature is perfectly consistent with (2) being true
at t0 in the reading given in (P1), for if (2) was true at t0 in this reading,
then at t0 it was true that Paris would host the 2024 Olympic Games –
although this may have been unknown to everybody at the time.
Now, the puzzle about the past cannot be solved in exactly the same
way as the puzzle about the future, since it makes no sense to invoke
plan readings for sentences about the past. Still, we believe that the two
puzzles have the same kind of solution. The idea is as follows. What
(5) says in the context of (4) is not what (P3) states that it says; instead,
what (5) says in that context can be expressed as in (5′):
(5′) There is an institutional frame according to which Bill commit-
ted a crime on day d.
Assuming this reading of (5) (call it institutional reading, for short), what
your utterance of (4) at t implicates, in the institutional reading of its
component sentence (5), is that (5′) (and not the proposition that (5)
expresses according to (P3)) was false at some time between day d and
t. In other words, your utterance of (4) at t implicates that at some time
t0 before t it was false that there was a (then valid) institutional frame
according to which Bill had committed a crime on day d. Notice that
this implicature is perfectly consistent with (5) being true at t0 in the
reading given in (P3): at t0 it was true that Bill had committed a crime
on day d.
2 Forcing readings and “now”-initial sentences
The general idea we pursue in this section is that plan readings and in-
stitutional readings are just a special case of a more general kind, which
2It can be added that (2′) can be true at t even if there is no time following t at which
Paris hosts the 2024 Olympic Games. See, e.g., [4].
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we call forcing readings. The fundamental notion is that of a forcing re-
lation holding between a state s and an event e: a relation of determi-
nation, whereby e occurring at some time is necessitated by s holding
at another time. Next we consider some linguistic data with the aim of
showing that sentences in which “now” contributes to the expression of
a forcing reading – like (1) and (4) from section 1 – share a particular
syntactic property, formally signaling that “now” is playing a different
role here from that of a regular temporal adverb (i.e., one which locates
an eventuality in time).
LINGUISTIC PROPERTIES OF “NOW”-INITIAL SENTENCES
If one looks at dialogic contexts in which the addressee denies what the
speaker has just said, it is clear that the syntactic position of “now” can
make an important difference to the interpretation of an utterance, and
consequently to the coherence of a dialogue. An example of this is the
contrast between (8) and (9):
(8) [Context: A and B are watching the 2011World Championships
in Athletics. A believes that Yohan Blake will run in a moment.]
A. Yohan Blake will win (right) now.
B. No, that’s false. He’ll run tomorrow afternoon. / ??Walter
Dix could make it as well.
(9) [Context: A and B are watching the 2011World Championships
in Athletics. They start talking just after Usain Bolt has been
disqualified for a false start.]
A. Now Yohan Blake will win.
B. No, that’s false. Walter Dix could make it as well. / ??He’ll
run tomorrow afternoon.
In dialogue (9), unlike in (8), the mere possibility that Yohan Blake does
not win is sufficient for B to deny A’s statement. That would be un-
expected unless A’s statement was understood as having a necessity
modal force (viz., in accordance with the forcing reading of the preja-
cent of “now”). The contrast between (8) and (9) shows that the syn-
tactic position of “now” in the sentence matters for the interpretation:
when it contributes to expressing a forcing reading, “now” typically
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occurs in sentence-initial position.3 In what follows, we shall refer to
sentences such as (1), (4) and A’s statement in dialogue (9) as “now”-
initial sentences.4
It has been observed by many that “now” has a contrastive value (at
least when used with predicates that can be true of extended intervals –
e.g., with stative predicates; see [10, 2, 14], among others). Mostly, this
has been observed for occurrences in which “now” functions as a regu-
lar temporal adverbmodifying a verb phrase. For instance, an utterance
of the sentence “I am tired now” implicates that the speaker was not
tired before her utterance.5 In line with this widespread observation,
we notice that “now”-initial sentences have a contrastive flavour: sen-
tence (10) implicates that, at a previous time, no wedding plan existed,
which forced the event of John and Mary getting married in April.
(10) [Said in January, just after the couple’s wedding plan has
changed.]
Now John and Mary are getting married in April.
Analogously, (11) implicates that a previous literary setting forced the
event that Holmes died in the Reichenbach falls:
(11) [Said after Holmes ‘resuscitated’ in The Adventure of the Empty
House.]
Now Sherlock Holmes didn’t die in the Reichenbach falls.
Analogously, again, A’s statement in dialogue (9) above implicates that,
3It can also occur in sentence-final position, although in this position one needs the
right intonation in order to make it clear that the adverb is not being used as a modifier
of the verb phrase (hence, as a regular time adverb).
4The semantic relevance of the position of time adverbs in the linear order of the
sentence, in particular the emergence of modal meanings with pre-verbal occurrences,
is a well-known phenomenon, one which has been described and amply documented
in the linguistic literature ([20], among many others).
5Such implications presumably arise via pragmatic inference – possibly exploiting
Grice’s maxim of quantity – and are not limited to “now”: it seems safe to say that the
use of any time adverb to specify the temporal location at which a certain eventuality
E holds triggers the inference that E does not hold at other locations, e.g., the senten-
ce “The shop is closed today”, without further indications, suggests that the shop was
not closed yesterday and will not be closed tomorrow. Said this, we think that there
likely is something special to the contrastive implications that “now” gives rise to in
“now”-initial sentences, as we discuss in greater detail in section 2.
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at a time preceding Usain Bolt’s disqualification, there was no state that
causally forced the event of Yohan Blake winning.
VARIETIES OF FORCING
The discussion so far should have made it clear that forcing relations
come in many varieties. The kind of forcing involved in (1), and in
(10) as well, we shall call forcing from plans. A relation of forcing from
plans obtains between the state of a certain plan being effective and the
events that must obtain if the plan is realized. The kind of forcing in-
volved in (4), we shall call institutional forcing. Yet another kind of forc-
ing, at play in the interpretation of A’s statement in dialogue (9) above,
is causal-historical forcing: this obtains between a state s and an event e
if s causally necessitates e, given certain historical conditions [17]. In
both causal-historical forcing and forcing from plans, the temporal or-
dering between s and e is such that s precedes e (causes precede effects,
plans precede the events that they intend). But it is also possible that
the temporal relation between e and s is reversed, as it may happenwith
institutional forcing.6
ANALYSIS OF “NOW”-INITIAL SENTENCES
Wepropose that “now” in the “now”-initial sentences considered above
is best modelled as a modal operator N with the following semantic and
pragmatic properties:
Stative Anchor: N is anchored to a state s∗ which obtains at reference
time tR. State s∗ can be described by a that-clause argument of
“now”7 and is presupposed (i.e., it is common knowledge that s∗
obtains at tR).
Forcing: N triggers a forcing reading for its prejacent, whereby a con-
textually relevant forcing relation R is required to hold between
6The kind of forcing involved in (11) seems to be different from all the others con-
sidered in the main text: in this case, it is not clear whether s and e can be said to be
related via a temporal relation.
7The possibility to describe the underlying state via a that-clause attached to “now”
is exemplified by the more verbose variant of (1) given in (i):
(i) Now that the International Olympic Committee has made its plan, Paris will host the
2024 Olympic Games.
See [6].
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s and the event e described by the prejacent. (A relation R hold-
ing between a state s and an event e in a world w at a time t is a
forcing relationwhen e occurs in every alternative to w at t which is
compatible with s.)
Change of State: The evaluation of an utterance of pnow (that S1), Sq2 at
tR generates an implicature concerning the behaviour of the forc-
ing relation R at alternative times t ′ for tR, to the effect that R does
not hold between any state obtaining at t ′ and the event e.
This analysis predicts that (1) is true in the context described at the
beginning of the paper at the condition that an event of Paris hosting
the Olympic Games occurs in the future of September 13, 2017 in ev-
ery world compatible with a presupposed state s∗, where s∗ is a state
in which the International Olympic Committee has made its relevant
plan. In this case, the variable R refers to the particular kind of forcing
exerted by plans. A completely parallel calculation can be provided for
the truth conditions of (4) (understood as “now that the relevant law is
in force Bill committed a crime on day d”), but in this case R will refer
to institutional forcing.
Let us comment on the Stative Anchor and Change of State prop-
erties formulated above. Concerning Stative Anchor, we note that the
state s∗ which is mentioned in it is typically established in surrounding
discourse, as in the following example (from a newspaper article):
(12) [Paris] deputy mayor Bruno Julliard announced that glass pan-
els will replace the grills that are currently weighed down by
hundreds of thousands of padlocks. [...] As inmany other cities,
couples lock their padlocks to bridges andmonuments, symbol-
izing their union. Recently, cities like Melbourne and New York
have removed locks from their bridges, and now Paris will join
them.
The sentence in italics in (12) is understood as “now that glass panels
will replace the grills in question (as announced by the deputy mayor),
Paris will join those other cities,” where the material in the that-clause
is clearly related to a previous stretch of discourse.
Turning to Change of State, we note that this property mentions al-
ternative times for tR, which are moreover claimed to be in the past of tR.
Thinking about the contrastive value of “now” (which was mentioned
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above) more broadly – for instance, thinking about the implications
of contrast of a sentence like “I am hungry now” – one may wonder
whether the alternative times for tR must necessarily be in the past or can
in some cases be in the future of tR. We think that the specific operator N
found in “now”-initial sentences is lexically specified in such a way that
the alternatives for tR are times preceding tR. Notice that a different oper-
ator N∗ exists in English, which is built with “now” but is more complex
than the plain “now” considered so far, and N∗ is such that the alterna-
tives for tR relevant for the interpretation of sentences containing N∗ are
times following tR. The operator in question is syntactically realized as
“for now”. An example of it is given in (13), which sharply contrasts
with (14) in its implications:
(13) For now I have no job.
(14) Now I have no job.
On the one hand, (14) implies that the speaker has become unemployed,
that is, a state holds at the present time t which makes it the case that
the speaker is unemployed at t but no state held at any time preceding t
which made it the case that the speaker was unemployed then. On the
other hand, (13) implies that the speaker may end up getting a job. We
contend that both prefixes “for now” and “now” in (13) and (14) above
use alternative times (for the reference time tR), and they both require
that some relation does not hold at those alternative times. The differ-
ence between those two prefixes is that “for now” looks forward in time
to find its alternatives, while “now” looks backward; from these opposite
temporal orientations of the two operators, the different implications
of (13) and (14) follow: simplifying somewhat, (13) implies that the
speaker does not have a job at present but could be no longer jobless
in the future, while (14) implies that the speaker does not have a job
at present but was not jobless in the past. In what follows we will not
elaborate on this difference of temporal orientation between the modal
operator “now” (of ”now”-initial sentences) and linguistically related
operators.8
8These remarks highlight the importance of taking temporal orientation into account
in order to develop a semantic theory of “now” and related modal operators; moreover,
they help framing the discussion of the relevant uses of “now” within the broader con-
text of temporal orientation of modals in natural language [7].
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In the next section we show that our analysis allows for a treatment
of two philosophical puzzles involving time and necessity: the fatalis-
tic argument, first discussed by Aristotle, and a more recent argument
concluding to the possibility of changing the past, presented in [3].
3 Two puzzles
THE FATALISTIC PUZZLE
There are a few philosophical arguments that allow one, starting from
prima facie plausible premises, to draw the fatalist conclusion that the
future is settled, that is, historically necessary. These arguments have
puzzled generations of philosophers over the centuries and still today
keep their grip on the minds of those who seek to defuse them. Puzzle-
ment stems from two sources: first, fatalism in itself is a nearly incredi-
ble doctrine; second, it is surprising to see that fatalism can be justified
on purely logico-linguistic grounds. Here we shall focus on a very sim-
ple argument, which Aristotle discusses in his De Interpretatione (19a23-
25) (see [21] for an alternative reconstruction of the argument).
Consider the following sentence, which intuitively concerns a con-
tingent eventuality:
(15) There will be a sea battle tomorrow.
By the principle of bivalence, (15) is either true or false. Let us start by
assuming that (15) is true. If so, then (15) is true now, that is:
(16) Now it is true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.
But if it is already true now that therewill be a sea battle tomorrow, then
the battle is fated, that is, inevitable – it is always too late to change the
present. Moreover, what is inevitable is not contingent. Therefore,
(17) It is not contingent that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.
We run into a similar conclusion if we assume that (15) is false. Since
this argument does not rely on any specific feature of the example cho-
sen, it can be generalized. The conclusion is that everything is either
inevitable or impossible: fatalism is true.
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Many philosophers accept the step from (15) to (16) as valid and
reject the step from (16) to (17) as invalid – this is [12]’s solution to
the fatalistic argument [see also 5, 13, 11]. Our analysis of now-initial
sentences strongly suggests the opposite stance: the step from (16) to
(17) is valid, and the invalid step is the one from (15) to (16) [see [16]
for a similar diagnosis]. It is natural to think that, if a sentence of the
form pNow Pq receives a forcing reading in a certain context, then also
the corresponding sentence pNow it is true that Pq receives a forcing
reading in that context.9 But if (15) does not validly entail (16), then,
for the very same reason, (15) does not validly entail the following:
(18) Now there will be a sea battle tomorrow.
Indeed, as uttered in the relevant context, (18) entails that a causal forc-
ing relation exists between some present state and the future event of a
sea battle tomorrow. Nothing similar holds for (15).
Before considering our second puzzle, let us note that a perfectly re-
spectable version of the fatalistic argument can be obtained by replacing
(18) with a sentence in which “now” does not occur in initial position,
for instance:
(19) It is true now that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.
Moreover, and perhapsmore importantly, it is easy to envisage a variant
of the fatalistic argument in which the role of (18) is taken by a past-
tensed truth ascription, for instance:
(20) Yesterday it was already true that there would be a sea battle
tomorrow.
If our solution to the fatalistic puzzle is correct, the existence of these
alternative arguments suggests that forcing readings can be triggered
by a wide array of linguistic constructions, which include but are not
limited to “now”-initial sentences. In turn, if this conclusion is correct,
then our approach to forcing is in wait of substantial generalization. We
shall briefly discuss this prospective generalization in section (4).
9Strictly speaking, it is the prejacent of “now” which receives a forcing reading. We
can also speak – in a derivative sense – of ‘forcing reading’ of a “now”-initial sentence,
in those cases in which the prejacent receives a forcing reading.
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THE PUZZLE OF THE CHANGING PAST
The second puzzle that we wish to consider is related to an argument
proposed by [3], calling into question the view that the past cannot
change. One way to present this argument is by making use of sentence
(21),10 uttered in the real-world context described below:
(21) [Context: On July 23, 2000, being the rider with the lowest over-
all time at the end of the last stage, Lance Armstrong had been
declared thewinner of the Tour de France byUnion duCyclisme
Internationale (UCI). It is now October 22, 2012: having discov-
ered that Armstrong made use of banned substances, UCI with-
draws all of Armstrong’s wins at the Tour de France.]
Armstrong has no longer won the 2000 Tour de France.
Barlassina and Del Prete remark that (21) is a true sentence about the
past, moreover, for (21) to be a true sentence about the past, it must be
the case that both (i) and (ii) hold true:
(i) at some t before now, the past was such that Armstrongwon the
2000 Tour de France;
(ii) now the past is such that Armstrong did not win the 2000 Tour
de France.
The conjunction of (i) and (ii) entails that the past has changed in the
passage from t to now and so sounds puzzling, since common sense is
strongly at odds with the view that the past can ever change.
If our analysis of “now”-initial sentences is correct, we have a prin-
cipled way out of this puzzle. First of all, observe that (21) essentially
conveys the same content as:
(22) Now Armstrong has not won the 2000 Tour de France.
Both (21) and (22) naturally receive a forcing reading. In other words,
both say that a presently obtaining state (i.e., the state containing the
presently effective declarations by UCI) institutionally forces the even-
tuality that Armstrong did not win the 2000 Tour de France. Moreover,
10Barlassina and Del Prete’s main argument is actually based on an intuition about
the change of truth value of the context-insensitive sentence about the past “LanceArm-
strong won the Tour de France in 2000” across two subsequent real-world contexts.
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both (21) and (22) imply that things were different in the past as re-
gards Armstrong not having won the 2000 Tour de France. But if our
analysis is on the right track, this implication can be dealt with without
assuming that the past has actually changed: we only have to recognize
(a) that an institutional event (such as an event of winning the Tour de
France) depends on the assignment of a status function by a competent
authority [16, 18, 1], and (b) that a state obtained at some time in the
past, which institutionally forced the event of Armstrong winning the
2000 Tour de France.
4 Perspectives for future work
In this paper, we presented a specific linguistic phenomenon, the forc-
ing reading of “now”-initial sentences, for which we briefly and infor-
mally described a possible treatment. In our proposal, a “now”-initial
sentence says that some presupposed state s∗, obtaining at reference
time tR (usually, the present), forces a certain event e, the relation of
forcing R being one of a number of possible relations of determination.
Moreover, such a sentence implicates that, for some alternative time
t ′ (typically before tR), R does not hold between any state obtaining at
t ′ and the event e. In the last part of the paper, we put our treatment
at work on two philosophical puzzles. We are aware that a lot of things
remain to be done in this area. In this final section we hint at some
perspectives for future work. In passing, we also address some natural
perplexities that this too-brief presentation might raise.
Firstly, of course, we have not provided any formal definition of our
proposal. We are pretty sure, however, that this can be done, and we
plan to offer a formal semantic-pragmatic analysis of forcing sentences
in the future (stay tuned!).
Secondly, we mentioned that forcing readings can also be conveyed
by sentences involving the truth predicate, such as “It is true now that
there will be a sea battle tomorrow”. It is interesting to observe that,
by using the truth predicate or related constructions, we can produce
forcing statements about past or future presupposed states. For instance,
consider (18) again (“Now there will be a sea battle tomorrow”) and
assume it was uttered yesterday at 3pm. Now suppose that today, in
the midst of the battle, you want to reassert the same content – includ-
ing the implied condition that the prejacent of “now” was false at some
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previous time. You could not say:
(23) ∗Yesterday at 3pm there would be a sea battle today.
Arguably, the best you could do is to say something along the following
lines:
(24) a. Yesterday at 3pm it was already true that there would be a
sea battle today.
b. Yesterday before 3pm it became true that there would be a
sea battle today.
c. Yesterday at 3pm it was already the case that there would
be a sea battle today.
A similar strategy applies to all “now”-initial sentences. Therefore, it
should be possible to generalize the proposal carried out here (or, better,
a suitable formalization thereof) to forcing sentences involving past or
future presupposed states. Again, this generalization is left for future
work.
We hope to have shown both the philosophical and the linguistic in-
terest of the phenomenon that we have highlighted and of the proposed
treatment. The phenomenon supports the view thatmodality in natural
language is a pervasive feature, affecting the interpretation in context of
utterances of linguistic structures of which, a priori, one would not think
they are modal. In particular, no one of our “now”-initial sentences con-
tain overt modal verbs (with the only possible exception of (1), if the
future tense auxiliary “will” is to be regarded as a modal verb). The
phenomenon also confirms the importance of syntactic structure for the
emergence of modal meanings: we have shown that the occurrence of
“now” in initial position is a structural pre-condition for “now” to be
promoted from the status of regular time adverb (syntactically, a VP
modifier; semantically locating an event in time) to the status of a com-
plex presuppositional modal operator. Our data and analysis connect
with recent and ongoing researches on dyadic uses of “now” and the
importance of presupposed underlying states in the interpretation of
natural language [6, 15].
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Abstract
The transition semantics presented in Rumberg (2016, [5]) constitutes a
novel approach to Prior’s theory of branching time. It has its roots in the
peculiar interrelation of actuality and possibility that we find in branch-
ing time structures: the forking paths in the tree of possibilities represent
temporal alternatives for a dynamic actuality to evolve rather thanmodal
alternatives to a given actuality. In this paper, we discuss the peculiar
interrelation of actuality and possibility that is at the heart of the theory
of branching time and illustrate how this interrelation is reflected in the
transition semantics.
Keywords: Branching Time, Transition Semantics, Open Future, Actu-
ality, Possibility, Contingency, Stability.
1 Introduction
Possibilities are often conceived of as representingmodal alternatives to
actuality, i.e. ways our world could be in a certain respect but actually
∗This paper is partly based on my PhD thesis (Rumberg 2016, [6]).
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is not. We may, for instance, say that it is possible that I am in Copen-
hagen right now, while I am actually sitting in Konstanz at my desk typ-
ing these sentences. The idea of modal alternatives famously underlies
the possible worlds approach. Each possible world stands in for some
possibility, and one of them is the actual world, the world we actually
live in.
The theory of branching time, pioneered by Prior (1967, [4]), affords
a different understanding of possibilities. Branching time structures de-
pict the future as genuinely open. The picture is that of a tree whose
branches represent possibilities for the future. At the moment, I am
sitting here in Konstanz at my desk typing these sentences, and it is
possible that I will continue writing for another few hours. But there
are alternate possibilities. I can take a break from writing and go for a
swim in the Lake Konstanz. And I may just as well head to the airport
and take the next flight to Copenhagen. These scenarios all constitute
genuine possibilities for the future: as of now, any of them can be actu-
alized.
The relation between actuality and possibility that is at play here is
a rather peculiar one: possibilities represent temporal alternatives for
a dynamic actuality to evolve rather than modal alternatives to a given
actuality. Whenwe are facing the future, we are facing amaze of forking
paths, and actuality makes its way through that maze. At each junction,
actuality traces one of the possible paths leading toward the future, and
all paths are equally viable. At each branching point, one possibility is
actualized, and the remainder fades away.
The transition semantics presented in Rumberg (2016, [5]) consti-
tutes a novel approach to Prior’s theory of branching time. It has its
roots in the peculiar interrelation of actuality and possibility that we
find in branching time structures. The distinctive feature of the transi-
tion semantics is that it builds on local future possibilities, viz. transi-
tions, rather than on complete possible courses of events. In doing so,
it enables a dynamic representation of the interrelation of actuality and
possibility and brings to the fore the idea that contingencies about the
future dissolve as time progresses.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we introduce the the-
ory of branching time. In section 3, we discuss the peculiar interrelation
of actuality and possibility that we find in branching time structures.
In section 4, we illustrate how this interrelation bears on the seman-
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tics of sentences about the future and motivate the transition semantics.
Section 5 provides a formal precisification of the fine-grained picture
underlying the transition approach. In section 6, we show how the con-
tingency of the future is dealt with in the transition semantics.
2 A World of Possibilities
Welcome to a world of possibilities! Prior’s theory of branching time
invites you to a world that is full of possibilities: possibilities for what
the future may bring. The future is open. In this section, we briefly
introduce the theory of branching time and outline two alternativeways
of representing possibilities in that framework: histories and transitions.
In the theory of branching time, the modal asymmetry between past
and future finds its expression in a tree of moments that is linear toward
the past and branches toward the future. Formally, a branching time struc-
ture is defined as a Kripke frame M = 〈M,<〉 consisting of a non-empty
set of moments M and an earlier-later relation < on that set that fulfills
the following three conditions: (1) there is no backward branching, (2)
any two moments that are not comparable by the earlier-later relation
< share some common past up to a branching point, and (3) there is
no last moment. An example of a branching time structure is provided
in Fig. 1. The first condition captures the idea that, at any givenmoment,
the past is fixed while the future may be open. It causes the structure
to be tree-like. The second condition guarantees the unity of the struc-
ture. It ensures that we are provided with a single tree rather than with
a forest andwarrants the existence of branching points at the joints. The
third condition, finally, reflects the idea that time does not end. There
is always a future moment.
The definition of a branching time structure incorporates a global
perspective on the tree of moments, viz. a perspective from outside of
time. The tree of moments is described from a bird’s eye view, as it were.
If we circle above a branching time structure and look down, the tree of
moments is lying there in its totality. The picture is an entirely static one.
All moments are on a par. There is no distinguished actuality. There is
no present, no past, and no future. There is only earlier and later, as
witnessed by the order relation < that unifies the tree of moments.
Naturally, the question arises what a branching time structure rep-
resents. One may be tempted to take the static tree of moments that
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Figure 1: A branching time structure. The dots represent mo-
ments, and the earlier-later relation < defines an order be-
tween those moments which takes the form of a tree.
we behold from above for an eternalist picture of the world or even
of time itself. A branching time structure is not supposed to represent
our world, however; nor does it represent time. Neither our world nor
time branches. Arguably, both evolve linearly. What a branching time
structure represents, when viewed from a bird’s eye perspective, is the
modal-temporal structure of an indeterministic world: it represents a
world of possibilities.
Branching time structures harbor a wealth of possibilities. Owing
to the existence of branching points, the earlier-later relation < has a
modal flavor, and it gives rise to possibilities, global and local ones, as
illustrated in Fig. 2. Given a branching time structure M = 〈M,<〉, we
can identify maximal chains of moments that are linked by the earlier-
later relation <. That is to say, we can carve out maximal <-linear sub-
sets of M. Each suchmaximal<-chain in the tree ofmoments represents
a history: a complete possible course of events. A history spans an en-
tire possible temporal development of the world, and any two histories
branch at some moment. They are historical alternatives.
Histories are possibilities, viz. global ones. But there are many more
possibilities to be found in the modal-temporal structure of the world.
If we zoom in on a branching point, we discover a plurality of local
possibilities. Branching points are like forks in the road, where ways
diverge. Each branching point allows for alternative possible future
continuations, and each such immediate possible future continuation
represents a local future possibility. Following Belnap (1999, [1]; 2005,
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[2]), we refer to these local possibilities as transitions. One simple way
to think about transitions—and, in fact, to draw them—is to view them
as little arrows that each specify one possible direction at a branching
point. A formal definition of a transition will be provided in section 5.
As we shall see, the key to the transition semantics lies in the primacy
of local over global possibilities.
(a) A history. (b) A transition.
Figure 2: Histories and transitions. (a) A history is a maxi-
mal <-chain of moments. (b) A transition is an arrow that
specifies a possible direction at a branching point.
3 Actuality, Possibility, and Time
With these preliminaries in place, we now turn to the peculiar interre-
lation of actuality and possibility that we take to be at the heart of the
theory of branching time. We have seen that in the static picture evoked
by the definition of a branching time structure, there is no actuality yet.
Actuality only enters the picture once we abandon our bird’s eye view
and take a local standpoint in the tree of moments, which is the perspec-
tive from which language is used. And as soon as we locate ourselves
in themodal-temporal structure of the world, the purely static character
of the structure disappears, and the tree gains dynamic traits.
So let us descend from our bird’s eye perspective and settle on a mo-
ment in a branching time structure. By locating ourselves at a moment
in the tree, we thereby mark that moment as present, and with a distin-
guished present, past and future enter the stage. At the same time, our
149
local standpoint partitions the tree into actuality, possibility, and coun-
terfactuality, as illustrated in Fig. 3. Due to the absence of backward
branching, the present moment determines a unique past, viz. the set of
all moments preceding the present moment. The present and the past
jointly provide a notion of actuality. They capture what has happened
so far. But then, there may be various branches lying ahead of us. These
branches represent possibilities for the future. None of them is actual
yet; but any of them can be actualized. Branches that split off from the
past course of events can best be dubbed counterfactualities. They are
possibilities that once could have been actualized but actually were not.
•
Figure 3: Actuality, possibility, and counterfactuality. The
dot marks the present moment. The thick line represents
actuality. Possibilities are indicated by thin black lines and
counterfactualities by thin grey ones.
The notion of actuality that enters the picture once we take a local
standpoint in the tree of moments is a temporal one, and it is dynamic.
Actuality comprises only the present and the past. The future is not
actual. The future is yet to come, and the branches spread out before us
represent alternatives for the future: possibilities for actuality to unfold.
Note that the relation between actuality and possibility that we find
in a branching time structure crucially differs from the one that we find
in a possible worlds framework. In a possible worlds framework, our lo-
cal standpoint in the pluriverse marks one of the possible worlds as the
actual world, and the remaining possible worlds are considered mere
modal alternatives to that actuality: they represent what could be the
case, in some respect or another, but actually is not. The resulting pic-
ture is provided in Fig. 4. In the theory of branching time, in contrast,
there is no actuality in the realm of possibilities, and the relation be-
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tween actuality and possibility is a temporal rather than a modal one:
the forking paths leading toward the future represent temporal alterna-
tives for a dynamic actuality rather than modal alternatives to a given
actuality.
•
Figure 4: Actuality and possibility in a possibleworlds frame-
work. The dot specifies our local standpoint. The thick line
represents actuality. Thin lines indicate possibilities.
The interrelation of actuality and possibility encoded in the tree of
moments closely interacts with the notion of time, as illustrated in Fig. 5.
When time passes, actuality evolves, and possibilities fade away into
mere counterfactualities. The present moment becomes past, moments
that have not been actual yet become actual, and possibilities that once
have been open disappear. As actuality meanders through the maze of
forking paths, at each branching point, one of the immediate future pos-
sibilities is actualized, ruling out the remainder. In the dynamic interre-
lation of actuality and possibility, the passage of time shines through. It
presents itself in the constant loss of possibilities that accompanies the
unfolding of actuality. In the end, all possibilities will have vanished,
and there is only actuality. At present, however, there is no fact of the
matter which of the forking paths actuality will tread.
4 Truth in the Absence of an Actual Future
The peculiar interrelation of actuality and possibility that we find in
branching time structures poses a semantic challenge: how to assess
whether a sentence about the future is true or false if there is no actual fu-
ture? There are two traditional semantic approaches to branching time,
which Prior (1967, [4]) refers to as Peirceanism and Ockhamism. In what
follows, we briefly review how future truth is dealt with on those ac-
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•
Figure 5: Actuality, possibility, and time. When time passes,
at each branching point, one of the immediate future possi-
bilities is actualized, and the remainder fades away.
counts andmotivate the transition semanticsproposed in Rumberg (2016,
[5]).
In the Peircean semantics, sentences are evaluated from the local
standpoint of a moment in the tree. Truth is relativized to a moment
parameter. The local standpoint mirrors the perspective of language
use, and it provides us with a notion of actuality. Yet, as we have seen,
the relevant notion of actuality comprises only the present and the past.
None of the forking paths leading toward the future is part of actual-
ity. There is no actual future. There are only future possibilities, and,
as of now, it is indeterminate which of them will be actualized. Due to
the absence of an actual future, on the Peircean account with its local
perspective, future truth comes out modalized. What will be the case
is what is true in every possible future. Future truth and necessity are
conflated.
In the Ockhamist semantics, on the other hand, in the absence of
an actual future, a hypothetical one is introduced. The maze of forking
paths is carved up into mutually exclusive, complete possible courses
of events, viz. histories, and truth at a moment is relativized to one
such overarchingpossibility. Sentences are evaluated atmoment-history
pairs. While the moment parameter pins down our local standpoint in
the modal-temporal structure of the world, the history parameter provi-
sionally singles out one complete possible evolution of actuality. What
will be the case comes down to what is true in the given history. Modal
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operators become interpretable as quantifiers over histories, and future
truth and necessity come apart.
Let us briefly take stock here. In away, Peirceanism andOckhamism
can be viewed as opposite extremes: they are strictly opposed to each
other as regards their perspectives. Whereas on the Peircean account,
truth is assessed solely from the local standpoint of amoment in the tree,
the Ockhamist account makes use of a history as an auxiliary parameter
of truth, and it thereby introduces a second, global perspective, viz. a
perspective from the end of time. Despite—or rather, because of—the
extreme, opposing perspectives, however, both Peirceanism and
Ockhamismprovide an entirely static picture of the interrelation of actu-
ality, possibility, and time. On neither the Peircean nor the Ockham-
ist account is there room for actuality to unfold: the Ockhamist history
parameter picks out a possible course of events that is already
completely unfolded, and Peirceanism lacks a second parameter of
truth.
The transition semantics is firmly rooted in our intuition of
a dynamic actuality, which makes its way through the maze of fork-
ing paths. Just as in Ockhamism, truth at a moment is relativized to a
possible course of events, a possible unfolding of actuality. However,
possible courses of events are no longer identifiedwith histories. Rather,
possible courses of events are built up from local future possibilities:
they are construed as sequences of transitions, which stretch linearly
from the past toward a possibly open future. Incomplete possible cour-
ses of events become available as well, which can then be extended to-
ward the future. The static Ockhamist history parameter is replaced by
a dynamic transition parameter, which provides a second, local perspec-
tive in time that can be shifted independently of the moment parameter.
The emerging picture is a tree of trees, as illustrated in Fig. 6. The pos-
sible future extensions of a sequence of transitions mirror the possible
evolutions of actuality, and each possible future extension rules out at
least one possibility.
The transition semantics generalizes both Peirceanism and Ockham-
ism and unifies both accounts in a single picture, as indicated in
Fig. 6. By building on local future possibilities, it naturally bridges the
gap between the local perspective inherent in Peirceanism and the glo-
bal perspective characteristic of Ockhamism. Both the Peircean and the
Ockhamist accounts turn out as limiting cases: they are to be found at
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the extrema of the fine-grained picture evoked by the transition
approach. Peirceanism amounts to the minimum of the tree of trees,
which consists in the empty sequence of transitions. Ockhamism, on
the other hand, corresponds to the maxima, which stand in for maxi-
mal sequences of transitions and, as such, are tantamount to histories.
•m
⊂•m
⊂
•m
⊂
•m
⊂
•m
Ockhamism
Peirceanism
Figure 6: Possible courses of events in the transition seman-
tics. Possible courses of events are construed as sequences
of transitions. Peirceanism and Ockhamism are indicated as
limiting cases.
5 The Maze of Forking Paths
The transition semantics draws on afine-graineddescription of themaze
of forking paths. The primacy of histories as global possibilities is re-
nounced. Instead, possible courses of events are modeled by sequences
of transitions. In this section, we show how the idea can be spelled out
formally. Wedefine the notion of a transition and illustrate howpossible
courses of events can be characterized by means of sets of transitions.
So far, wehave only provided apictorial representation of transitions.
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We have depicted transitions as little arrows that specify a possible di-
rection at a branching point, and we can find this idea back in the for-
mal definition. A transition is defined as a pair consisting of a branching
point m and a set of histories H that spans one of the alternative immedi-
ate possible future continuations of m. We call the branching point m the
initial of the transition and the set of histories H its outcome. Conceived
of as initial-outcome pairs, transitions are nothing but arrows: they are
anchored in their initials, and they point toward their outcomes. The
idea of an arrow is also visible in the notation: a transition with initial
m and outcome H is written 〈mH〉.
Of course, it remains to be said which sets of histories span an im-
mediate possible future continuation of a branching point and hence
qualify as admissible outcomes of transitions. Here, we make use of
the relation of undividedness, which captures the local branching behav-
ior of histories at a given moment and allows us to treat discrete and
continuous structures alike. At each branching point m, some pairs of
histories branch while others continue to overlap for a while after m, in
which case they are said to be undivided at m. The relation of undivid-
edness at m is an equivalence relation on the set of histories containing
themoment m and hence provides a partition of that set. Each cell of the
partition captures one immediate possible future continuation of m, and
for each cell, there is a transition with initial m whose outcome equals
that set, as illustrated in Fig. 7.
As pointed out above, in the transition semantics, possible courses of
events are construed as sequences of transitions. This creates the need
to define an order ≺ between transitions which allows us to single out
possible courses of events as linear sets of transitions; just aswe have sin-
gled out histories as linear sets ofmoments in the order<. Consider two
transitions 〈mH〉 and 〈m′H ′〉. Obviously, for 〈mH〉 to precede
〈m′H ′〉, it is necessary that the initials m and m′ are ordered m < m′.
But also the outcomes H and H ′ must stand in some suitable relation if
the transitions are to be properly aligned. In particular, the outcomes
must not be disjoint. Technically, this means that whenever 〈mH〉 pre-
cedes 〈m′H ′〉, the outcomes H and H ′ must be ordered H ′ ⊂ H. Taking
these two conditions together, we arrive at the following definition: we
have 〈mH〉 ≺ 〈m′H ′〉 if and only if (m < m′ and H ′ ⊂ H).
With the transition ordering≺ at hand, we can nowprovide a formal
characterization of possible courses of events in terms of sets of transi-
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h5
h1
h4
h2 h3
•m
Figure 7: Transitions. The set of histories containing the
branching point m has three elements: h2, h3, and h4. The
relation of undividedness at m partitions the set into two
cells: {h2,h3} and {h4}. Hence, there are two transitions,
〈m{h2,h3}〉 and 〈m{h4}〉, which are indicated by the two
arrows.
tions. Analogously to the case of histories, we require that the relevant
transition sets be linearly ordered by the relation≺ between transitions;
just as histories are linearly ordered by the relation< betweenmoments.
Linearity provides us with a notion of modal consistency (cf. Müller
2014, [3]). In contradistinction to the case of histories, however, we
do not require that the relevant transition sets be maximal linear sets.
Rather, we only demand them to be downward closed in the transition
ordering. Every ≺-chain of transitions that is closed toward the past
depicts a possible course of events: a complete or an incomplete one.
Maximal≺-chains of transitions represent complete possible courses of
events: they correspond to histories. Non-maximal ≺-chains of transi-
tions, on the other hand, such as the one provided in Fig. 8, represent
incomplete possible courses of events: they allow for alternative possi-
ble future continuations.
6 Future Truth, Contingency, and Stability
Unlike Peirceanism and Ockhamism, the transition semantics builds on
a dynamic picture of the interrelation of actuality and possibility. Truth
at a moment is relativized to a chain of transitions, which is closed to-
ward the past but can be extended toward the future. In this section, we
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Figure 8: A set of transitions. The transition set contains three
transitions, which are indicated by the three arrows. The tran-
sitions are linearly ordered by the relation ≺, and the set is
downward closed. The possible course of events represented
is an incomplete one, viz. one that allows for alternative pos-
sible future continuations.
illustrate what future truth amounts to in the transition framework, in
the absence of an actual future.
In the transition semantics, sentences are evaluated at pairs m/T con-
sisting of amoment m and a set of transitions T . Themoment parameter
m marks our local standpoint in the tree of moments, and the transition
set T specifies a possible unfolding of actuality compatible with that
moment. The language of the transition semantics extends the standard
propositional language by a past and a future operator, P and F, a neces-
sity operator 2, and a so-called stability operator S, which is specific to
the transition approach. The operators can roughly be divided into two
classes: the temporal operators shift the moment parameter whereas
the necessity and the stability operators vary the transition set.
In what follows, we will focus on the semantics of the future oper-
ator F and the stability operator S in order to illustrate how the contin-
gency of the future is dealt with in the transition semantics. For this
purpose, we consider the model provided in Fig. 9. The model contains
a branching point m, which allows for two immediate possible future
continuations: a p-continuation and a ¬p-continuation. We will be eval-
uating at the moment m with respect to two different transition sets: on
the one hand, we consider the transition set T , which captures the ac-
tual past course of events up to the moment m; on the other hand, we
consider the transition set T ′, which hypothetically specifies a possible
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future extension of T .
¬p
p p
•m
xT
(a) Evaluation w.r.t. m/T .
¬p
p p
•m
x
T ′
(b) Evaluation w.r.t. m/T ′.
Figure 9: Future truth, contingency, and stability. The sen-
tence Fp is false at the index m/T but true at the index m/T ′.
In particular, the sentence Fp is contingent at the index m/T
but stably-true at the index m/T ′.
Let us first have a look at the future operator. The future operator F
of the transition semantics has both Peircean and Ockhamist traits: the
Peircean idea of universally quantifying over future possibilities is com-
bined with the Ockhamist idea of relativizing truth to a possible course
of events. What will be the case is what is true in every possible future
that is admitted by the given transition set. That is, the transition param-
eter functions as a restrictor on the set of open future possibilities: all
and only those future possibilities that are still open if actuality evolves
as described by the given transition set are required to contain a witness
for the future claim.
In order to get a feel for the restricting role of the transition parame-
ter, let us see what happens if we evaluate the sentence Fp in the model
provided in Fig. 9 at the moment m with respect to the transition sets
T and T ′, respectively. The transition set T does not rule out any of the
future possibilities open at the moment m, and since there is one pos-
sible future continuation that lacks a witness for the future claim, the
sentence Fp cannot be true at the index m/T . If we wish to embrace bi-
valence, we are thus forced to say that the sentence is false at that index.
Yet, as we shall see, the sentence comes out false at that index only con-
tingently. By extending a transition set toward the future, we delimit
the range of possible futures that we need to take into account. The pos-
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sible future extension T ′ excludes the future continuation in which p
fails to hold, rendering the sentence Fp true at the index m/T ′.
In the fine-grained picture underlying the transition approach, the
truth value of a sentence about the future at amoment can change in the
course of time, viz. under the possible future extensions of a given tran-
sition set, and the stability operator S constitutes a perspicuous means
to capture this behavior. It provides us with a notion of relative set-
tledness and brings to the fore the idea that contingencies about the
future dissolve as time progresses. What is stably-true (stably-false) is
what remains true (false) no matter how the future unfolds later on, i.e.
no matter how we extend the given transition set. And what is neither
stably-true nor stably-false is contingent.
With the stability operator at our disposal, we can express that the
sentence Fp is contingent at the index m/T : it is true at the moment m
with respect to one possible future extension of T but false with respect
to another. Relative to the future extension T ′, on the other hand, the
truth value of the sentence stabilizes: the sentence Fp is true at the index
m/T ′, and it remains true at m under all possible future extensions of T ′.
It is worthwhile to note that in the transition semantics, the disjunction
Fφ∨F¬φ is falsifiable. In ourmodel, the sentence Fp∨F¬p is false at the
index m/T . The disjunction can never be stably-false, however. Sooner
or later, the contingency dissolves: ¬S¬(Fφ ∨F¬φ) is a validity.
7 Conclusion
The interrelation of actuality and possibility that is at the heart of the
theory of branching time is a rather peculiar one, and it differs crucially
from the relation between actuality and possibility that we find in a pos-
sible worlds framework. In the theory of branching time, actuality is a
temporal notion that comprises only the present and the past, and the
branches leading toward the future represent possibilities for actuality
to evolve: they are temporal alternatives for a dynamic actuality rather
than modal alternatives to a given actuality.
The transition semantics is deeply rooted in the picture of a dynamic
actuality. Possible courses of events are modeled by chains of transi-
tions, which can be extended toward the future. In the absence of an
overarching actualitywhich comprises an actual future, there is no need
to conceive of possibilities as histories. In fact, transitions seem to be the
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more natural choice. The local and dynamic nature of the transition ap-
proach provides an unprecedented view on the open future, on which
future truth, contingency, and stability come apart.
The formal details are worked out in Rumberg (2016, [5]), where
correspondence results are provided that expose Peirceanism and Ock-
hamism as limitations of the transition approach. In Rumberg and Za-
nardo (2018, [7]), the set-theoretic complexity of transition sets is dealt
with, and axiomatizability results are established. The future is open
for further research on transitions.
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Abstract
ABE In this paper, we show that a particular thin red line semantics
introduced by Bräuner, Øhrstrøm, andHaslemakes the so-called Burgess’
formula 2G(ϕ →3Fϕ)→3G(ϕ → Fϕ) invalid, and we discuss some rea-
sons why the failure can be considered a problem for the semantics.
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1 Introduction
The Thin Red Line semantics (TRL semantics for short) is a formal de-
vice that has been proposed to interpret future contingent propositions
[4, 14].1 This semantics extends the trees from [2, 15] with a thin red line
1Notice that TRL semantics has also been defended as an accurate formalization of
William of Ockham’s view on future contingents [13, 12]. As for future contingents, TRL
is far from being the only formal approach. Wewill note some alternatives in the course
of this paper.
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function2 trl : T 7−→ HT , which assigns a ‘thin red line’ trl(t) to each mo-
ment t ∈ T—ideally, this is the actual history at t. In the TRL semantics
sentences such as “tomorrow there will be a sea battle” (F p) is true at t
if and only if p is true at some later time t ′ in trl(t).
The very idea of a ‘thin red line’ has met detailed criticism, notably
by [1, 2] and [16]. In particular, criticism has been raised against the
fact that ϕ → PFϕ is not valid along the semantic account based on the
so-called ‘functional TRL’ [16], which constitutes the standard version
of TRL semantics. There are at least two reasons to consider this as an
undesirable feature. First, ϕ → PFϕ above expresses an appealing prin-
ciple on the interaction between tenses, namely: if ϕ is true now, then it
was the case that ϕ would be true (the so-called retrogradation of truth).
Second, TRL semantics was meant to provide a conceptually sound ac-
count of future contingents, and this seems to have nothing to do with
the principles that capture structural features of branching time. In a
nutshell: choice of the TRL-based machinery should not conceal mini-
mal temporal validities.
The TRL semantics by [4] restores the validity of ϕ → PFϕ by intro-
ducing the notion of a set C(t) of counterfactual branches along with the
function trl. This is the set of histories that (1) pass through t, (2) are
the thin red lines of some moment t ′ later than t. In this particular TRL
semantics truth is relative to a moment in time t and a branch h ∈ C(t).
Given the truth conditions defined by [4], the introduction ofC(t) helps
restore the validity of ϕ → PFϕ , as desired (see Section 2).
In this paper, we show that, although it fixes the problem above, the
TRL semantics by [4] has a similar problem with the so-called Burgess’
formula 2G(ϕ → 3Fϕ)→ 3G(ϕ → Fϕ) that has been discussed by [5]
and [17]. In particular, [5] and [17] show that the formula is valid in full
trees, but not in the so-called bundled trees (see Section 3). We prove our
point in two steps. First, we exemplify a bundled tree T B that falsifies2G(ϕ → 3Fϕ)→ 3G(ϕ → Fϕ) at a moment t ∈ T—this is the bundled
tree from [17, §9]. Second, we prove that T B can be coherently ex-
tended with a trl function such that, for every t ∈ T , C(t) ⊆ Bt—where
Bt is the bundle of histories passing t. Since Bt guarantees the failure
of 2G(ϕ → 3Fϕ) → 3G(ϕ → Fϕ) in the initial bundled tree, we have
that the failure is transferred in the corresponding bundled tree that
2This is also called chronicle function in [4].
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includes the trl function. A consequence of this failure is that the TRL
semantics by [4] falls short on the second methodological requirement
we have presented above, which suggests that the semantics of the thin
red line should not conceal the properties of the temporal structure.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic tem-
poral language and structures that are relevant for this paper, and intro-
duces the TRL semantics from [4]. The section also discusses failure of
ϕ → PFϕ in the standard TRL semantics, its recovery in the semantics
from [4], and it briefly describes the two methodological requirements
above. Section 3 shows that Burgess’ formula2(Gϕ →3Fϕ)→3G(ϕ →
Fϕ) has a countermodel in the semantics from [4], and it also men-
tions two previously known failures. Section 4 discusses why failure
of Burgess’ formula is problematic for the proposal from [4]. Section 5
discusses some open issues and directions for future research. Finally,
Section 6 presents some conclusions.
2 The thin red line: language and semantics
SYNTAX
The language L that we use in this paper is the standard option in phi-
losophy [1, 10, 15], mathematical logic, [17, 21] and computer science
[8, 9], when it comes to temporal reasoning.
Definition 1 (Language). Given a set P of atomic formulas, the language
L is defined by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ψ | ϕ ∧ψ | ϕ → ψ | 2ϕ | Pϕ | Fϕ
where p ∈ P , and the propositional connectives receive their standard
interpretations. Formula 2ϕ means “it is inevitably the case that ϕ”, Pϕ
means “it was the case that ϕ” and Fϕ means “it will be the case that ϕ”.
Duals of these expressions are 3ϕ , Hϕ , and Gϕ , respectively.
Remark 1. This language dates back to [15, Ch. VII]. The reading of Fϕ
is shared by nearly all formal approaches to branching-time logic and future
contingents, and especially Prior’s Ockhamist branching-time logic, and
TRL semantics. Supervaluationism also shares this reading, but it equates
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the notion of truth (falsity) with the notion of necessary truth (falsity).3
By contrast, in Prior’s Peircean Branching-time logic Fϕ reads ‘Inevitably,
it will be the case that ϕ ’, and it naturally generates a dual Gϕ = ¬F¬ϕ that
reads ‘Possibly, it will always be the case that ϕ ’. In this logic, operator G is
introduced as a primitive and Gϕ reads ‘Inevitably, it will always be the case
that ϕ ’.
TREES
Languages for indeterministic temporal reasoning are usually interpre-
ted on branching-time structures known as trees, or some close variations
of them [2, 15, 18]. In particular, trees are particular Kripke structures
that are defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Trees). A tree T is a pair 〈T,<〉 where:
• T is a set {t, t ′, t ′′, . . .} of moments.
• < is an order – i.e. an irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive relation –
on T satisfying:
∀t, t ′, t ′′ ∈ T : t ′ ≤ t and t ′′ ≤ t
⇒ t ′ ≤ t ′′ or t ′′ ≤ t ′ (backward-linearity)
where t ≤ t ′ is short for ‘t < t ′ or t ′ = t’. A crucial notion in branching-time
semantics is that of a history. For every tree T , a history is a maximal
<-chain h of moments in T , i.e. it satisfies the following conditions:
t ′ /∈ h ⇒ h∪{t ′} /∈ HT (maximality)
∀h ∈ HT : t 6≤ t ′ and t ′ 6≤ t ⇒ t /∈ h or t ′ /∈ h (chain)
We denote with HT the set of histories defined on tree T . Furthermore,
Ht = {h ∈ HT | t ∈ h} is the set of histories that pass through the moment
t. A tree is represented in Figure 1.
3More precisely, Supervaluationism take a formula like Fϕ to be true (false) if and
only if for every history, ϕ holds good (fails to hold) at some later moment.
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. . . h h′ h′′ h′′′ . . .
t ′
t ′′
t
Figure 1: A tree
TRL SEMANTICS
The intuition behind TRL semantics is that, for every moment t, there
is an actual history—‘thin red line’—among the many passing through
t. Views endorsing this intuition are usually referred to as Actualism
[5], True-futurism [14], Ockhamism [3, 14], and they oppose so-called
Antactualism [5], which is the view that no history passing through t can
be singled out as the actual history of t. The most widespread version
of TRL semantics define the thin red line as a function:
Definition 3. (Thin red line function) For every tree T , a thin red line
(trl) function trl : T → HT is a function that satisfies the following two condi-
tions:
TRL1 ∀t ∈ T : t ∈ trl(t)
TRL2 ∀t, t ′ ∈ T : t < t ′ and t ′ ∈ trl(t) ⇒ trl(t ′) = trl(t)
Condition TRL1 secures the ‘effectivity’ of trl: the thin red line is rel-
evant for the continuation of events from t onwards. Condition TRL2
secures that the thin red line does not change until we remain on the
same history.
The problem of Retrogradation of Truth. The standard TRL seman-
tics evaluates sentences like Fϕ as true at t, relative to the function trl
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((t, trl) |=Fϕ) if ϕ is true at a latermoment t ′, relative to trl ((t ′, trl) |= ϕ).4
It has been noticed by many [3, 4, 14, 16] that standard TRL semantics
makes ϕ → PFϕ invalid. Figure 2 provides a countermodel. Here, we
assume that there are no moments between t ′′ and t, that trl(t ′′) = h′′′
and trl(t) = h (the histories selected by trl are represented with thick
lines), which is consistent with conditions TRL1 and TRL2. In the fig-
ure, we have (t ′′, trl) |= p and (t, trl) 6|=F p, since trl(t)= h and (t ′′′, trl) 6|= p
for every t ′′′ ∈ h later than t. Since, by assumption, there is no moment
between t and t ′′, we have (t ′′, trl) 6|= PF p. This implies that 6|= ϕ → PFϕ .
. . . h h′ h′′ h′′′ . . .
t ′
t ′′p
t
Figure 2: A counterexample to Retrogradation of Truth.
Failure of ϕ →PFϕ is (nearly) universally considered a serious draw-
back of standard TRL semantics. Most notably, [16] argues that this
failure shows the inadequacy of the ‘thin red line’ proposal, and even
supporters of the proposal take the failure as an indesideratum. There is a
good reason for this view: ϕ →PFϕ expresseswithin the object language
the semantical principle known as retrogradation of truth: if it is true now
that ϕ , then it was true that it would have been true that ϕ .5 This princi-
ple is ubiquitous in our linguistic practices involving tenses, as well as
in social practices like betting or foreseeing. A theory of future contin-
gents and temporal reasoning can hardly dispense with it. However,
there is another reason for believing that failure of ϕ → PFϕ is problem-
atic. Such failure entails the invalidity of ϕ → HFϕ , which is an axiom
4We refer the reader to [3] for a detailed discussion on the semantics.
5This principle was also known as de praesenti ad praeteritum by Medieval logicians.
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of minimal temporal logic and (partly) encodes a structural property of
branching time, i.e. that past and future are mirror relations. Structural
properties and their modally expressible counterparts (valid formulas)
give us the principles of temporal reasoning. The role of a theory of fu-
ture contingents (like TRL semantics) is altogether different: it is theory
of truth-attribution to sentences (or assertions) about the future. Such a
theory should be built on top of the structural properties of a branching-
time structure (and of temporal reasoning) and should not conceal the
properties of the temporal structure. But this is what standard TRL se-
mantics is doing, by failure of ϕ → PFϕ .
AN ALTERNATIVE TRL SEMANTICS
[4] devises an alternative TRL semantics that validates ϕ → PFϕ . For
every t ∈ T , this semantics takes into account also the counterfactual thin
red lines, that is the histories that are thin red lines of some t ′ ∈ T later
than t (t < t ′). The following definitions set the structures and notions
needed for this.
Definition 4. (Trl tree) A trl tree T trl is a triple (T,<, trl) where (T,<) is
a tree and trl : T 7−→ HT is a thin red line function.
Definition 5. (Trl model) A trl model M trl is a pair (T trl ,υ) where T trl
is a trl tree and υ : P → 2T×HT is a valuation function defined over the pairs
(t,h) such that h ∈ Ht . For every p ∈ P , the function satisfies:
(t,h) ∈ υ(p) ⇔ (t,h′) ∈ υ(p) for every h′ ∈ Ht
Definition 6. (Counterfactual histories) For every trl tree (T,<, trl) and
moment t ∈ T , the set C(t) of counterfactual histories at t is defined as follows:
C(t) = {h ∈ Ht | ∀t ′ ∈ h : t < t ′ ⇒ trl(t ′) = h}
Temporal language is interpreted on the ground of the following satis-
faction relation:
Definition 7. (Satisfaction, 1)We interpret the formulas ofL on trl models
by the satisfaction relation |= between trl models, moment-history pairs (t,h)—
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satisfying h ∈ Ht—and formulas. For all h ∈ Ht :6
M trl,(t,h) |= p ⇔ (t,h) ∈ υ(p)
M trl ,(t,h) |= Pϕ ⇔ ∃t ′ < t : t ′ ∈ h and M trl,(t ′,h) |= ϕ
M trl ,(t,h) |= Fϕ ⇔ ∃t ′ > t : t ′ ∈ h and M trl,(t ′,h) |= ϕ
M trl ,(t,h) |= 2ϕ ⇔ ∀h′ ∈C(t) : M trl,(t,h′) |= ϕ
Satisfiability in a model (M trl |= ϕ) and trl-validity (|= ϕ) are defined as
usual. Condition C(t) = {h ∈ Ht | ∀t ′ ∈ h : t < t ′ ⇒ trl(t ′) = h} for atomic
sentences implies that p → 2p for every p ∈ P . It is easy to check that
this extends to every formula ϕ that contains no occurrence of F . Nowwe
prove that the semantics by [4] fixes the problem with retrogradation of
truth.
Proposition 1. If the converse of < is serial then |= ϕ → PFϕ (ϕ → PFϕ
is trl-valid)
Proof. Suppose M trl,(t,h) |= ϕ . Let us now analyze the truth conditions
of M trl,(t,h) |= PFϕ step by step. This equates with ∃t ′ < t : t ′ ∈ h and
M trl ,(t ′,h) |= Fϕ . From the backward linearity of <, t ′ ∈ h for every
t ′ < t, and since Ht ⊆ H ′t for every t ′ < t, we have h ∈ H ′t . Since the con-
verse of < is serial, the existence of such a t ′ < t is guaranteed. Left
to check is whether M trl ,(t ′,h) |= Fϕ . This equates with ∃t ′ > t : t ′ ∈ h
and M trl ,(t ′,h) |= ϕ . Our initial moment of evaluation t guarantees this.
Thus, M trl,(t,h) |= PFϕ . Since M trl and (t,h) are arbitrary, this general-
izes to any trl-model and pair (t,h) satisfying h ∈ Ht . As a consequence,
ϕ → PFϕ is trl-valid.
We briefly comment on the result.7 The semantics by [4] avoids the
problem that affects the traditional TRL semantics. Indeed, the history
of evaluation h ∈ Ht is fixed as the only relevant history for interpreting
ϕ , PFϕ , and Fϕ and therefore ϕ → PFϕ is valid. Just to get a concrete
feeling of this, consider Figure 2. There, (t ′′,h′′) |= p. Also, (t,h′′) |= F p,
which in turn secures (t ′′,h′′) |= PFϕ . Contrary to the standard TRL se-
mantics, we do not need to switch to h = trl(t) in order to evaluate Fϕ
at t. Thus, the TRL semantics by [4] gets the retrogradation of truth back:
6We skip the clauses for the Boolean constructions, which are standard.
7Notice that that Proposition 1 and its proof also apply to Prior’s Ockhamist seman-
tics.
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from the fact that it is true now that ϕ , we can infer that it was true that
it would be the case that ϕ .
Relations with Prior’s Ockhamist semantics. The TRL semantics by
[4] can be seen as a variant of Prior’s Ockhamist semantics introduced
by [15]. The satisfaction relation of Prior’s semantics is obtained from
Definition 7 by replacing universal quantification onC(t)with universal
quantification of Ht in the truth clause of 2ϕ . This is a natural choice,
since Prior’s Ockhamist semantics does not define any trl function, or
any device to single out one history as the only relevant history of eval-
uation (at a given moment).8
3 The failure of Burgess' formula
In this section we show that, although it fixes failure of ϕ → PFϕ , the
TRL semantics from [4] runs into a similar problem with the so-called
Burgess’ formula [5]:
2G(ϕ → 3Fϕ)→ 3G(ϕ → Fϕ)
When it comes to Prior’s Ockhamist semantics, this formula marks the
difference between a number of different structures. In particular, given
that semantics, the formula is valid on full trees, while it fails in Kamp
frames [2, 17, 18], Ockhamist frames [2, 20], and bundled trees [2, 6, 17].9
Here we show that the Burgess’ formula is not valid in the TRL seman-
tics from [4]. This is done by transforming a bundled tree which falsifies
Burgess’ formula [17, §9] into a corresponding TRL tree, where the fail-
ure is preserved. Let us define the notions of a bundle and of a bundled
tree:
Definition 8. (Bundle) Given a tree T , a set B of histories is a bundle on
T iff:
8The TRL semantics by [4] has been criticized by [11] in the wake of its similarities
with Prior’s Ockhamist semantics. We do not go through the criticism here, and we
refer the reader to [11] for it.
9Strictly speaking, the original formula appearing in [5] is not 2G(ϕ → 3Fϕ) →3G(ϕ → Fϕ), but 2G3Fϕ → 3GFϕ . These two formulas, however, are equivalent in
all the families of structureswe havementioned. This iswhy the label ‘Burgess’ formula’
is ambiguously used for both of them.
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B1 B ⊆ HT ;
B2 ∀t ∈ T : (∃h ∈ B : t ∈ h).
Definition 9. (Bundled Tree)A bundled tree T B is a triple (T ,B)where
T = (T,<) is a tree and B is a bundle on T
Auseful notation isBt =B∩Ht . The interpretation of formulas in a bun-
dled tree works as for standard Prior’s Ockhamist semantics, with the
important exception that the history of evaluation is picked, for every
t ∈ T , from Bt rather than from Ht . In particular:
Definition 10. (Model) A model M B is a pair (T B,π) where T B is a
bundled tree and π : P → 2T×HT is a valuation function defined over all
(t,h) such that h ∈ Bt . For every p ∈ P , the function satisfies:
(t,h) ∈ υ(p) ⇔ (t,h′) ∈ υ(p) for every h′ ∈ Bt
Definition 11. (Satisfaction, 2) We interpret the formulas of L on models
by the satisfaction relation |= between models, moment-history pairs (t,h)—
satisfying h ∈ Bt—and formulas. For all h ∈ Bt :
M B,(t,h) |= p ⇔ (t,h) ∈ π(p)
M B,(t,h) |= Pϕ ⇔ ∃t ′ < t : t ′ ∈ h and M B,(t ′,h) |= ϕ
M B,(t,h) |= Fϕ ⇔ ∃t ′ > t : t ′ ∈ h and M B,(t ′,h) |= ϕ
M B,(t,h) |= 2ϕ ⇔ ∀h′ ∈ Bt : M B,(t,h′) |= ϕ
Satisfiability in a model (M B |= ϕ) and validity (|= ϕ) are defined as
usual. The truth clause for 2ϕ implies that the operator 2 quantifies
only over the branches in B, which may exclude some of the branches
in Ht . This is in turn the key for the failure of the Burgess’ formula on
bundled trees, as is shown by the countermodel from [17, §9] that we
present here. Consider the atomic formula p ∈P and themodel M B =
(T,<,B,π), where
• T = {(n,m) ∈ N×N | 0 < n ≤ m or 0 = n = m}
• (n,m)< (n′,m′) ⇔ (n = n′ and m < m′) or (n = m)< m′
• D = {(n,m) ∈ T | n = m}
• B = HT \{D}
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(1,4)
(1,3)
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(1,1)
p
(0,0)
p
Figure 3: A countermodel to the Burgess’ formula
• (n,m) ∈ π(p) ⇔ (n,m) ∈ D
The model is represented in Figure 3.
For the sake of simplicity, we name histories according to this con-
vention: for every n ∈ N such that n < ω , hn = {(l,m) ∈ T | l = n and
l < m}∪{(l, l) | l ≤ n}. It is easy to check that M B,((0,0),h1) |= 2G(p →3F p), while M B,((0,0),h1) 6|= 3G(p → F p). Therefore Burgess’ for-
mula is falsified at ((0,0),h1).
We now build a corresponding trl-model where the counterexam-
ple is preserved, to the effect that Burgess’ formula is also invalid in
the semantics from [4]. Given the model M B, we define the trl model
M trl = (T ′,<′, trl,υ) where
• T ′ = T
• (n,m)<′ (n′,m′) ⇔ (n,m)< (n′,m′)
• trl(0,0) = {(0,0)}∪{(1,n) | n ∈ N}
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• trl(n,m) = {(n,m′) | n < m′}∪{(l, l) | l ≤ n}
• υ(p) = π(p) for every p ∈ P
It is straightforward to see that trl satisfies conditions TRL1 and TRL2
from Definition 3. Just to give a concrete grasp of the construction, we
have10 trl(0,0) = trl(1,1) = trl(1,k) = h1 for k ≥ 1, trl(2,k) = h2 for k ≥ 2
, trl(3,k) = h3 for k ≥ 3 and so on. Also, notice that the history D =
{(n,m) ∈ T | n = m} is the trl of no moment in T ′: trl(t) 6= D for every
t ∈ T .
We now show that falsification of Burgess’ formula at (0,0) is
transferred to M trl . Given Definition 6 and the construction above, it is
straightforward thatC(0,0) = {h1} and for every (n,n)∈ D, if 0 < n, then
C(n,n) = {hn,hn+1}. We have M trl,((0,0),h1) |= 2G(p → 3F p). In order
to see this, consider that (i) M trl,((0,0),h1) |= G(p → 3F p). Indeed, for
every (1,k) with k > 1, M trl,((1,k),h1) |= p → 3F p trivially holds since
M trl,((1,k),h1) 6|= p. As for (1,1), we have M trl,((1,1),h2) |= F p. Since
h2 ∈ C(1,1), this implies (ii) M trl,((1,1),h1) |= p → 3F p. From (i) and
(ii),M trl,((0,0),h1) |=G(p→3F p) follows. SinceC(0,0)= {h1}, this suf-
fices to have M trl ,((0,0),h1) |= 2G(p → 3F p). At the same time, how-
ever, we haveM trl,((0,0),h1) 6|=3G(p→F p). Indeed,M trl ,((0,0),h1) 6|=
G(p → F p) since M trl,((1,1),h1) 6|= p → F p: p is true at ((1,1),h1) and
false at any pair ((1,k),h1) for k > 1. Again, Burgess’ formula is falsified
at ((0,0),h1).
Formal differences aside, the falsification of Burgess’ formula on the
model M B and the trl model M trl above relies on the very same fact:
exclusion of D. Indeed, suppose we included D in the set of histories
that are relevant for evaluating formulas of the form 2ϕ and 3ϕ at any
(n,m) ∈ T such that n = m. This yields ((n,m),D) |= G(p → F p). More: D
is the only history relative to which the formula is satisfied. Thus, the
exclusion of D from B is a crucial move in the counterexample by [17].
As for our trl-model M trl , a consequence of the construction above is
that D /∈C(n,m) for every (n,m) ∈ T . This is secured by the fact (that is
easily checked) that C(t) ⊆ Bt for every t ∈ T . But once again, D is the
only history relative to which the formula is satisfied.
10In what follows, we will abuse notation a bit and write trl(n,m) rather then
trl((n,m)), for the sake of readability. The same convention applies to C.
174
OTHER NOTABLE FAILURES
Burgess’ formula is not the only principle of temporal reasoning that
fails in the semantics from [4]. As [4, 3, 14] notice, another notable
failure is F3Fϕ → 3FFϕ , which connects the futurity of a possibility
with a possibility.11 In order to see this, change the trl-model that we
constructed above (see Figure 3) by just imposing (1,k) /∈ υ(p) for every
k ≥ 1 and keeping (2,2)∈ υ(p). From this andC(1,1) = {h1,h2}, we have
((1,1),h1) |= 3Fϕ . From this and C(0,0) = {h1}, we have ((0,0),h1) |=
F3Fϕ . However, from (1,k) /∈ π(p) for every k ≥ 1 and C(0,0) = {h1},
we have ((0,0),h1) 6|= 3FFϕ .
Also, H(Gϕ → 3Gϕ) is not valid. Take again the model depicted in
Figure 3, and let us include history D as a relevant parameter of eval-
uation. We have ((0,0),D) |= Gp. But since C(0,0) = {h1}, we have
((0,0),D) 6|= 3Gp. This in turn implies that ((2,2),D) 6|= H(Gp → 3Gp).
Contrary to Burgess’ formula, these principles are valid, relative to
Prior’s Ockhamist semantics, on both trees and bundled trees. Both
formulas seem to capture principles that are rooted in our intuitions
about time: F3Fϕ → 3FFϕ implies that future possibilities just do not
emerge anew; H(Gϕ → 3Gϕ) implies that what will simply happen by
chance is a ground for what future possibilities are. Notice that failure
of H(Gϕ →3Gϕ) (but not of F3Fϕ →3FFϕ) is fixed by a different TRL
semantics that is introduced in [3]. Due to limits of space, we cannot dis-
cuss this further proposal here, but we plan to consider this semantics
in future research.
4 Discussion
Failure of Burgess’ formula implies that the TRL semantics from [4]
does notmeet one of themethodological requirements that we have out-
lined in Section 2: this particular theory of future contingents conceals
some structural property of temporal reasoning—in our case, a prin-
ciple expressing some specific interactions between tense and modal-
ity. We briefly discuss Burgess’ formula and its place in branching-time
logic, in order to get a better idea of why its failure is a drawback for the
semantics from [4].
11Here, by ‘a possibility’ we mean a fact that is expressed by a true formula 3Fϕ .
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The Burgess’ formula states that if it is inevitable that a fact will
always keep being a future possibility, then it is possible that it will
alway keep happening from time to time, at least if it happens some-
times. This interaction between tense and modality is valid if, for every
moment t ∈ T , there is at least one history h ∈ Ht that can be associated
with a limit ordinal. This condition is in turn secured by the (full) trees
that we have presented in Section 2, but it is failed by some bundled
trees (like the one from [17, §9] and Section 3). Thus, Burgess’ formula
describes a property of the temporal structures that [4] presupposes
for the interpretation of temporal language (that is, full trees). In Sec-
tion 2, we suggested that validity of this kind of formulas (and hence,
of properties) should not be concealed by our theories of future con-
tingents, since these aim at providing an adequate mechanism of truth
attribution to some sentences, not to tell us what properties our tempo-
ral structures enjoy. In light of failure of 2G(ϕ →3Fϕ)→3G(ϕ → Fϕ),
we can conclude that the TRL semantics from [4] really clashes with the
methodological requirement above.
Besides, many temporal logicians regard Burgess’ formula as a
desirable principle of temporal reasoning, to the effect that the seman-
tics from [4] does not meet the first methodological requirement from
Section 2 either: it invalidates a widely accepted principle of temporal
reasoning. In particular, a discussion on the descriptive adequacy of
bundled trees (and then, on the status of Burgess’ formula) is carried
by [2, §7A.6], [12, pp. 268–269], and [18, pp. 222–223]. The discussion
focuses on examples such as the following:12
(⋆) Inevitably it will be the case that, if radium atom a has not yet de-
cayed (p), then a might not decay in the next moment but it might
also decay in the next moment.
(⋆⋆) Inevitably, it will be the case that the atom a has not yet decayed
and will decay on the next moment.
In the language thatwe deploy in this paper, (⋆) is expressed by2G(p→
(3F p∧3F¬p)); (⋆⋆) is expressed by 2F(p∧G¬p).13 The first implies
the antecedent of the Burgess’ formula, the seconddenies its consequent.
12The example is an adjustment of an example from [2].
13Of course, we are assuming that ¬p → G¬p: atom a stays decayed after he gets
decayed.
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[2] and [18] maintain that (⋆) and (⋆⋆) are mutually incompatible. In
turn, this implies that they support validity of Burgess’ formula and the
adequacy of full trees as temporal structures. By contrast, [12] admits
for the compatibility of (⋆) and (⋆⋆), thus implying that bundled trees
(or other related structures) may provide an adequate representation
of time.
The view from [2, 18] has raised a wider consensus than the view
from [12], to the effect thatmany see full trees as the adequate structures
for interpreting branching-time logic. We do not take part in the debate
here, although we believe that bundled trees deserve more considera-
tion.14 That being said, we believe that the issue concerning the validity
of Burgess’ formula and use of full trees (or bundled trees) should be
settled by arguing about the desirability of the temporal property it ex-
presses.15 By contrast, the semantics from [4] decides for invalidity of
Burgess’ formula by a machinery that is justified by considerations on
future contingents. In turn, this has nothing to do with the properties
we wish (or wish not) ascribe to our temporal structures. Hence, we
believe that appeal to the requirements suggested in Section 2 is cogent
in our case, and that it justifies the claim that failure of Burgess’ formula
is a drawback of the TRL semantics from [4].
Similar considerations apply to the failures of F3Fϕ → 3FFϕ and
H(Gϕ → 3Gϕ), with the difference that the two principles seem to be
deeply rooted in our intuitions as ϕ → PFϕ is. Thus, their failure is
equally unsatisfactory.
5 Open issues and perspectives for future
research
The failure discussed in this paper raises a number of questions. Of
course, a natural question is whether the TRL semantics from [4] can
be adjusted in order to restore validity of the Burgess’ formula, without
14A recent addition to the debate is [7], which introduces a particular game-
theoretical scenario based on an infinitely repeated Prisoner Dilemma. This scenario
cannot be modeled on full trees.
15To this concern, we find that the considerations put on the table from [2, 18] are
far from conclusive. In particular, we agree with [21] that talk of incompatibility (or
compatibility) actually presupposes the choice of full trees over bundled trees (or vice
versa), and thus it does not help settle the issue.
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at the same time renounce to provide a theory of future contingents. A
similar question concerns the failures of F3Fϕ → 3FFϕ and H(Gϕ →3Gϕ).
We believe that a real understanding of this issue can be provided
only if we get a clear and rigorous way of what is the import of the
above failures for the temporal structures we use in our semantics. We
have already mentioned that the so-called limit closure is lost if Burgess’
formula is not valid. However, it would be interesting to explore which
properties are called off by the other two failures.
In our opinion, correspondence theory [19] is the most promising way
to approach the problem. This implies shifting from the second-order
theory of (full) trees to a first-order theory of branching time. We know
from [17, 20] that this is no problem: temporal structures such as Ock-
hamist frames [20] provide first-order theories of time; moreover, the
notion of validity in such structures is equivalent to the notion of valid-
ity in bundled trees. In future research, we wish to deploy correspon-
dence theory in order to connect (failure of) the three formulas above
with (lack of) first-order properties of suitable temporal structures. An
assessment of the cogency of these properties (or the admissibility of
their lack) will in turn provide a rigorous way to understand whether
the TRL theorist in the style of [4] can find a way out of the failure—
or justify them with a different view on time—or must give up on the
tenability of the solution that she is proposing.
Another interesting open issue is whether failure of Burgess’ for-
mula affects also the semantics from [3]. We plan to explore the topic
in a future paper.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the TRL semantics from [4] (Sec-
tion 2), we have shown that it fails Burgess’ formula 2G(ϕ → 3Fϕ)→3(G → Fϕ) (Section 3), and we have discussed the conceptual import
of this failure (Section 4). The semantics from [4] has been devised in
order to fix another failure of the standard TRL semantics, namely that
of ϕ → PFϕ . In section 2, we comment on this failure and suggest that
a formal theory of future contingents should not conceal the validity of
principles of temporal reasoning. We prove failure of Burgess’ formula
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in Section 3. In doing this, we rely on the fact that the formula is not valid
on the so-called bundled trees. In particular, we consider a particular bun-
dled tree from [17] that provides a counterexample to Burgess’ formula,
we turn it into a corresponding trl tree in the style of [4], and we show
that failure of Burgess’ formula is preserved by the construction. We
also briefly comment on two other failures of standard temporal princi-
ples in the semantics from [4]. In Section 4, we discuss the failure and
explain why it proves unfortunate: beside violating the methodologi-
cal requirement outlined in Section 2, this failure makes the semantics
of [4] take side in a debate that has no apparent connection with the
issue of future contingents. Finally, we discuss some open issues and
perspectives for future research.
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Abstract
When we are engaged in phronetic activities, the notion of time plays a
crucial role in our exercise of judgment in specific cases. For instance,
undertaking an obligation implies that we seek to figure out what we
ought to do in a given situation by considering plausible future scenarios
with morally preferably outcomes on the background of the current situ-
ation. Likewise, in deliberating about whether we did right or wrong, we
evaluate past actions by zooming in on some specific past circumstances,
which are chosen as points of departure for judging a given past course
of events. Also, judgments about situations involving moral wrongdoing
and accountability often involve reasoning from counterfactual scenar-
ios based upon revisiting an alternative past version of future courses of
events, which might preferably have taken place. When we act morally
this limits our future space of freedom of action and thereby involves a
certain amount of risk-taking. The learning process inherent in such risk-
taking activities drives the kind of engagement needed to cultivate us to
become phronimos. In continuation thereof, it is argued that an artificial
ethical agent shall presumably never be phronimos in the strong sense as
it would lack the ability to experience and learn from the relation between
time and risk and the role this relation plays in moral life.
Keywords: time, phronesis, artificial moral agents, branching time mod-
els, machine learning.
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1 Introduction
This paper discusses the role of time in relation to phronetic activities,
i.e. activities focusing on situated deliberation about moral choices fol-
lowed by the enactment of selected moral actions. The notion of choice
may be clarified with reference to Aristotle’s notion of choice as a volun-
tary action, which we decide on by previous deliberation - “Choice will
be a deliberate desire of things in our power […]” (Aristotle 1934: NE,
Book III. iii. 17-iv. 3, p. 141, [2]). This means that we do not deliberate
about the present moment since things that happens instantaneously,
at this particular moment, cannot be deliberated upon. Also, the past
is necessary now and it is not in our power to make choices that may
change what happened in the past. Hence, deliberation is restricted to
future alternatives. However, we often reflect on past events in a judg-
mental context (Thomason 1981, [17]), when engaging in after the fact
evaluations of past events. Here, we deliberate about the past by apply-
ing counterfactual reasoning and move back to a point in time in which
alternativeswere still open to us, i.e., to the point in time inwhich ‘ought’
still implied ‘can’ and would have allowed us to act differently (Thoma-
son 1981, p. 174, [17]).
To further refine the above-mentioned observations concerning this
fundamental asymmetry between the past and the future, i.e., the ope-
ness of the future and the nececesity of history, the second part of the
paper introduces Prior’s philosophy of time (1949). His preliminary
outline of a tensed ontology takes as its point of departure presentism,
i.e. the notion of the dynamic aspects of time as changing, which is
reflected in the interplay between the present, which is real, the past,
whichwas real, and the future, whichwill become real (Øhrstrøm, Schär-
fe andPloug 2010, [23]). Here, his development of a notion of branching
time makes it possible to settle the truth value of future contingencies,
while avoiding determinism. In that sense, Prior’s tense logic concep-
tualizes the importance of the relation between time, free choice, and
ethics.
Based on this outline of the philosophy of conceptual structures of
time, the third part of the paper introduces the notion of phronesis, i.e.,
the kind of practical wisdom or experience-based knowledge that is
crucial for navigating in social situations to a decision, making moral
choices with proficiency. Here, the kairos of such phronetic activities
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implies that the phronimos can judge the incentives as well as the stakes
involved when selecting the right moment to act.
Finally, in part four, the paper elaborates on the kairos of phronetic
activities. It is argued that an artificial ethical agent shall presumably
never be phronimos, as it would carry out ethical reasoning with no
real sense of how time affects our moral life. That is excatly why, when
approaching a future in which an artificial ethical agent will be able to
make ethical decisions, we should ensure that such a system will be
capable of presenting us with proper ethical evaluations of its moral
choices.
2 Time, future contingents, and free choice
Prior’s temporal realism resonates well with Aristotle’s notion of free
choice as the asymmetric structure of time reflects the relation between
time and free choice. The quotation below represents some of Prior’s
early thoughts on tense logic as reflected in the paper Some Free Thinking
about Time, which laid the foundation for his break through contribution
Time and Modality (1957, [13]), which was followed up by his milestone
book Past, Present, and Future (1967, [15]).
One of the big differences between the past and the future is
that once something has become past, it is, as it were, out of
our reach - once a thing has happened, nothing we can do
can make it not to have happened. But, the future is to some
extent, even though it is only to a very small extent, some-
thing we can make for ourselves. And this is a distinction
which a tenseless logic is unable to express. In my own logic
with tenses I would express it this way: We can lay it down
as a law that whatever now is the case will always have been
the case; but we can’t interchange past and future here and
lay it down that whatever now is the case has always been
going to be the case – I don’t think that’s a logical law at all;
for if something is the work of a free agent, then it wasn’t go-
ing to be the case until that agent decided that it was. But if
happenings are just properties timelessly attached to dates,
I don’t see how you can make this distinction.
(Prior 1958, p. 2, [14])
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Prior emphasizes the importance of a so-called A-theoretical represen-
tation of time, which is in accordance with our everyday notion of time
(Prior 1967, p. 2, [15]). Here, we have an arrangement of events ordered
by A-concepts, ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’, which mirrors the asym-
metrical relation between the past (as necessary in the present) and
the future (as possible in the present). Consequently, an A-theoretical
description captures the dynamics of change as time passes by - as op-
posed to the static, tenseless symmetrically linear ordered B-time-series,
by means of which time positions are presented in a fixed temporal or-
der. Hence, in what follows, the A-theoretical idea of the asymmetry of
time is presented by introducing the notion of branching time, which
captures not only how future developments of events can be seen as ei-
ther possible or necessary, but also how the role of time is important to
account for moral choice.
In the context of time and ethics, it is striking, that despite the fact
that Prior and von Wright exchanged ideas, we see no traces of tense
logic in VonWright’s work on deontic logic, although he acknowledged
Prior’s work on tense logic –- “What I have seen of your work, how-
ever, makes it clear that it is important. […] It must be very satisfying
to you to know that you started this new and exciting branch of logical
study. […] I’m sure it will have a great future” (Jakobsen, Øhrstrøm
and Hasle. 2017, p. 11, [7]). Also, before Past, Present and Future, Prior
worked on deontic logic, and in the paper: The Paradoxes of Derived Obli-
gation (Prior 1954, [12]), he discussed von Wright’s work, and again,
von Wright commented on the critique (Wright 1956, [19]). However,
Prior never fullfilled the ambition he had concerning the incorporation
of deontic and tense logic. Nevertheles, Prior’s ideas on branching time
is highly relevant for a conceptualization of the interrelatedness of time
and ethics. An example of Prior’s early ideas on branching time is re-
flected in the paper: Postulate-sets for Tense-logic, which can be found in
the Prior Nachlass archive1.
In these models the course of time […] is represented by a
linewhich, as it moves from left to right (past to future), con-
tinually divides into branches, so that from any given point
on the diagram there is a unique route backward (to the left;
to the past) but a variety of routes forwards (to the right; to
1The Nachlas of A.N. Prior: http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk/
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the future). In eachmodel there is a single designated point,
representing the actual present moment; and in an Occamist
model there is a single designated line (taking one only of
the possible forward routes at each fork), which might be
picked out in red, representing the actual course of events.
(Prior 1966, p. 5, [11])
Subsequently, one of the major topics in his influential Past, Present and
Future was the discussion of issues concerning divine foreknowledge
and free choice, presented in his investigations of puzzles concerning
the relation between the truth-value of future states of events and in-
determinism. Here, Prior presented the notion of branching time as a
useful framework for discussing determinism and indeterminism.
The branching time model below illustrates four so-called chroni-
cles, each of which represents possible future courses of events, only
one of which will be realized in the future. This means that the unre-
alized chronicles reflect counterfactual courses of events (what would
have been realized given counterfactual circumstances). Different mod-
els have been suggested to account for future contingents. Hence, inDe
Interpretatione, Chapter IX, Aristotle’s example of “the sea-battle tomor-
row” discusses whether statements about the future (“there will be a
sea battle tomorrow”, “there will not be a sea battle tomorrow”) can be
said to be true today. Here, Aristotle claimed that the future is indeter-
ministic, i.e., propositions about future events are neither true nor false
(Anscombe 1967, [1]). However, in contemporary research concerning
an interpretation of the idea of the true future, work has been dedicated
to the development of a satisfactory representation of a future operator
in branching time models (Thomason 1981, [17]; Øhrstrøm 2009, [22]).
Prior maintained that indeterministic tense-logic is possible without re-
jection of the principle of bivalence. He gave two interpretations of the
idea of branching time, the so-called “Ockhamist system” and the “Peir-
cian System”, one its fragment (Prior 1967 p. 130, [15]). According to
the Ockhamist system, from a God-eyes-perspective, we may say that
there exists one possible future, which is true now. This also reflects our
intuition about time as we in the present act in accordance with what
we expect to happen in the future, even though it is not possible for
us to know whether the expected future eventuates or not. Clearly, as
has been shown by Øhrstrøm and Hasle (2011, [24]) to the Ockhamist,
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there is a distinction between three expressions of future, viz. ‘it will be
the case that p’, ‘it will possibly be the case that p’, and ‘it will necessar-
ily be the case that p’, which may be formalized by introducing modal
operators. Hence, we may at time α (the root time shown in the dia-
gram) ascribe prima facia truth value relative to a designated route in
the branching time model, implying that the truth-value of future con-
tingencies is relative to a specifically selected history. In this manner, it
becomes possible to distinguish between necessary and possible future
courses of events, allowing one to assign truth-values to future contin-
gencies while avoiding determinism.
Of the fragment that Prior called the Peircean system, Prior remarks
that:
The Peircean system can only say ‘it will be that p’ when p’s
futurition is necessary, when it is not necessary but will oc-
cur all the same, he has to say that ‘It will be that p’ is false;
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the sense in which it is true eludes him. But to the Peircean,
the Ockhamist seems to treat what is still future in a way in
which it would only be proper to treat what has been future –
he views it as it would be proper to view it from the end of
time. (Prior 1967, p. 130, [15])
Prior favored the Peircean system since he found that it did not make
sense to refer to a true future now with reference to a prima facia future,
i.e. a God-eyes-view. Prior could not become reconciled to the idea that
divine foreknowledge could be seen as founded onwhat humanswould
choose to do in the future. Consequently, there is no truth now about
an agent’s future decision until the decision is actuallymade (Øhrstrøm
2009, p. 23, [22]). To Prior, it seemed reasonable that we should con-
sider some possible futures, and only those propositions, which hold in
all possible futures, i.e., are necessarily true in the future, can be said
to be true now. In Prior’s view, indeterminism is reflected in the asym-
metry between the past as necessary, which means that P(x)p∨P(x)~p
(‘in the past, it has been the case at time x that either p or not p was the
case’) is a theorem, as precisely one of the propositions will be true of
the past. On the other side, the Ockhamist theorem F(x)p∨F(x)~p (‘in
the future it is going to be the case at time x that either p or not p’) should
not be ascribed a truth-value now (Jakobsen, Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2017,
[7]). Consequently, in the Peircean system, the future equals the nec-
essary future. Obviously, this position runs counter to our intuition
about time. As such, the Ockhamist system seems a good reflection of
our common sense intuition about time, as we, in the present, act, plan
and reason about the future envisioning that a certain courses of events
is going to play out. By the same token, the philosophical notion of an
indeterministic worldview can be seen as closely related to the idea of
future contingents, represented by future statements, which are neither
unavoidable nor impossible. In our context, the notion of a branching
timemodelmay serve as a highly useful framework for illustratingways
in whichmoral agents respondwith ethical excellence by reacting at the
right time, in the right way, and to the right extent, i.e., by “hitting the
kairos” (Eikeland 2008, p. 154, [6]).
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3 The Kaioros of Phronetic Enactment
The Aristotelian concept of phronesis reflects the kind of practical wis-
dom or situated knowledge which is needed for our choice and perfor-
mance of morally good actions cases. Hence, in the Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle mentions two kinds of virtues, viz. intellectual virtues (phrone-
sis, techne, nous, episteme, and sophia) and ethical virtues, virtues of
character. Intellectual virtues are further specified by distinguishing be-
tween those virtues which deal with practical thinking, versus those
which theoretical reasoning (Aristotle 1934: NE, Book II., [2]).
That is, ethical virtues reflect standards of good practice informed
by rational reasoning. As MacIntyre remarks, “According to Aristotle
then excellence of character and intelligence cannot be separated” (Mac-
Intyre 2000, p. 154, [9]). This stands in contrast to the modern world-
view, according to which can be both good and stupid, as when Kant
holds that possesion of the good will “[…] alone is both necessary and
sufficient for moral worth” (MacIntyre 2000, p. 154, [9]). Moreowever,
Aristotle holds that a flourishing life is sustained by activities, which are
enacted by reason and are in alignmentwith virtue or excellence (Dunne
1993, p. 275, [5]). In that sense, Aristotle consolidates the superiority of
the excercise of theoretical reasoning and contemplation. At first glance,
this might seem to contradict his overall practice-based position and his
observation that there cannot be a theoretical catalogue of rules for eth-
ically wise decision making, since we are dealing with particular cases,
which calls for excercise of practical wisdom and ethical excellence. In
a similar veine, Aristotle emphasizes that young people may be good at
mathematics and geometry, but that lack of practical knowledge makes
will tend to make poor when it comes to moral choices:
[…] although the young may be experts in geometry and
mathematics and similar branches of knowledge, we do not
consider that a youngman can have Prudence. The reason is
that Prudence includes a knowledge of particular facts, and
this is derived from experience, which a youngmandoes not
possess; for experience is the fruit of years.
(Aristotle 1934: NE, Book VI., viii. 3-5, p. 349-51, [2])
Nontheless, Aristotle distinguishes between intellectualvirtues, obtained
via teaching, and virtues of character and ethics, which are developed
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via habitual exercise (MacIntyre 2000, p. 154, [9]). Here, phronesis
provides the phronimos with the ability to reason well about particular
cases and to see what is needed by relying on particular as well as gen-
eral knowledge (nous). As such, phronesis is necessary and sufficient
for being a virtuous person, who knows how to live well (eu zén). Ac-
cordingly, the phronimos is already virtous, and phronesis may inform
his deliberations. Consequently, phronesis stands out from other intel-
lectual virtues by being interweawed with the ethical virtues; indeed,
in some interpretations of Aristotle, phronesis is considered an intellec-
tual virtue of a special kind because it is, at the same time, an ethical
virtue (Eikeland 2008, p. 53, [6]). However, as shall be discussed be-
low, although life-experience is necessary for virtue and phronesis, it is
not sufficient, and it is not the case that experience automatically fosters
phronesis (Eikeland 2008, p. 154, [6]).
In continuation of this overall outline of phronesis, the role of time,
viz., the kairos of phronetic activitiesmay be elaborated on by turning to
an analysis of the act of promising. Obviously, the phronimos is capable
of “hitting the kairos, or the “extremely correct” target of “ethical excel-
lence in the situation” (Eikeland 2008, p. 154, [6]). But not everyone
acts with ethical excellence, when making promises. Sometimes stakes
are too high, as in the well-known case of Jephthah’s dilemma:
Then the spirit of the Lord came upon Jephthah, and he
passed through Gilead andManasseh and passed on toMiz-
pah of Gilead, and from Mizpah of Gilead he passed on to
the Ammonites. And Jephthahmade a vow to the Lord, and
said “if thou wilt give the Ammonites into my hand, then
whoever comes forth from the doors of my house to meet
me, when I return victorious from the Ammonites, shall be
the Lord’s, and I will offer him up for a burnt offering.
(Judges 11: 29-40, NRSV, BibleGateway, [3])
Here, upon his return, Jephthah finds himself in a dilemma as he is met
by his daughter, who he then has a plight to offer in sacrifice. Conse-
quently, Jephthah can be said to have promised to do the forbidden, as
argued by vonWright: “It may be shown that if the act of an agent gives
rise to conflicting duties, then this act is itself something fromwhich the
agent has a duty to abstain” (Wright 1981, p. 119, [20]). Or, as formu-
lated in his “Jephthah’s Theorem”: (where O stands for Ought, and “∼”
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is negation): O(∼t |p) ⇒ O∼p; i.e., if, given that p, every t is forbidden,
then p itself is forbidden (Wright 1968, p. 79, [21]).
However, following van Eck (1982, [18]), it does not seem plausi-
ble to evaluate the status of a deontic expression on behalf of later un-
foreseen circumstances – “if Jephthah had been met by a goat, then he
would not have promised the forbidden” (van Eck 1982, p. 260, [18]).
Moreover, when we make a promise, we are usually aware that we risk
breaking it in case later conflicting duties arise. As such, we calculate
with a ceteris paribus clause, andwe are ready to accept a certain amount
of risk. Nevertheless, we feel that Jephthah’s disposition is wrong; not
because he has promised to do the forbidden, instead, by stating this
specific promise at that given time, he has run an unusually great risk.
Hence, according to van Eck, it makes sense to judge the moral status
of a promise relatively to the situation in which one finds oneself, while
promising to do something (van Eck 1982, p. 261, [18]). As mentioned
earlier, the notion of kairos reflects the opportune moment of ethical
action. This rich and complex concept has been described by Smith by
pointing out three perspectives on kairos:
Thus kairosmeans the timewhen something should happen
or be done, the ’right’ or ’best’ time; itmeans the timewhen a
constellation of events presents a crisis to which a response
must be made; it means the time when an opportunity is
given for creative action or for achieving some special result
that is possible only at ’this’ time. Implicit in all three senses
of kairos is the concept of an individual time having a criti-
cal, ordinal position. Such a time is one marked off from its
predecessors and successors by the fact that it is a critical or
’turning’ point in a historical process.
(Smith 1969, p. 6, [16])
This sense of the right time, or the favorablemoment, to react to a certain
situation can be reflected in a branching time model, which allows for
an asymmetric account of time. Hence, Thomason (1981, [17]) presents
a tempo modal model supported by two deontic principles for evalua-
tion, depending on whether we find ourselves in a deliberative or a judg-
mental context. The first-mentioned refers to moral choice situations in
which it is assumed that we have morally valid options, viz. alterna-
tive possible futures can be realized, and we have the opportunity to
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make morally good choices. For instance, the following expression is
true at nine o’clock: ‘I have to go shopping before eleven o’clock’. Here,
‘ought’ implies ‘can’, but after eleven o’clock, the expression is false as
it represents an option which cannot be realized any longer. Here, we
may introduce a distinction between primary versus secondary, and ac-
tual duties. After having failed to do the shopping, I nowhave to choose
among a new set of future alternatives (secondary duties). Accordingly,
possible future scenarios, which are morally acceptable, could include,
e.g., apologizing (a repairing obligation). However, the expressionmay
still be regarded as valid after eleven o’clock, namely according to a judg-
mental context in which we take departure in scenarios as “might-have-
beens” (Thomason 1981, p. 174, [17]), i.e., the fact that at a certain past
point in time, before eleven o’clock, there existed possible alternative
scenarios in which I might have acted as I ought to do.
Thomason’s notion of branching time is useful to illustrate how
awareness ofways inwhich timemay bothwiden and constrain our free-
dom of choice, is significant to phronetic activities. Similarly, when we
make a promise, we are aware that this involves a certain amount of risk-
taking on our side since the act of promising limits our space of liberty
of action in the future, and, furthermore, we may fail to succeed to do
that whichwe ought to do. Also, whenwe evaluatemoral actions, those
of our own or others, we pass judgment by applying counterfactual rea-
soning, moving back in time to a point in which options were still open
to us. From this vantage point, we may judge a given course of events,
and in doing so, we often gain insights on contemporary events by re-
flecting on what we could not have known back then, either because we
lacked knowledge, or becausewe could not, in themidst of events, know
how things were to develop. Accordingly, through life-experience, we
learn to master kairos, i.e., to moderate and balance moral deliberation
about particular cases on the backdrop of our common-sense notion of
time. As mentioned above, ethical excellence and virtue are cultivated
via life experience and habituation - “they establish themselves as “skill-
patterns” emerging from actions repeated many time” (Eikeland 2008,
p. 182, [6]). Obviously, moral self-cultivation does not take place in iso-
lation; rather, interactions with the surroundings, family, schools, and
communities of practices scaffold ourmoral development. Here, Macin-
tyre emphasizes that “the making and sustaining of those relationships
is inseparable from the development of those dispositions and activi-
193
ties through which each is directed towards becoming an independent
practical reasoner” (Macintyre 2000, p. 107, [9]).
It is by taking part in transactions with our fellow-men that
some of us become just and others unjust; by acting in dan-
gerous situations and forming a habit of fear or of confidence
we become courageous or cowardly. […] In a word, our
moral dispositions are formed as a result of the correspond-
ing activities.
(Aristotle 1934: NE, Book II. i. 7-ii. 3, p. 73-75, [2])
4 Machine ethics based on deep learning, and
why we should worry
When we deliberate about how what we choose to do now may either
narrow or widen our future possibilities, we are aware that there is
something at stake. This kind of awareness fuels the engagement needed
in our striven-towards moral self-cultivation and towards becoming
phronimos. We acquire knowledge of particulars from participating
in practice, dealing with cases when we, or others, have undertaken
obligations, made commitments, or deliberated about matters. In such
situations, more often than not, ethical insights are painfully acquired.
Gradually, through experiences, we learn (often the hard way) to mas-
ter the kairos of phronetic activities. In that sense, an artificial ethical
agent shall presumably never be phronimos, as it would carry out ethi-
cal reasoning without the ability to gain a proper understanding of the
role of time in moral life. Hence, an artificial moral agent would likely
give a treatment of time by weighting the probability of different pos-
sible future outcomes on behalf of present patterns in data, patterns,
about which it does not, or cannot, care. Consequently, it would lack
the ability to experience the relation between time and risk, and the role
this relation plays in moral life. This does not imply that machine ethics
might never be realised. Presumably, a system might be capable of eth-
ical decision making by reasoning about data sets representing both
particulars and general knowledge. However, although computational
ethical decision models might be feasible, they would lack an essential
component of human moral agency, viz. experience based knowledge
of what it means to be in an ethical situation in which something is at
194
stake. First and foremost, as pointed out byMcDermott, an ethical agent
is always faced with a conflict between self-interest and what ethics pre-
scribe us to do. The fact that I may deliberately choose to act ethically
wrong is constitutive of being an ethical agent (McDermott 2011, p. 95,
[10]). Moreover, the fact that our learning process is driven by there
being something at stake is crucial to fostering the kind of engagement
needed to cultivate us to become phronimos.
But, why should we be concerned about lack of inner states in a
system, which might be able to produce ethically correct judgments?
It seems to be of little relevance, especially if an artificial ethical agent
eventually becomes better than us in exercising ethical excellence. How-
ever, this aspect is highly relevant as machine-learning technology in-
creasingly powers our world. Here, computational models based on
deep learningmethods, including supervised or unsupervised learning,
have succesfully made progress in a variety of fields, such as
natural language processing, topic classification, question answering,
image recognition, and transcription of speech to text. Originally, con-
ventionalmachine-learning techniques required engineering by hand in
the shape of:
[…] careful engineering and considerable domain expertise
to design the feature extractor that transformed the raw data
[…] into a suitable internal representation […] from which
the learning subsystem […] could detect or classify patterns
in the input. (LeCun et al. 2015, p. 436, [8])
Yet, recent progress in machine learning holds promise that systems
will increasingly be better at learning by doing without human over-
sight. Hence, Lecun et al. point to “representation learning” as a set
of methods, which makes it possible for a machine to automatically dis-
cover the representations needed for detection or classification (LeCun
et al., 2015, p. 436, [8]). Accordingly, nowadays, humans are increas-
ingly moving out of the loop, and this is welcomed by the authors:
We think that deep learning will have many more success-
es in the future because it requires very little engineering
by hand, so it can easily take advantage of increases in the
amount of available computation and data.
(LeCun et al. 2015, p. 436, [8])
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Of course, the performance of such systems is measured to test “its abil-
ity to produce sensible answers on new inputs that it has never seen dur-
ing training” (LeCun et al. 2015, p. 437, [8]). In that sense, it is possible
to scaffold the systems responsiveness to its surroundings to avoid cases
likeMicrosoft’s fail with the real time Tay Twitter Bot, who overnight be-
came abusive and racist as people coaxed it into saying horrible things.
Nevertheless, such inductively based test methods may not guarantee
an expected, and valid, outcome for all future cases (Bringsjord et al.
2006, [4]).
Moreover, with humans moving out of the loop, we do not gain an
insight into how the artificial moral agent made the decision. This con-
cern is addressed in the European General Data protection legislation
(GDPR).2 Here, transparency is one of the cornerstones in the GDPR,
which takes black-box decisions into considerations (e.g., article 4, 13,
14, 22):
The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the con-
troller confirmation as to whether or not personal data con-
cerning him or her are being processed, and, where that is
the case, access to the personal data and the following infor-
mation: […] (h) the existence of automateddecision-making,
including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and,
at least in those cases,meaningful information about the logic
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged con-
sequences of such processing for the data subject.
(GPDR, Article 15)
However, despite the good intentions behind the law, one may fear that
it might be a difficult or even impossible task to explain, in ordinary
language, what goes on due to the complexity of autonomous decision
making. It is highly questionably that a deep learning driven artificial
ethical agent will be able to produce an understandable output, which
explains its decision making procedure in complex cases with moral
ambiguity.
2GDPR:https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj. Accessed March 13 2019.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have argued that discussions about whether phronesis
is computationally tractable or not may benefit from including an anal-
ysis of the relation between time and morality. Hence, I have illustrated
how Prior’s philosophy of time and the notion of branching time may
serve as a useful framework for sorting out the relation between time,
free choice, and ethics. Moreover, I have shown that when we learn to
master the kairos of phronetic enactment this learning process is driven
by our awareness that something is at stake. Consequently, an artifi-
cial moral agent shall presumably never be able to be phronimos in the
strong sense as it would have no understanding of the crucial role of
time in our moral life. Hence, if we increasingly trust artificial moral
machines based on complex abstractions without humans in, or on, the
loop, we risk losing sight of what ethics is about in the first place. We
risk switching ethics for calculation.
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Abstract
The Prior Virtual Lab is an online research collaboration which aims to
transcribe and make public manuscripts, notes and letters by (or sent to)
the logician and philosopher Arthur N. Prior (1914-1969). This article
explores and discusses the Danish Prior Internet Resources (PIR), which
the Prior Virtual Lab is part of, and argues that it constitutes a Virtual
Research Environment (VRE). The article also argues that a significant
challenge for future work with the PIR is applying the knowledge of the
iHumanist. In particular, we shall argue that part of what is required
when moving into the digital humanities is a shift from a needy-user
paradigm (emphasizing search for missing information) to an explorabil-
ity paradigm (which emphasizes serendipity).
Keywords: Virtual Research Environments, Serendipity, Explorability,
Needy-user paradigm, eArchive, iHumanist, eResearch, Interdisciplinary
ResearchCollaboration, Research Infrastructure, Arthur Prior, DigitalHu-
manities.
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1 Introduction
In 2011, Norbert Loussau predicted that “virtual research environments
will establish themselves as the norm in the coming five to ten years,
and become as entrenched as the use of email and internet in the every-
day life of a researcher.” (Lossau 2011, p. 156, [31]) While the predic-
tion has three more years to be fulfilled, virtual research environments
(henceforth VREs) are a long a way from becoming the norm. How-
ever, interest in VREs has not diminished, and a significant amount of
research today takes place as eResearch (Jeffery and Wusteman 2012,
[26]), where researchers explore and make use of modern technologies
to facilitate research, research communication and research collabora-
tion. Loussau encourages librarians to play a role in the development
of eResearch by arguing:
Transcending the borders betweendisciplines, librarianswill
be able to apply themselves to their genuine tasks of cata-
loguing, administering and safekeeping the accessibility of
knowledge in the age of internet and at the same time take
on an essential role in the research process. »Librarians Go
Research!« could become the catchy motto for libraries in
regard to virtual research environments and should not be
frightening but, rather, an incentive for bringing our basic
competencies and experience to the new digital world of col-
laborative research, which is new to many researchers and
librarians alike. (Lossau 2011, p. 156, [31])
As information professionals (the term was explored in Engerer and
Sabir, 2018, [17]), we strive to play such a role in the Danish-based eRe-
search project The Primacy of Tense: A.N. Prior Now and Then (often short-
ened to the Prior Project). Here we support an interdisciplinary group
of domain researchers1 in their use of eResearch tools and their endeav-
our to transform the physical Nachlass of Prior into an enhanced virtual
Nachlass, thus moving from a traditional archive to an eArchive.
1“Domain researcher” is a term from information science that refers to colleagues
from other disciplines [24]. In the Prior Project case this means the logicians, philoso-
phers and historians, that the information professionals collaborate with and support
with general expertise in digital information systems.
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This article discusses the ongoing work of developing the domain
group’s main tool for eResearch: the Prior Internet Resources (PIR).
Based on a discussion of how to define VREs, we argue that VREs are
characterized by being online systems that support and facilitate re-
search communication and research collaboration, data management
and analysis, projectmanagement, and that functions via a participation
architecture. We will argue that the PIR has many of the elements that
characterize VREs, but not all of them, and that it has them to different
degrees. However, we argue that this does not pose a problem for the
characterization of the PIR as a VRE, as the list should not be evalu-
ated as a collection of necessary characteristics, but merely as charac-
teristics a VRE might have. Crucially, only the characteristics that are
relevant for the particular domain group that the VRE is supposed to
serve should be included. Moreover, we shall argue that the typical
characteristics of VREs that the PIR lacks should be evaluated as poten-
tial developmental issues, not as disqualifications.
Due to our experience of keeping the PIR updated, we have come
to believe that discussions of VREs and the PIR would benefit from an
iHumanist-approach, where the discussions and developmental work
are enhanced by the concepts and ideas of the digital humanities. Here
we argue that VREs and other online systems for supporting and fa-
cilitating eResearch should undergo a shift from what we shall call a
needy-user paradigm, where information professionals support the do-
main groups in their search for information, to an explorability paradigm,
where information professionals support the domain group in exploring
information. Here we argue that serendipity is a key concept in devel-
oping modern eAchieves: adequate online systems for eResearch like
VREs should not just offer search based information, but should facili-
tate serendipitous research.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the Prior Project. Here we
argue that the project has enabled the Nachlass material, left behind by
the New Zealand philosopher and logician, Arthur N. Prior, to move
from a physical archive into an eArchive. In Section 3, we discuss the
concept of VREs and present a list of characteristics a VRE typically has.
Against this background, we argue that the PIR constitutes a VRE. We
also argue that by making using of the knowledge of information pro-
fessionalswith humanistic backgrounds, iHumanists, the PIR has the po-
tential to be enhanced and expanded. In Sections 4 and 5, we develop
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these ideas further. In Section 4, we argue for a shift from the needy-
user paradigm to an explorability paradigm. In Section 5, we argue that
VREs such as the PIR could be significantly enhanced by emphasising
an explorability paradigm with a focus on serendipity. Based on read-
ings of selected literature, we present a tentative list of design features
for explorable systems that foster serendipitous discoveries. Section 6
concludes.
2 From archive to eArchive
The Primacy of Tense: A.N. Prior Now and Then was launched in the au-
tumn of 2016 as an interdisciplinary research collaboration with two
different, but connected, goals. One was to explore the link between
the ideas of the New Zealand born logician and philosopher Arthur
N. Prior (1914-1969) and modern temporal, modal, and hybrid logic.
Another was to study and expand The Nachlass of A.N. Prior, thereby
making more of Prior’s work accessible not only for researchers, but
for anyone interested in Prior’s logic and philosophy (see the project
description at https://www.prior.aau.dk/). A significant background
resource supporting these endeavours is the Danish Prior Internet Re-
sources (PIR) consisting of the following sites:
Name URL
Prior Studies https://priorstudies.org/
The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies https://research.prior.aau.dk/login_user.php
The Nachlass of A.N. Prior https://research.prior.aau.dk/nachlass/
The first site, Prior Studies, offers traditional resources such as biblio-
graphical lists and information about the Prior archives at Aalborg Uni-
versity andOxford. The site also links to the YouTube channel PriorStud-
ies, where talks on Prior’s logic and philosophy can be found.
Since the spring of 2018, the PIR has been undergoing reconstruc-
tion: the design has been updated, making the site more user-friendly,
and new features of have been added (the site was originally launched
in the nineties, and several features needed updating).
One expansion of the research resources was the addition of a list
of web resources users might find relevant for their studies. A more
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notable addition to the site was the development of a research commu-
nity, where researchers are invited to join a Prior-community and re-
ceive news relevant for their study of Prior.
In addition, Prior Studies functions as a gateway for exploring the
archives at Aalborg University, the Bodleian Library, and Oxford Uni-
versity. One element of the gateway is information about the content of
thematerial contained at these physical Prior archives. Another element
of the gateway is the link to The Nachlass of A.N. Prior. Here researchers
may find transcriptions of physical content from the Bodleian Library
and from Aalborg and Oxford Universities.2 At the time of writing, The
Nachlass of A.N. Prior contained transcriptions of 68 previously unpub-
lished letters and papers from the Prior archives. Furthermore, Prior
Studies links to The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies, where photographs of
the material in Oxford (more than 6000 individual photographs) may
be accessed. Presently, only a limited amount of the material at Aalborg
University is to be found in the Virtual Lab, but more is being added.
The establishment of The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies was a significant
contribution to research on Prior, and it was officially inaugurated at
the Arthur Prior Centenary Conference held in 2014 in Oxford. This
timely event was the culmination of several earlier events aimed at pre-
serving Prior’s legacy.
In 2007, Prior’s widow, Mary Prior (1922-2011) granted Peter Øhr-
strøm (Aalborg University) and Per Hasle (then at Aalborg University,
nowUniversity of Copenhagen) permission to make use of and publish
archival material from Prior located in Oxford.
The archival material was received shortly after the death of Prior
in 1969, after Mary Prior and the philosopher Peter Geach (a friend
of Prior) had sorted and organized notes, scientific material and let-
ters written or received by Prior into twenty-nine boxes. These archival
boxes were handed over to the Bodleian Library, where the material un-
derwent a second ordering at the hands of two Oxford librarians, David
and Steffi Lewis. From then on, researchers with written permission
from the Prior family have been able to access and study the material of
twenty-two boxes in the Bodleian’s Special Collections Reading Room,
2Wewill describe the transcription process shortly. Here we will simply remark that
the result of the transcriptions process (the files which are accessible in The Nachlass of
A.N. Prior) are searchable PDF files. For a discussion of what they call the transcription
loop see [16].
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while seven boxes can be studied at the Philosophy Department Library,
10 Merton Street, Oxford.
Then, in 2010, the Bodleian Library allowed the Danish research
group for Prior Studies to store digital photographs of the boxes’ con-
tents on the condition that the library retained the rights to the pho-
tographs and that access to them was to be suitably restricted. This
second condition was meet by the creation of the online research plat-
form The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies. Via this portal, the photographs of
Prior’s archival material could be accessed from anywhere in the world,
but only by users who had been assigned a user profile and login. Once
registered, users could download the photographmaterial, butwere not
permitted to distribute it.
Further development of The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies took place in
2017, when the son of Arthur and Mary Prior, Martin Prior, donated
a collection of letters, notes, scrapbook material and some of Arthur
Prior’s personal books to Aalborg University. More recently, in late 2018
and early 2019, Martin Prior donated further material (all of these ad-
ditional documents are currently in the process of being scanned and
added to the lab).
However, the main purpose of The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies is to
make the archival material accessible for examination and transcription.
Registered users are free merely to browse and download the material,
but the hope is that they will become active transcribers, converting this
material, into searchable digital material (PDF files). It is worth noting
that the transcription process makes two distinct changes to the accessi-
bility to the Prior material. First, it converts it from an (unsearchable)
image format to the standard format for digital documents, namely PDF
files. Second, transcription transforms the ownership. The Bodleian Li-
brary retains the rights to the images, but the rights to the transcribed
material reside with the Danish Prior Group.3 All in all, transcription
plays a pivotal role in the PIR, and we need to discuss it further.
When a researcher has undertaken and completed the work of tran-
scribing a document in the Virtual Lab, another researcher (with exper-
tise, on the one hand, in Prior’s logic or his philosophy or the historical
development of his work, and, on the other hand, significant experience
with reading Prior’s handwriting) proofreads the transcription.4 Once
3The copyright holders are Per Hasle, Peter Øhrstrøm and David Jakobsen.
4Mary and Arthur Prior’s son, Martin Prior has over the years played a significant
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approved,5 the document is uploaded to its final destination: The Nach-
lass of A.N. Prior. The path of the Prior material can be illustrated in the
following way:
Figure 1: From Archive to Nachlass
Another way to think about the transformation of material is described
by Engerer and Sabir:
Here is another way to think about it. The contents of the
boxes in the Bodleian Library might be thought of as Prior’s
‘physical Nachlass’. The photographs of this raw material in
PVL [The Prior Virtual Lab6] might be thought of as Prior’s
‘virtual Nachlass’. And the transcribed and commented ma-
terial available on the internet site, https://nachlass.prior.
aau.dk/ (the Nachlass of A.N. Prior) might be thought of
as Prior’s ‘digitally enriched Nachlass’.
(Engerer and Sabir 2018, p. 16, [17])
Figure 2 illustrates this description of the relationship:
Figure 2: Different types of archives
In short: The Nachlass of A.N. Prior offers an eArchive of transcribed
documents from The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies, which contains digital
consultative role in the transcription process, resolving numerous issues ranging from
idiosyncrasies of handwriting to providing background information.
5Approval has to be granted by either Per Hasle, Peter Øhrstrøm or David Jakobsen.
6In other articles, PVL abbreviates The Prior Virtual Lab. However, The Virtual Lab for
Prior Studies is the correct name.
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photographs of the physical material held for the most part at Oxford.
Broadly speaking the goal of the PIR is to increase accessibility to the
works of Prior. Viewed from this perspective, how does it fare?
While access to both the physicalNachlass atOxford andTheVirtual
Nachlass inTheVirtual Lab for Prior Studies are restricted (the documents
at the Bodleian Library can only be accessed after traveling to Oxford
and obtaining a written permission from the Prior family to study the
material, while the Virtual Lab requires a user profile and login) the Vir-
tual Nachlass clearly offers more convenient access conditions. The first
and the most obvious advantage is that the lab is accessible from any-
where in the world. A second difference is that the assignment of a user
profile and login to the lab functions through a peer-system; probably a
more transparent and open process. Third, the site makes available cer-
tain meta-information about the material stored at Oxford. These are
contained in the so-called ‘box-descriptions’ made by Per Hasle on pri-
orstudies.org; these offer guidelines to the content of The Virtual Lab for
Prior Studies. These guidelines also apply to the Physical Nachlass at Ox-
ford, and indeed they are called box-descriptions because they describe
the content of the 29 physical boxes in Oxford.
The Digitally Enriched Nachlass of A.N. Prior is even more assess-
able, as the material in The Nachlass of A.N. Prior can be accessed and
searched by anyone from anywhere in the world. Furthermore, since
the documents in The Nachlass of A.N. Prior have been enriched with
comments from both the transcriber and the expert who did the proof-
reading, the documents offermore guidance to the study of Prior’s logic
and philosophy. Thus, the PIR (constituted by Prior Studies, The Virtual
Lab for Prior Studies, and The Nachlass of A.N. Prior) does fulfil its basic
functions in enhancing the opportunities to study Prior.
But can its potential be enhanced and expanded? In the next sec-
tion, we discuss the PIR as a Virtual Research Environment, and argue
that useful development paths may be partially identified by viewing it
through the lens of VRE theory.
3 On Being a Virtual Research Environment
The arrival of the personal computer, followed by their interlinking, and
then, a decade later, the widespread use of the internet, transformed
research, research collaboration and research communication. Before
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this, research interaction tended to be limited to local environments,
and was only rapid in limited contexts, such as face-to-face discussion
at conferences and workshops.7 Today, research has the potential to be
both fast and global. With tools like email, video conferencing, online
writing platforms, and discussion forums, research communication and
research collaboration have substantially changed, so much so that it is
tempting and plausible to rethink research as eResearch (Jeffery and
Wusteman 2012, [26]).
However, the internet, the personal computer, and the tools they
provide not only alter research communication and research collabora-
tion, they alter the nature of research itself. Under these new condi-
tions for research, Ankeney and Leonelli have argued that the Kuhnian
idea that scientific change takes place as scientific problems accumulate
(Kuhn 1962, [28]) does not offer an adequate picture of how contempo-
rary research functions. Scientific changes, indeed scientific revolutions,
are not merely the result of researchers and their scientific findings, but
are also (and perhaps more importantly) the result of changed condi-
tions for conducting research. These changed conditions influence and
alter the scientific questions and problems that researchers ask and try
to solve (Ankeny and Leonelli 2016, [1]).
Labels for the new transforming conditions, all designed to embrace
the nature of eResearch, include ‘e-research communities’, ‘collabora-
tive virtual environments’, ‘gateways’, ‘science gateways’, ‘portals’, ‘vir-
tual organizations’, ‘virtual research communities’, ‘cyber-environments’
and ‘virtual research environments’. Although these labels differ in
meaning, definition, and the particular technologies they inhabit, they
all seem to point towards the same phenomenon: digitalization of re-
search (Bracken et al. 2014, [7]; Carusi and Reimer 2010, [9]). However,
as evolving concepts, and with many different technological manifes-
tations, the definitions of technological solutions which enable and en-
hance eResearch, are subject to considerable debate (Bracken et al., 2014,
[7]; Carusi and Reimer, 2010, [9]; Jeffery and Wusteman 2012, [26]).
7The history of Prior’s own research demonstrates this. Living in New Zealand, at-
tending academic conferences was not easy, and many of Prior’s research discussions
with other scholars took place by letter. For example, the Smart-correspondences shows
how research topics were discussed, and in one of his letters to Prior J.J.C. Smart writes,
“You’ve missed a few things out, surprising as it may seem!”, and then goes on to list
events in academia, that might have interested Prior [36].
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In 2010 the UK Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) sug-
gested VREs as significant for eResearch.8 In their report, JISC argued
that a VRE is a technological, internet-based support system, which en-
ables eResearch to take place while potentially crossing boundaries of
disciplines and locations. In their search for a definition, JISC offered
the following:
The term VRE is now best thought of as shorthand for the
tools and technologies needed by researchers to do their re-
search, interact with other researchers (whomay come from
different disciplines, institutions or even countries) and to
make use of resources and technical infrastructures avail-
able both locally and nationally. The term VRE also incorpo-
rates the context in which those tools and technologies are
used. The detailed design of a VRE will depend on many
factors including discipline, context, and security require-
ments.
(JISC in: Carusi and Reimer 2010, p. 13, [9])
That is: the key element of VREs is technological support of research
in a way that has the potential to cross the boundaries of discipline and
geography. Given thewide scope of this definition, determiningwhat is
and what is not a VRE can be challenging. Here, Jeffery and Wusteman
have argued that the concept of VRE risks being diluted by too wide an
application due to a tendency to call any online research facilitation a
VRE:
[…] as the concept of the VRE becomes more widely recog-
nised, the tendency to describe every portal, gateway and
8From the many different labels for technologies that support eResearch we have
chosen to discuss the PIR solely as a virtual research environment, even though other
labelsmight have been relevant. However, as the JISC report and Jeffery andWusteman
argue, the different labels overlap significantly, and VREs stand out as a broad and flex-
ible concept (they have many different features, not all of which need be incorporated
in any particular VRE). Moreover, eResearch is frequently discussed in the context of
VREs. The emphasis onmultiple many different features and the non-excluding nature
of the VRE-concept makes it useful for discussing the PIR – we need a flexible concept.
We also remark that much discussion of eResearch takes place in a natural or social
science setting, and not all features of eResearch here are relevant for eResearch in the
humanities. A flexible concept helps us to transfer and open the discussion of eResearch
in a humanistic setting.
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digital library as a VRE needs to be guarded against. Whilst
these applications may be central components of a VRE, the
latter is more than a digital library, or even a portal or gate-
way to a range of digital libraries. A VRE should describe an
environment in which research collaboration is facilitated,
not just a resource to be used in research.
(Jeffery and Wusteman 2012, p. 135, [26])
In the light of this, Jeffery and Wusteman argue that the system they
explore (OJAX++) is “demonstrating the next generation of Virtual Re-
search Environments.” (Jeffery and Wusteman 2012, part of the title
of their article, [26]). They argue that OJAX++ facilitates research in
“sharing of data; support for communication within a team; provision
of access to tools; services or an infrastructure; support for project man-
agement; collaborative annotation of data; and analysis and processing
of data.” (Jeffery and Wusteman 2012, pp. 135–36, [26]). Jeffery and
Wusteman further add that OJAX++ as a VRE offers “data and services
that facilitate “remixing” with other data and services, [and functions]
via an “architecture of participation”” (Jeffery and Wusteman 2012, p.
135, [26]).
Examining Jeffery and Wusteman (henceforth J&W) and the defi-
nition of VRE by the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC), we
find the following formulations, which indicate characteristic elements
of VREs:
1. “Tools and technologies neededby researchers to do their research”
(JISC)
2. “interact with other researchers (who may come from different
disciplines, institutions or even countries)” (JISC)
3. “makeuse of resources and technical infrastructures available both
locally and nationally” (JISC)
4. “incorporates the context in which these tools and technologies
are used” (JISC)
5. “more than a digital library, or even a portal or gateway to a range
of digital libraries” (J&W)
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6. “describe an environment in which research collaboration is facil-
itated, not just a resource to be used in research” (J&W)
7. “sharing of data” (J&W)
8. “support for communication within a team” (J&W)
9. “provision of access to tools” (J&W)
10. “support project management” (J&W)
11. “collaborative annotation of data” (J&W)
12. “analysis and processing of data” (J&W)
13. “data and services that facilitate “remixing” with other data and
services” (J&W)
14. “architecture of participation” (J&W)
This rather long “double” list gives grounds for characterizing VREs as
online systems containing many different features relevant for the con-
duct of modern research. However, in some cases merely keeping to
the list above, or more precisely, keeping to the exact wording, would
give an oversimplified picture when we wish to discuss an online sys-
tem. For example, the first item on the list gives too broad a definition
of VRE: “Tools and technologies needed by researchers to do their re-
search” could refer to just about anything from blackboard and chalk
to computers and spaceships. Likewise, item 2, which requires that
the system enables researchers to “interact with other researchers (who
may come from different disciplines, institutions or even countries)”,
could be fulfilled by email. Conversely, simply sending an email clearly
does not count as making use of a virtual research environment; a key
element of a VRE is indeed research communication (item 8), but also
research collaboration, which is why email alone is not sufficient.
When discussing a system as a VRE, or arguing why a system per-
haps does not constitute a VRE, one should keep in mind that merely
holding one of the features of the list is not sufficient to qualify as a VRE
(which is why simply offering a digital library, or guiding researchers
on to other websites, does not qualify as a VRE (item 5)). Only when
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a system incorporates a selection of the items, does it qualify as a vir-
tual environment for eResearch. The key is that the different elements
together facilitate research (item 6), and thus the systemmust offer ways
of managing and analysing data (item 7, 9, 11, 12 and 13). Furthermore,
the system should support project management (item 10).
Note that the third item on the list suggest that a VRE should allow
research to take place ‘both locally and nationally’. Here we remark that
changing this to locally, nationally and globally seems better, as VREs are
online systems that can be used anywhere.
The fifth point (VREs being more than just digital libraries or gate-
ways) means that if we were merely looking at priorstudies.org and its
function as a gateway to The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies and The Nachlass
of A.N. Prior, we would not be dealing with a VRE. However, we shall
argue below that, as a whole, the PIR does much more than simply pro-
vide these points of entry.
Being global and transnational is all very well and good, but the
fourth item from the list demands that VREs also be sensitive to the
context of the research. Locality is also crucial. We interpret this as
meaning that VRE must be sensitive to the particular needs of the do-
main researchers using the VRE.
Finally, VREs operate with an “architecture of participation” (item
14). For the PIR, the drive to enter the lab is to study novel Prior ma-
terial, and the motivation to undertake the work of transcription seems
to be stimulated by being credited as a transcriber when, after peer re-
view, the document goes fromThe Virtual Lab for Prior Studies into The
Nachlass of A.N. Prior (we will say more about this later in the article).
Thus, in the interest of simplicity and compactness, we propose to
condense the previous “double” list down to the following items. A
VRE is an:
1. Online System, which facilitates
2. Research communication and research collaboration,
3. Data management and analysis, and
4. Project management, that works through a
5. Participation architecture.
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That is, we argue that a VRE should facilitate and integrate tools for
research communication and collaboration and in doing so it should of-
fer technologies for data management and analysis, be online accessible
and have a participation structure. This rather broad definition leaves
sufficient room different VREs to display different features depending
on the particular domain of eResearch.
Taken individually, the three different domains of the PIR do not
qualify as VREs. However, taken together the PIR does exhibit many
of the features that characterizing VREs. We will argue that the fact
that not all features are included, and some are only built-in to a limited
extent does not disqualify the PIR as a VRE. The “level of fulfilment”
should not be seen as binary yes or no, but be evaluated as a scale. Fur-
thermore, in the article “Information Professionals meet Arthur Prior”
(2018, [17]) it was argued that it is important for information profes-
sionals supporting domain groups to take an iHumanist approach, to
explore the particular needs of the domain group, and to develop the
online support system to reflect these needs. Bearing this inmind, let us
now consider in more detail why the PIR should be considered a VRE.
Let us start with item (a) from our five item summary list. Obvi-
ously, the PIR is an online system and thus has the first characteristic of
a VRE: the PIR can be accessed globally. That said, it is worth noticing
that the different domains of the PIR vary in openness (as discussed in
the previous section). While both Prior Studies andNachlass are publicly
accessible, The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies is restricted to assigned users.
This somewhatmutes the goal of enhancing access tomaterial on Prior’s
logic and philosophy.
Now for item (b). Research communication and research collabo-
ration are an important part of The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies, where
researchers ask for input, and comment on and discuss transcriptions.
An example of this is the interaction shown in Table 1 between two re-
searchers, where a user of The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies points out a
minor (but significant) mistake to the transcriber.
The example shows how researchers use the lab to facilitate discus-
sion and thereby collaborate on gaining knowledge from the archival
material. However, there are some obvious limitations: neither partic-
ipants nor administrators are notified when a question is posed, nor
when it is answered. Which is also demonstrated by the example by the
a big time lag between the initial comment and the response.
214
Table 1: Correspondence from The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies.
Researcher A:
– latest edit of comment: 09-01-2015 13:28:35 (GMT+1)
This letter is Sobociński’s explanation of two Leśniewski’s systems -
Ontology and Protothetic. The unusual notation which is used here
is explained in the footnotes 7 and 8. If you find it not sufficient or if
you find some mistake, please inform me. I will correct it.
In this letter Sobociński used merely Polish notation.
Researcher B:
– latest edit of comment: 10-06-2018 19:19:20 (GMT+1)
The formula in the second paragraph, CfpCfNpfp, has been tran-
scribed incorrectly. It should be CfpCfNpfq. The last symbol in the
formula is q , not p.
Record no. 1157
Title: Sobocinski to Prior 16.09.1953
Fetched by user Fatima Sabir
Recently, however, Prior Studies has started to expand its support
for a research community. Researchers and scholars are now invited
to join the network by creating a profile, which provides information
about their current work place and links to personal website. Such fea-
tures help to identify relevant researchers and potential collaborators
for studies of Prior’s work. Thus, the PIR does facilitate communication
and collaboration. Nonetheless, the facilities are still rather basic; for
example there is no chat forum. More remains to be done here.
Item (c) from our summary list says that a VRE should offer tools
for data management and analysis. Indeed, Jeffery and Wusteman ar-
gued that it should also facilitate “remixing” with different tools (Jef-
fery and Wusteman, 2012, p. 135, [26]). In our case, data is constituted
by the digital photographs of the archival material; here The Virtual Lab
for Prior Studies offers a structured way of accessing this material, and
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The Nachlass of A.N. Prior offers digitally enriched documents from the
Prior archive in Oxford and Aalborg. Also, before they enter The Virtual
Lab for Prior Studies, researchers can freely consult information about
the content of the Prior archive at the Bodleian Library using the list of
box contents compiled by Per Hasle. On Prior Studies one finds the cat-
egorizations “Box 1-11”, “Box 12-21”, “Box 22”, and “Box 23-29”. Here
researchers may find information like the following description of “Box
22”:
This box contains the fullmanuscript for Prior’s unpublished
book ‘TheCraft of Formal Logic’ (Finished in december 1951
and submitted to Clarendon Press 6/12/1951). A full over-
view of its contents is given in Craft-of-logic/table of con-
tents, and a description of its placewithin Prior’s authorship
is given at the related manuscript Items from a dictionary of
formal logic/box 6.
A part of the manuscript has been published as The Doc-
trine of Propositions and Terms, ed. by P.T. Geach and A.J.P.
Kenny. University ofMassachusett [sic] Press, Amherst, 1976
(1976a).
Prior’s work on ‘The Craft of Formal Logic’ is described
in Kenny 1970 as well as in the introduction to ’The Doc-
trine of Propositions and Terms’ (the latter overlaps some-
whatwithKenny 1970, but naturally also adds some details).
From ’TheCraft of Formal Logic’ the book brings Part I, chap-
ter 1 and 2, and Part IV, chapter 1–3; these five chapters to-
gether ”make up a self-contained account of the traditional
doctrine of propositions and terms” (Geach and Kenny’s In-
troduction, p. 9).
The manuscript found in box 22 is a gift from J. L. Mackie
(no full copy was found among Prior’s own papers after his
death in 1969).
P. 549 and p. 600 are missing.
— Per Hasle
(www.priorstudies.org)
Information of this sort, describing the content of the box, provides re-
searchers with a starting point for determining which documents in the
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Virtual Lab that might be relevant to her/his research interests. In some
cases, however, the information about the boxes are rather limited, like
the one for “Box 20”:
1) Scott, Dana: Advice onModal Logic. 1968. MS 71 p. Later
published in volume ed. by K. Lambert.
2) Scott, Dana: Formalizing Intensional Notions. 1968. MS
71 p.
3) Scott, Dana: The Logic of Tenses. Dec. 1965. MS 8 p.
4) Scott, Dana: A Proof of The Independence of the Contin-
uum Hypothesis. Stanford University. 1966.
5) Segerberg, Krister, Modal Logic Based on a Three-valued
Logic. MS 12 p. Published in Theoria 1967.
6) Sellars, W.,The Identity Approach to theMind Body Prob-
lem. MS 21 p. 1963.
7) Sellars, W.,The Intentional Realism of Everett Hall. MS 22
p.
8) Sellars, W.,Theoretical Explanation. MS 17 p.
9) Sengupta, S.S., Schotch, P., Czarny,P., Relevance: A Logic
and a Calculus, University of Waterloo
10) Shwayder, David, Appendix On Time and Tense, p.200-
267. MS. […]
(https://www.priorstudies.org)
Thus, in the case of “Box 20”, researchers merely have a list of titles
to help them whether or not the material is relevant for study and tran-
scription. As with the tools for communication and collaboration, how-
ever, the tools offered for data management and analysis are rather
simple, for example it would be useful if registered users could add fur-
ther comments on the items listed or perhaps remix by drawing atten-
tion to other items. But such options are not yet available.
Item (d) on our list is that VREs are tools for facilitating project
management. In The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies; data is organized us-
ing a color system. Thus, documents that are in the process of being
transcribed are marked with red; the document is locked by the tran-
scriber (though the administrators can still access it). Data that has
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been transcribed, but is still awaiting proofreading is marked yellow.
Finally, documents that are both transcribed, proofread and published
in The Nachlass of A.N. Prior are marked green in The Virtual Lab for Prior
Studies. This very simple marking system offers gives a basic indica-
tion of progress on individual documents, but to claim that it qualify as
“facilitation of project management” seems rather generous. The list of
box content on Prior Studies also offers some overview of available data,
but as has already mentioned, the level of detail and usability could be
significantly improved. Data management is also part of The Nachlass of
A.N. Prior, but only in the sense that researchers can explore transcribed
documents through keyword search.
Finally, we come to item (e): that a VRE should work through a par-
ticipation architecture, meaning that the system should facilitate user
contribution. In the case of the PIR, the architecture of participation is
built into The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies, and one of the incentives it
offers is both powerful and interesting.
While one incentive to work in The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies and
transcribematerialmight be the altruistic goal ofmaking the philosophy
and logic of Prior more accessible, the often time consuming work of
reading and transcribing is demanding. The accrediting of researchers
for this labor seem to be a key building block in the architecture of par-
ticipation; so to speak, the altruistic goal is nudged by the reward of
recognition.
While it is possible to merely study the material in The Virtual Lab
for Prior Studies, the incentive to go further and undertake the work of
transcribing the material is fostered by researchers being credited with
the effort. An example from Nachlass is the following, where David
Jakobsen and Martin Prior are credited for the transcription of “Letter
from J.J.C. Smart to A.N. Prior, October 9, 1951” [36] with the help from
Martin Prior in the following manner:
Editor’s note: The letter is in the Prior archive box 3 at the
Bodleian Library in Oxford and has been transcribed and
commented by David Jakobsen and Martin Prior.
However, another more scholarly incentive to participate (and perhaps
the most powerful one) is the opportunity to discover interesting, per-
haps even completely new, material on Prior, or to discover novel links
between the data. That is, in our view, a key incentive to participate
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in the VRE is the opportunity to explore data and make serendipitous
discoveries. This is a point we will pursue in the following sections.
Our discussion of the PIR considered as a candidate VRE is summa-
rized in Table 2:
Table 2: Elements of VREs in the PIR.
Elements of VREs PS VL NL
Online System X X X
Research communication and research
collaboration
(X) X ×
Data management and analysis (X) X (X)
Participation architecture × X ×
Project Management × × ×
Legend: PS = Prior Studies, VL = Virtual Lab, NL = Nachlass.
X= Fully implemented. (X) = Partially implemented.
× = Not implemented.
4 Digital humanities: from searching to exploring
Now that we have isolated five key elements for VREs (they are on-
line systems, facilitating research communication and collaboration, en-
abling data and project management, and fostering participation), and
discussed their relevance and degree of realization in the current PIR,
we turn to consider the PIR from the perspective of the digital humani-
ties. This discussion takes as its point of departure an ongoingparadigm
shift in information science: the move from searchability to explorabil-
ity. The former has its roots in the what we have called the needy-
user paradigm, which still largely characterizes the pre-digital humanities
approach to VREs; the latter, explorability, acknowledges a more open,
even experimental research landscape in digital humanities which is
no longer driven by information needs and knowledge gaps alone. By
shifting the focus from the searchability of digital resources to the ex-
plorability of digital objects in eResearch, tangible consequences for the
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developmental goals of VREs in general and the PIR in particular are
emerging.
There have been numerous attempts to define digital humanities
(see, for example, the collection of definitions in Terras, Nyhan, and
Vanhoutte 2013b, [38]) and much work in the area focuses on enumer-
ating concrete digital projects and digitization initiatives, which in some
way are supposed to define the area (Deegan and McCarty 2012, [14];
Flanders 2012, [18]; Hockey 2012, [25]; Warwick, Terras, and Nyhan
2012, [40]). However, this extensional strategy (defining by enumerat-
ing exemplars of a class) is not a shortcut to determining the essential
property the exemplars have in common (the intensional approach to
definition). Knowledge of such a property (or a set of properties)might
prompt richer understandings of the digital humanities.
An early and frequently cited paper by Unsworth can be seen as a
first step towards such an intensional definition (Unsworth 2013, [39]).
Drawing on still earlier work by Davies Shrobe, and Szolovits (1993,
[13]), Unsworth describes ‘doing digital humanities’ (or humanities
computing as the current term was at that time) as a special practice
of knowledge representation. He proposes viewing ‘digital humanities’
as a kind of attribute, a property all digital resources have, more or less,
to a certain degree. His exemplification implicitly suggests a scaling of
what it means for a digital system to be digital humanities-like. In full,
his charlatanism-argument goes like this:
[D]egree matters, and one way in which that degree can be
measured is by the interactivity offered to users whowish to
frame their own research questions. If there is none offered,
and no interactivity, then the project is probably pure char-
latanism. If it offers some (say, keyword searching), then
it can be taken a bit more seriously. If it offers structured
searching, a bit more so. If it offers combinatorial queries,
more so. If it allows you to change parameters and values
in order to produce new models, it starts to look very much
like something that must be built on a thoroughgoing repre-
sentation. If it lets you introduce new algorithms for calcu-
lating the outcomes of changed parameters and values, then
it is extremely well designed indeed.
(Unsworth 2013, p. 37, [39])
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We can extract three main stages from this citation, two of which are
rather straightforward (stages 1 and 2), one rather less so (stage 3):
1. Digital humanities and interactivity go together: the more inter-
active, the more digital humanities-like the system is.
2. Digital humanitiesmeans, amongother things, searching: themore
sophisticated the search options are, the more digital humanities-
like the system is.
3. Digital humanities enables system manipulation (we propose an-
other term below): the larger the researcher’s possibilities are to
modify the system (for example, to change parameters and intro-
duce new algorithms), the more digital humanities-like the sys-
tem is.
Interactivity (1) is a popular and comprehensive concept in informa-
tion science (Borlund 2013, [6]; Ruthven and Kelly 2011, [32]), human-
computer interaction (Lazar, Feng, and Hochheiser 2010, [29]),
computer-mediated communication (Herring, Stein, and Virtanen 2013,
[22]) and established disciplines such as psychology and sociology
(Kiousis 2002, [27]). Searchability (2), however, seems to be the exclu-
sive domain of information science (Case and Given 2016, [11]). How-
ever, compared with stages 1 and 2, stage 3 seems far more nebulous.
Nonetheless, we find a further hint of what Unsworth means by it in a
remark a few sentences later:
But you see the principle implied by this scale – the more
room a resource offers for the exercise of independent imag-
ination and curiosity, the more substantially well thought-
out, well designed, and well produced a resource it must be.
(Unsworth 2013, p. 38, [39])
Here Unsworth makes the move from digital humanities-like systems
to the digital humanist her/himself. Digital humanities is something
practiced by researchers with “independent imagination and curiosity”.
This shift in perspective comes with a shift in focus: needs-triggered
search behavior moves to the background, while in the foreground we
instead have researchers engaging with a digital system, driven by ex-
ploration and curiosity to discover something unexpected.
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Information science has traditionally been allied with stage 2 rather
than with stage 3. The challenge for a search-centred information sci-
ence (and the agenda of information professionals guided by this the-
ory) is its reliance on the scenario of an ‘information need’, perpetuating
the picture of the ‘needy’ individual who is urged to apply information
seeking strategies (or seek professional assistance) to meet these needs
(Batley 2005, [2]; Beghtol 1986, [4]; Borlund 2013, [6]; Case 2012, [10];
Cooper 1971, [12]; Derr 1983, [15]; Limberg, Sundin, and Talja 2012,
[30]; Wilson 1981, [41]).9 No doubt, the needy-user concept has its
legitimacy and merits in many areas of information scientific investiga-
tion and practical work. It is by no means an irrelevant or inappropri-
ate scenario: historically, the need for information and the actions we
take to obtain information is a basic human condition (Sandstrom 1994,
1999, [33-34]). However, in a digital humanities context, the needy-user
paradigm seems somewhat conservative: it evokes a set of traditional
professional values drawn from information science. These values do
not seem to adequately reflect the conditions found in eResearch.
The traditional idea of information as information-about (Beghtol 1986,
[4]), which is linked to the concept of information systems as secondary
supportive resources that are encoded in searchable knowledge orga-
nizing systems, has given way in the digital humanities to the idea of
information as a digital research object in its own right. Accordingly, in-
formation systems such as research databases (Hider 2012, [23]) are no
longer regarded as shortcuts to information somewhere external to the
system or ‘signposts’ to knowledge about the outer world; they are to a
higher degree viewed as explorative structures which lend themselves
directly to research-related investigation.
Turning to the case of the Nachlass and Prior’s digitized papers, by
exploring whole networks of digital records of his handwritten works
(letters, draft papers and so on) research questions can be inspired by
information that exists exclusively in digital form. There may be nodes
connecting several drafts of a manuscript with recurring concepts de-
9The focus on the needy-user and the overemphasis of searchability in system de-
sign furthers the tendency to interpret researchers’ actual digital explorative activities
from stage 3 as stage 2 search activities. Resulting misfits can then lead to information
systems that still are primarily designed for information search, although researchers
approach thempracticallywithout pronounced information needs. Therefore, wemake
the point in this paper that we need systems more designed for explorability, and less
for searchability, in the digital humanities.
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veloped in series of letters, or nodes indicating changes in Prior’s philo-
sophical concept of determinism in the light of critical feedback he
received. Notions such as ‘access to the letters’ or ‘information on this
or that logical concept’ are then not the only ways to address a Prior
scholar’s research interests in a digital context. Consequently, Prior re-
searchers’ motivations for using the PIR do not arise solely, or even pri-
marily, from the information gaps they might have experienced. Far
from being needy, they are curious, experimental, and fond of discov-
ery. This perspective offers an alternative account of Prior researchers’
motivation to becoming involved in the lengthy and difficult transcrip-
tion process.
5 Explorability and serendipity
Serendipity occurs when a researcher discovers something interesting
by chance; the discovery was not planned or specifically sought out
(Björneborn 2017, [5]; Foster and Ellis 2014, [19]). At first glance it may
seem that there is a tension between serendipity and the more system-
atic, anticipatory and expectant attitude of the researcher. Moreover,
it may seem that the very idea of serendipity (which emphasizes the
idea of pure chance) is further attenuated when purposeful research ac-
tivities in digital environments (of the sort conducted in the PIR) are
discussed. But these tensions seem resolvable. Indeed, the tension be-
tween purposeful explorations versus serendipitous findings resonates
well with a well established characterization of serendipity as a kind of
research strategy opposed to pure change discovery. This connection
had already been noted in Cannon’s book The Way of an Investigator in
1945 (Cannon 1945, [8]), as Foster and Ellis note (Foster and Ellis 2014,
[19]). In the book, Cannon (referring to the well-known dictum due to
Pasteur: chance favors only the prepared mind) identifies researchers’ pre-
pared minds as the feature which distinguishes chance discovery from
serendipitous findings (Foster and Ellis 2014, [19]). In more concrete
terms: the researcher observes a surprising datum, evaluates its signifi-
cance, and uses it eventually in theoretical reflection and new hypothe-
ses (Foster and Ellis 2014, [19]).
We might say that both serendipity and explorability cover central
phenomena in the digital humanities, but emphasize different aspects of
eResearchers: the notion of serendipityputs focus on themore emotional,
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psychological attributes of digital humanists involved such as inventive,
imaginative, curious, while explorability highlights the systematic, exper-
imental nature in achieving serendipitous experiences. This interdepen-
dent relationship between serendipity and explorability highlights the
combination of the systematic-exploratory attitude of researchers and the
more accidental nature of the resulting event in which something unex-
pected is found. Exploring and having a serendipitous experience are
not the same, but they are connected.
What makes exploring attractive for researchers is the possibility of
serendipity; what makes systematic exploring particularly attractive for
researchers is that the probability of achieving more than one serendip-
itous discovery is increased; and, last but not least, what makes the ‘sur-
prising’, ‘emotional’ element in serendipity compatiblewith the planned,
rational systematic exploration, is the condition of a ‘prepared mind’ in
scientific serendipity (Foster and Ellis 2014, [19]). By connecting ex-
plorability to the notion of serendipity and exploiting the strong inter-
dependencies between these two concepts, we can get a clearer picture
what happens when researchers engage with a digital resource.
In digital humanities there is a close connection of exploring a digital
resource and serendipitously encountering an interesting piece of infor-
mation. It thus surprises that serendipity is not explicitly treated as a
topic in three milestone publications on the digital humanities, namely
the volumeDebates in TheDigitalHumanities (Gold 2012, [21]), the partly
retrospective reader Defining Digital Humanities (Terras, Nyhan, and
Vanhoutte 2013a, [37]), and themost recent handbookANewCompanion
to Digital Humanities (Schreibman, Siemens, and Unsworth 2016, [35]).
The potential of serendipity as an informational concept in the digital
humanities does not seem to have been noted, yet alone fully explored.
As far as we are aware both the link between explorability and serendip-
ity on the one hand, and between serendipity/explorability and the dig-
ital humanities on the other (as targeted at by Unsworth) have not been
previously noted.
How to build explorability features into eResearch systems in a way
that encourages serendipitous discoveries is a difficult topic and one we
cannot discuss in detail here. However, based on a selective literature
review of influential studies of serendipity and exploration phenomena
(Bawden 1986, [3]; Björneborn 2017, [5]; Foster and Ford 2003, [20];
Unsworth 2013, [39])wefind that serendipity and explorability features
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are a matter of how the digital researcher interacts with a system (1, In-
terface & search features), how she/he moves around in it (2, Naviga-
tion features), which content she/he is confrontedwith at several stages
of her/his interaction (3, Content presentation), what the underlying
representational characteristics of information items are like (4, Meta-
data structure), how prepared and open the systems is for interaction
with researchers with different disciplinary backgrounds (5, Interdis-
ciplinary features), and the degree to which a researcher can manip-
ulate system features her/himself (6, User engagement). Thus, based
on this review, we tentatively point to six design categories, that may
guide us towards building VREs in a way that reflects a move from a
searchability-paradigm to an explorability-paradigm and enhances the
chance of serendipitous discoveries:
1. Interface & search features (Bawden; Foster and Ford; Unsworth)
2. Navigation features (Björneborn)
3. Content presentation (Bawden; Björneborn)
4. Metadata structure (Bawden; Foster and Ford)
5. Interdisciplinary features (Bawden; Foster and Ford)
6. User engagement (Bawden)
This list reflects six areas that have been identified by research as being
relevant for systems’ explorability and hence to enhance the chances of
serendipitous discoveries. These six categories are not clear-cut, nor are
they exhaustive or mutually exclusive, andmore work needs to be done
on examining them individually and the links between them. Thus,
these six categories are, beyond their heuristic value for further discus-
sions, also hypotheses as to which system aspects have an impact on
researchers’ explorative behavior.
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6 Conclusion
We have argued that while significant work has been conducted to en-
hance the Prior Internet Resources (PIR) as a resource that will foster
research and expand knowledge on Prior’s logic and philosophy, fur-
ther developmental issues can be identified by thinking systematically
about virtual research environments (VREs) and the digital humanities.
Following a discussion of VRE-theory, we argued that the PIR qualifies
as a VRE, but also suggested that it could be improved by incorporat-
ing better tools for research communication and research collaboration,
and adding tools for project management. Furthermore, we argued that
the architecture for participation could be enhanced. Here we have sug-
gested that a fruitful way to approach this developmental issue might
be to include the notions of serendipity and explorability, which we re-
gard as central to the digital humanities. Based on a literature review
of influential selected contributions to the notions of explorability and
serendipity, we suggest that further developments of the PIR should fo-
cus on six areas of system design and information architecture: 1) Inter-
face & search features, 2) Navigation features, 3) Content presentation,
4)Metadata structure, 5) Interdisciplinary features, and 6)User engage-
ment. This list calls for further research, but for the moment we argued
that it offers a tentative program for the development of an enhanced ex-
plorability and a user-centered, serendipitous system that invites Prior
researchers’ open, prepared, and curious minds, thus making pioneer-
ing discoveries in the eArchives of Prior more likely.
We should admit that there is a risk here. When discussing and de-
signing VREs, Jeffery and Wusteman warn that one should be aware of
the danger of trying to put too many features into a VRE:
The temptation for software developers to reinvent thewheel
is often overwhelming. The wish to create a “perfect” appli-
cation for a perceived need can over-ride the option of adopt-
ing a good-enough, widely-supported and simpler solution.
Commonly, such developments result in either a replication
of existing software with very little added value or software
which exhibits some added value but supports only a subset
of the functionality of existing products. Academic-related
software has appeared particularly prone to this syndrome.
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(Jeffery and Wusteman 2012, p. 136, [26])
The fundamental problem of such an endeavour is that one risks com-
promising integration in the VRE; toomany functionswithout clear and
central purposes risk hindering researchers’ use of the VRE. Therefore,
theVRE should focus on integrating tools researchers alreadyuse. How-
ever, such an approach might also limit the VRE significantly in a way
that does not enable researchers to gain the all the benefits that theworld
of VREs offers (Jeffery and Wusteman 2012, p. 137, [26]).
Clearly, we want to avoid this danger in the case of the PIR. We be-
lieve that thinking about its development in terms of the higher-level
concepts of serendipity and explorability will help us to do so. A sig-
nificant purpose of the PIR is to help researchers explore the logic and
philosophy of Prior by enabling restricted, but significantly easier access
relevantmaterial through an eAchieve. Although researchers and schol-
ars may enter The Virtual Lab for Prior Studies with the altruistic goal of
making Priors logic and philosophymore accessible to a wider public, a
significant motivation for participating in The Virtual Lab for Prior Stud-
ies is to discover material relevant for their own research. Like all other
researchers, they enter the archive to discover new questions, ideas, an-
swers and inspirations. In such an endeavour, serendipity seems vital
and might be nurtured by an architecture that encourages explorability.
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This is a second volume of papers discussing the history of Arthur 
Prior’s life and work and the philosophical themes he introduced or 
elaborated. Many of them draw inspiration from his rich and varied 
contributions to logic. The second volume draws on material presented 
at two conferences: one held in Copenhagen from 22nd-24th November 
2017, and a shorter event held at Roskilde University on 2nd March 
2018 as part of the Annual Meeting of the Danish Philosophical Society. 
Both meetings were organized as part of the Danish Research Council 
(DFF) project The Primacy of Tense: A. N: Prior Now and Then.
